THE CHRISTIAN FAITH


Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library

https://archive.org/details/christianfaithse00unse

LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
NOV 21 1922
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

A SERIES OF ESSAYS FOR THE USE OF PARENTS AND TEACHERS WRITTEN AT THE INSTANCE OF THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE SOCIETY

EDITED BY

C. F. NOLLOTH, M.A., D.Litt.

HON. FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD;
EXAMINING CHAPLAIN TO THE BISHOP OF ROCHESTER

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1922

All rights reserved

PREFACE

THE series of essays contained in this volume has been written at the request of the Committee of the Christian Evidence Society.*

That Society exists, according to its sub-title, "for the study, proclamation, and defence of Christian Truth." It works on inter-denominational lines, for it deals with the fundamental verities of our religion. It is perhaps best known through the addresses which are given, both by clergy and laymen throughout the year, from platforms in the parks and open spaces of London.

The Society is also largely occupied in dealing with the requirements of people of good education. Courses of lectures are given in churches and colleges in London and other great towns. Certain classes of people who have special difficulties to meet, or responsibilities to bear, are considered. Thus, in the present volume, the help and guidance of parents and teachers in the religious instruction of their children or pupils is the object in view.

* Offices: 33 and 34, Craven Street, Strand, W.C. 2. Hon. Secretary, the Rev. C. L. Drawbridge, M.A.

The authors of the following essays have written independently of one another. There has been no previous conference for the exchange of thought. Each writer is responsible for what is contained in his own contribution, and for that alone. The subjects treated are thus regarded from different points of view. But it is believed that, although the writers occasionally differ in their way of dealing with matters of some importance, the consistency of the book as a whole does not suffer, while it gains in directness of treatment, everyone feeling untrammelled by consideration of the opinions of his fellow-essayists.

One result of the stress and strain of recent years has been to draw increased attention to the need of soundness of method in the education of boys and girls in all classes of the community.

In no department of teaching is the use of right method more desirable than in that of religion.

Two chief factors in the making of a good teacher are adequate knowledge of the subject and the gift of imparting it in such a way as to ensure its reception by the pupil.

There is also the factor of personal influence—that indefinable force which lays hold of the impulses and the will of another and bends them in the desired direction. It was this gift that, more than anything else, was the secret of Dr.

Arnold's power at Rugby. When the Provost of Oriel, Dr. Hawkins, wrote to the trustees of the school in support of Arnold's candidature for the headmastership, he said that, if Arnold were appointed, he would "change the face of education all through the public schools of England." This remarkable forecast was literally fulfilled. The beginning of a more rational system in the training of boys dates from Arnold's appointment, however slowly it was destined to prevail in the country generally. Education was seen to be not so much the imparting of certain items of knowledge, or even the conveying of sound principles of thought. Rather it meant the drawing out of the pupil's latent powers, inviting the exercise of his own resources, stirring up whatever gift was in him.

But the improvement of method in education has reacted upon the parent, with the result that, in many cases, too much is left to the teacher, and the parent's sense of personal responsibility is weakened. There is a feeling that it is the teacher's business. The call of work or pleasure is more and more withdrawing from children the direct solicitude and care of the parent, with much loss to both. For, after all, the natural guide and mentor is the parent, and there is much in the spiritual and moral training of the young which no one else can do so well.

One aim of these essays is to provide guidance and help for parents who are alive to their duty; who, while necessarily leaving much to the teacher in the way of definite and systematic instruction, feel that there is much which they cannot leave, but in which they must themselves take part if they are to be true to their parental vocation.

Then, as regards the teacher. It is the aim of the present volume to suggest what, in the opinion of the writers, are the right points of view from which he should regard the subject-matter of his religious teaching. His task has its own special difficulties. The personal element is far more in evidence than in other branches of education. Force of character, strength of conviction, sincerity of feeling—or their absence—tell here, as nowhere else in the whole field of instruction. If the spiritual element is all-important, the subject-matter of the teaching is hardly less so. It matters greatly that children should be so taught the facts and truths of religion that, however widely their outlook is extended when they grow up, they may not have to unlearn what they were taught when young. While they are encouraged to prove as far as possible out of their own life the truth of what they are taught, nothing should be presented to them which has not stood the test of time and experience. It is

no occasion for mere experiment, for airing new ideas. Freshness of thought is eminently desirable; but it must not be at the cost of accuracy in substance and expression. A capable teacher will keep his mind always open to new light. But he will teach what has been proved by an experience wider than his own. The Christian Faith, as it passes down succeeding generations, receives fresh illustration from new sources of knowledge. But, in itself, it does not change. What it needs is restatement in view of the requirements of a changing time, fresh interpretation to meet the new questionings that arise in an altered world and in social conditions unknown before.

The majority of the following essays are by acknowledged masters of their subject. It is hoped that the book will be both a help and an encouragement to those who are entrusted with the sacred task of instructing our boys and girls in the knowledge and the practice of the Christian Faith.

C. F. N.

OXFORD,
April, 1922.

CONTENTS

PREFACE - - - - - *Page* v

I

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

By Clement C. J. Webb, M.A.,

Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews); Oriel Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion in the University of Oxford; Fellow of Magdalen College.

Philosophy a characteristic human interest. Religion precedes Philosophy, and is concerned with the same object. Hence tension between them is inevitable, and this must be allowed for in the terms upon which alone they can live together. Neither can ultimately take the place of the other, and both are necessary to human life as a whole.

The philosophical difficulties special to Christianity distinguish it as a peculiarly philosophical religion. Its relations with Philosophy throughout its history have been intimate, and its services to Philosophy great, both in insisting on features of experience which Philosophy has been tempted to neglect, and in calling particular attention to problems of general philosophical interest. But Christianity must not be regarded as imposing any special philosophy upon its adherents, or as forbidding them to explore the possibilities of any line of thought whatever.

The paper closes with some practical suggestions as to the right way of dealing with the religious perplexities of children and young persons - - - - - *Page* 1

II

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS

By H. U. Weitbrecht Stanton, Ph.D., D.D.,
Warden of St. Catherine's House, Highbury; Commissary to the Bishop of Lahore.

Investigation of world religions and rise of Comparative Science of Religion. Progress in research enables us to view religion as a whole in its essential unity. Is this consistent with the uniqueness of Christianity? To answer this, consider the origin, process, and aim of religion.

1 *The Origin of Religion.*—(*a*) Supposed by some to be discoverable in the most primitive forms of religion known as Animism, a dim idea of a soul in men and things leading to propitiation of ghosts and spirits, and on a higher stage to worship of ancestors and powers of nature. (*b*) Among animists also a belief in a Supreme Being general, but He is remote and harmless, and religious observance is devoted to propitiation of malign beings, a sign rather of deterioration from a nobler ideal than of progress to a higher. (*c*) Sacrifice and sacrificial feasts in Animism offer partial analogies to Christian rites. But these analogies are rightly understood, not from the embryonic stage, but from that of maturity, as a reaching out of the human soul to the adequate revelation of God and communication of His life.

2. *The Process of Religion.*—No classification of religions accurately fits the growth of every one. Apply this to the widely spread theory of evolution as explaining religious development. (*a*) Supposed to depend on heredity and environment, therefore each several religion best suited to the stage of development of its professors. Why try to change it? (*b*) The religious demands of conscience regarded as themselves the product of evolution, adapting conduct to the needs of society; good = pro-social, bad = anti-social: radical disturbance of the balance injurious. (*c*) Evolution not a force which governs things, but a theory which tries to explain them. To be tested by facts. Religion in many cases develops contrary to environment or heredity. (*d*) Conscience is the persistent demand of the soul for a supreme standard of moral values which on occasion overrides purely social values. Contrariety to that supreme standard is sin, and the deliverance from this universal defect is universally applicable.

3. *The Aim of Religion.*—Common idea that belief matters little if conduct is decent, or that the crude popular religions all lead up to the one absolute religion. But different religions clearly give very different ideas of God, and therefore different conceptions of the moral standard of perfection. To be like God is the supreme aim of religion. That depends on the facts of His self-revelation in Christ which are to be truly apprehended, whole-heartedly embodied in life, and proclaimed to the world
Page 24

III

THE BIBLE AND SCIENCE

By W. M. Bell, B.D. (Lond.).

The conflict between religion and science still survives among the masses; religion is still defended by antiquated arguments, and misunderstanding is caused by Bible teaching being separated from definite Christian teaching.

Wrong Methods of dealing with the Situation.

(*a*) Separation of scriptural and scientific knowledge is attempted, but is impossible in practice.

(*b*) "Reconciliation" of discrepancies between the Bible and science has been tried after the old manner of reconciling all discordant passages in Scripture itself, and is equally impossible.

General Principles.

1. *Purpose of the Bible.*—It is a religious book not meant to teach science, but religion. St. Paul's view of its purpose.

2. *The Nature of Inspiration.*—The sacred writers, inspired to see truth about God, were not rendered incapable of error—*e.g.*, Amos proclaimed a grand religious truth, but was mistaken in secular matters.

3. *The Bible the Record of a Revelation.*—Its stages summarized.

Particular Cases.

(*a*) *The Creation Story.*—Its religious message and how to teach it in conformity with science.

(*b*) *Jonah.*—The religious value of the story as a missionary lesson.

The idea of the Bible as the record of a revelation is in accordance with the humble origin of man as taught by science. These views not repugnant to Church tradition *Page* 45

IV

THE RELIGIOUS VALUE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

By R. H. Kennett, D.D.,

Canon of Ely; Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Cambridge; Fellow of Queen's College.

Our Lord's attitude towards the Old Testament in relation to—

(1) History; (2) morality; (3) ritual; (4) theology; (5) national hopes.

Futility of attempting to maintain the doctrine of the inerrancy of all Scripture.

In order to understand the Old Testament, a study of the history of the Israelite people is of primary importance.

The stories of the earliest reputed ancestors of Israel are coloured by Canaanite tradition.

The tradition of the time of Moses preserved by the great pre-exilic prophets differs from the account contained in the Pentateuch.

The pre-exilic prophets deny that sacrifice was offered during the sojourn in the wilderness.

Moses himself and those born during his leadership are said to have been uncircumcised.

The great prophets were monotheists and apparently monogamists.

The conquest of Palestine; fusion of Israelites and Canaanites.

Characteristics of Canaanite religion.

Successive attempts to purge the religion of Jehovah from the worst Canaanite elements which had become associated with it.

The present value of the Old Testament, not only as containing a record of an age-long struggle to separate the true from the false, but also for its example in faith and in worship.

Parabolic use of Old Testament stories.

A study of the Old Testament necessary in order to understand the idiom of the New Testament - - - *Page* 60

V

THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY

By R. Webb-Odell, B.A.,
Vicar of St. John the Baptist, Enfield.

The fact of the Resurrection to be distinguished from the details of its record.

The Church's belief in the Resurrection primitive, universal, empowering. "Delusion theories" pessimistic, inadequate, and based upon an obsolete science. That Christ really rose the only rational solution of the problem of Christian origins.

This the central evidence for the faith.

Other evidences for which sceptics have to account.

1. The Jesus of the evangelic history.

He is—

(*a*) Living.
(*b*) Inexplicable.
(*c*) Sinless.
(*d*) In, yet not of, His age.
(*e*) Inclusive of all perfection.

Either "unlearned and ignorant men" have accomplished a literary miracle *or* the Gospel story is substantially true.

2. The witness of the Saints through the centuries.

They witness to a power—

(*a*) Uniform.
(*b*) Objective.
(*c*) Transforming.
(*d*) Open to all.

Personal inexperience of this power no argument against its existence.

3. The evidence from the Church's history.

(*a*) It survived the fall of Jerusalem, the postponement of the end, the break-up of the Empire, the schisms in the East and West.
(*b*) It has assimilated the new learning.
(*c*) It has been the unique agency for social reform.
(*d*) It alone presents an ecumenical faith.

Yet it springs from a Galilean peasant.

4. The evidence from Christian doctrine and modern thought.

(*a*) "Repugnance to reality," and the Fall.
(*b*) Pain and the goodness of creation; pain and sin; pain and the Cross.

(*c*) The unknowable God of physical science, and the known Christ.

(*d*) God, revealed as Trinity, is love, is a social unity, is in man.

Modern needs anticipated in the Gospel.

The burden of proof on those who oppose, not on those who hold, the historic Faith - - - - *Page* 91

VI

THE NEW TESTAMENT RECORD

By Arthur S. Peake, M.A., D.D.,

Hon. D.D., Oxford and Aberdeen; Rylands Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester; formerly Fellow of Merton College.

Christianity is inseparably associated with history. If the Gospels were demonstrated to be entirely fictitious they would retain much value, but Christianity could not survive the demonstration. The alliance with history must be accepted, though it creates grave difficulties. Principles which must guide our investigation. The historicity of Jesus may be proved without appeal to the Christian documents. Since the Jewish law affirmed crucifixion to be an accursed death, the story of a crucified Messiah cannot have been invented. Hence such an abnormal development of Jewish Messianic dogma can be explained only by the actual crucifixion of a man whom His followers regarded as Messiah. Their belief must have been formed in His lifetime with His knowledge and approval. We have documentary evidence, both non-Christian, especially Tacitus, and Christian, for Jesus as the Founder of Christianity and His execution. The Christian records are entitled to a hearing with all proper precautions. Generally accepted results in the criticism of the Pauline Epistles and the Synoptic Gospels. Features in the Gospels which cannot have been invented. The question of miracles. We cannot settle the problem without reference to the Person of whom they are recorded. Forces which tended to modify the strict accuracy of the Gospel record. The Gospels give us what it is vital for us to know—a vivid conception of the Personality of Jesus, a trustworthy account of His teaching, a knowledge of the critical events. The first of these is of supreme importance. The "eschatological theory" gives a very one-sided view. The problem of "Jesus and Paul": Did the Apostle fatally pervert the simple theology and ethic of Jesus into a mythology? He could not, in face of the denial of his right to represent Christianity, have failed to famil-

iarize himself with the teaching of Jesus, and his Christology created no controversy in the Church. Nor need we argue that the primitive Christians applied to Jesus a pre-Christian Messianic dogma. Jesus believed Himself to be the Messiah, the pre-existent Son of Man, the suffering Servant of Yahweh, to stand above angels and men in a unique relation to God. His consciousness of the nature of His Personality and mission is decisive for us, and finds confirmation in the presentation of Him in the Gospels and in the experience of His followers

Page 115

VII

JESUS CHRIST

By C. F. Nolloth, M.A., D.Litt.,

Hon. Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Rochester.

The question of the crowd on Christ's entry to Jerusalem one of identity, "Who is this?" Does the answer then given still suffice?

Growth in apprehension of Christ gradual.

We have to enquire:

1. What Christ said about Himself.

2. What His followers thought about Him.

1. He accepted the title of Messiah when applied to Him, but preferred to speak of Himself as Son of Man.

It is certain that He regarded Himself as "the Son of God" in a special sense.

His consciousness of Sonship was shown in various ways: (*a*) Full knowledge of the Father; (*b*) infallibility in divine things; (*c*) the assumptions which pervade His teaching; (*d*) His claim of sinlessness; (*e*) Unique self-assertiveness.

History has sanctioned His claim. Existence of the Church proves its acceptance of it, not on the ground of His teaching merely. Influence of the Cross and the Resurrection.

2. Perception of the disciples. The Gospel of the Apostolic Church was from the first the Gospel of a divine Saviour. St. Peter's preaching, St. Paul, St. John.

The Personality of Christ divine. His true humanity. The reconciliation of what seemed incompatible not attempted by the primitive Church.

Faith and experience came first. Theology, as a body of reasoned knowledge, followed.

Present-day conditions. Certainty - - *Page* 139

VIII

THE ETHICS OF CHRIST

By Percy Gardner, D.Litt.,

Professor of Classical Archæology in the University of Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy; Corresponding Member of the Institute of France and of the Academies of Sciences of Prussia and Göttingen.

The foundation of ethics laid down by Christ: first, love of God; and second, love of man. Both principles to be found in the Old Testament in essence, but raised to a new level in the New. The fresh revelation of God's love. The love of God as applied to the modern world opposed to secularity. The latter believes in the reformation of life by action from without, and the promotion of comfort; the former teaches that life develops from within, and urges the transmuting of society by ideals. The love of God may really be present where God is not recognized. Often men give out trivial reasons for conduct which is really inspired by higher motives.

In the earliest Christianity no code of morals; only principles. But the working of the spirit of Christ soon produced a visible society and a code for conduct. The first great organizer of Christian ethics was St. Paul, who carried on his Master's work. Sometimes, however, St. Paul misled by temporary conditions. At the Reformation most of the Catholic ethics preserved. Modern attempts to supersede it have been negative, and their success only momentary.

Modern attempt to go back to the letter of the Sermon on the Mount not self-consistent nor compatible with organized society. Need rather for an adaptation of it to permanent conditions. It has to be taken in conjunction with the precept to judge beliefs by their fruits. It is chiefly in the estimate of values that modern Christianity differs from materialist Utilitarianism.

The reckless hunt for wealth of the last century has brought its natural consequence in envy and jealousy, the clash of classes, and hatred between nations. It is tempting to try hasty remedies, but the permanent remedy can only be found in kindliness combined with wise consideration of the results of action. There is also discontent with Christian ethics, especially in questions of sex, but here also reckless experiments may be fatal; the only hope lies in a combination of a Christian heart with a scientific mind - - - - - - *Page* 161

IX

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

By Hastings Rashdall, D.D., D.Litt., D.C.L., LL.D.,

Dean of Carlisle; Fellow of the British Academy; Hon. Fellow (late Fellow and Tutor) of New College, Oxford.

Christian morality not the arbitrary commandment of God: authority of conscience.

Necessity of development in the details of morality implied by the promise of the Holy Spirit.

The two great commandments.

Christ's teaching not reducible to bare rules.

Reply to objections commonly urged against the Christian law in its application to modern social life.

1. Non-resistance, forgiveness, punishment.
2. The lawfulness of war.
3. The question of property.

Modern experience requires the recognition of new duties but no change of principle.

Seeley on the need of such development: defects of conventional Christian morality.

4. Christianity and socialism.
5. Christianity and culture.

Too little recognition of the claims of art and science, learning and the pursuit of truth in the conventional Christian ideal: need of development in this direction.

Pursuit of truth and beauty parts of the Christian ideal as well as love - - - - - - *Page* 185

X

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY: ITS BEARING ON RELIGIOUS TEACHING

By E. W. Barnes, Sc.D., F.R.S.,

Formerly Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Cambridge; Canon of Westminster.

Psychology—the analysis of the working of the human mind—its limitations—will not solve metaphysical problems. Modern psychology based upon experiment; the danger of argument from particular types of mental pathology; theories, to be adequate, must completely explain observed facts. The unconscious mind and its nature; reasons for accepting belief in its existence. Psychological determinism and its inadequacy. Psychology and divine influence—grace. The unconscious mind suggested as the region where we make contact with the Holy Spirit. Answer to objections to this view. The consciousness of our Lord. Sin and regeneration; confession and forgiveness. Psychology and sacramental grace. The religious value of suggestion. Revivals and mental ill-health. The danger to theology of the religious use of suggestion. Psychology and the Eucharist. Types of religious devotion to be tested by their fruits. Tension in the religious life a source of energy. Dr. Rivers on subconscious instability - - *Page* 216

XI

CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY

By E. W. Watson, D.D.,

Canon of Christ Church; Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford.

Christianity a leaven. It is conditioned by the state of successive generations. Christians from the first shared the qualities of their contemporaries. This was the case in the age of the

Fathers. Increasing ignorance affected Christian thought—*e.g.*, in the fallacy of a Golden Age in the past. So with the influence of philosophy, as in the debt of St. Augustine to Plotinus. Also with Roman law. Yet the Middle Ages, with all their credulity, and because of their peculiarities, produce high types of Christian character. It is impossible to detach Christianity from the age in which it is exemplified. Has progress been continuous? The evidence is inconclusive, but suffices to show that such failure as there has been was not due to Christianity itself. Successive generations vary; change comes by reaction. Hence waves of religion; we are in the trough of one of them. Hence a tendency to despond. Hannah More and Bishop Butler. This largely subjective, and the penalty for previous elation. There is no real failure, but there is a trial for faith - - - - - *Page* 240

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

I

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A.

Man is distinguished from the other animals by a concern which we are probably safe in saying that none of them shares with him, a concern with that which underlies, or lies behind, or includes within its embrace (we may use whichever metaphor we please) himself and all the many things around him and all that is done by, or to, himself or them. Preoccupied as he often—most often—is with the affair of the moment, he sometimes turns aside to ask, What does it *all* mean? Whatever befalls him, whether it be good or ill, is seldom or never more than just this—it is always an *instalment*, so to say, of some fate to which he can set no limits: it increases or decreases the quantity of good or ill, not only in his life but in the world. He "looks before and after," and to his capacity for doing so his pleasures and his pains alike owe their keenest poignancy.

Now Philosophy is nothing else than the

deliberate effort to think about this characteristic object of human interest, about this background, this inner significance, this underlying essence of all our experiences, actual or possible. But before men set themselves deliberately to think about the problem of the ultimate meaning and nature of the world of which they find themselves a part, they express in what they call Religion their sense of being part of such a world, their apprehension that it has a meaning, and their hope that it may mean them well. For to recognize any object, however insignificant it seem to us, though it be the "wood and stone" of the missionary hymn, as a *sacred* object, is to treat it as somehow containing in itself the secret at the heart of things which gives them influence over us, and makes it possible for us to enter into relations with them and perhaps to control them in our favour.

Thus Philosophy is from the first concerned with the same object as Religion, although its interest in it is, as compared with that of Religion, what we may call for the moment an *abstract* and *scientific* rather than a *personal* and *practical* interest. But, as we might expect from this distinction, Religion precedes Philosophy, certainly in the life of human societies and commonly also in the life of individual philo-

sophers; and thus, when Philosophy comes to occupy itself with the problem of the ultimate nature of the world of which we are a part, it generally finds Religion already in the field with practices intended to make favourable to us the powers which control the course of this world, and with theories designed to explain and justify these practices. Now this can hardly fail to lead to conflict between Philosophy and Religion. For, when men come to ask themselves what it is that they are aiming at in their philosophizing, they find that it is something which they can only hope to attain on one condition. This condition is that they take nothing for granted, and admit nothing to be true without first testing and examining it for themselves. Thus Philosophy is bound, by the very nature of the desires which it comes into being in order to satisfy, to take up an attitude of independence towards the religious tradition which it finds in possession, whether that tradition embodies merely the feelings and speculations about the encompassing mystery of the world of men at a stage of intellectual development earlier than that at which Philosophy arises, or, as often happens among civilized peoples, includes also the results of previous philosophizing on the subject; and this inevitable and legitimate attitude of independence may, as the experience

of mankind abundantly shows, pass into an attitude of hostility.

This is especially likely to happen if the representatives of religious tradition, whether in the community or in a particular family or place of education, take up on their side a repressive attitude towards the newly-awakened activity of the intelligence which is seeking to comprehend its experience as a whole—that is, to philosophize; if, instead of welcoming this as just that special kind of service which the intellect has to offer to God, they deny the claim of the intellect to leave no part of experience uninvestigated and to ascertain as far as possible, in the case of every part of that experience, the nature of its relation to the rest.

But, even where there is no such hostile attitude taken up towards Philosophy by the representatives of religious tradition, it is inevitable that there should be tension between Religion and Philosophy. Nor, indeed, ought we to desire that, in the case of those to whom the problems of Philosophy present themselves as real problems at all, it should be otherwise. To every well-instructed Christian, at any rate, it should appear as natural enough that there should be appointed to all men a night of wrestling with God, a Way of the Cross, which may sometimes culminate, as with our Master

Himself, in the supreme trial of the withdrawal from the soul of the consciousness of God's Presence. Now there are those for whom this night of wrestling with God, this Way of the Cross, this hiding of God's face, takes the form of philosophic doubt. It is not possible, nor is it really to be desired, that some apologetic device should be found which would exempt Christians altogether from such trials. There is room, indeed, for what are called apologetics, just as there is for institutions to aid men in resisting the temptations of the flesh which all or most men must face in the course of their spiritual warfare. But we must not look for victory in this warfare without battles. The strain on religious faith which is involved in philosophic thought is as much in the order of the day—although fewer, no doubt, are called upon to face it—as is the strain on moral obedience involved in the natural development of our instinctive bodily appetites.

There is, however, an important distinction between the two kinds of strain which I have just compared. It belongs to the very nature of our moral consciousness that the law of Duty presents itself to us as invested, in Butler's celebrated phrase, with a "manifest authority" to which the appetites, urgent and absorbing as they may be, lay no claim. But Philosophy

and Religion both make a claim which is unlimited. We cannot with a good conscience set either claim aside, and yet the two claims may come into collision. It is this fact which gives its special character to the tension between them.

There is no region of a philosopher's life—and I mean here by a philosopher everyone who is conscious of this claim of Philosophy upon him—which Philosophy can acquiesce in leaving unexplored; and, on the other hand, Religion cannot allow that there is any part of life which God has no right to claim for His service, and with which Religion has thus nothing to do. The only satisfactory treaty possible between two powers so exacting must be one comparable to the best kind of marriage, in which there is mutual devotion and mutual respect, each alike without reserve. Philosophy cannot permit Religion to keep, as it were, a secret chamber into which Philosophy may not intrude, nor can Religion suffer Philosophy to treat as illusory what Religion knows by experience to be real.

Just as Philosophy must allow Religion to claim that the witness which religious experience bears to the nature of Reality be not ignored by Philosophy, so must Religion in turn allow Philosophy to subject religious experience, no

less than any other kind of experience, to examination and criticism.

It is sometimes thought that Religion can take the place of Philosophy; or, on the other hand, that Philosophy can take the place of Religion. Now no doubt there are a great many people who are not called upon to be philosophers at all, and of these not a few obtain, through their Religion, their view of that great Whole which includes all that happens to them or falls within their experience, and our concern with which distinguishes us human beings from the other animals; and so, since they do not go on to that closer study of the nature of this great Whole which we call Philosophy, for them Religion may be said to take the place of Philosophy. But it is vain on this account to tell those in whom the spirit of free and thorough-going enquiry is once aroused that they can satisfy their intellectual hunger by taking on trust from their religious teachers the view of the world traditional among them.

On the other hand, when the development of the powers of the human mind reaches a certain level, Philosophy does come to do what at an earlier stage is done by Religion in providing a view of the world as a whole; and so people who suppose it to be the sole business of Religion to provide such a view have gone on to think

that Philosophy, which has thus taken over this function to a considerable extent already, will eventually take the place of Religion altogether. But what is really characteristic of Religion is not the provision of a view of the world as a whole, although such a view is always connected with it and even implied in it. What is really characteristic of Religion is rather what we may call the activity of worship. Now our natural need of an object for worship cannot be satisfied by Philosophy apart from Religion. That worship is natural to man is not the less true because the need of it is not felt equally by all men, nor at all by some; nor is the statement that Philosophy cannot normally satisfy it disproved by the fact that here and there may be found an exceptional person who has enjoyed in philosophical speculation what seems to have been a truly religious experience.

So far we have been speaking of Religion in general, and not of the Christian religion in particular. With respect to the Christian religion there are two things to be said in this connection. The first is this: that if sometimes it seems more than some other religions to resist reconciliation with Philosophy, it will be found that this is not because it is *less* but because it is *more* philosophical than these others. The second is that, as a matter of fact,

the historical relations of Christianity with Philosophy have been intimate and its services to Philosophy great.

A characteristic feature of Christianity which is often thought to be an obstacle in the way of its reconciliation with Philosophy is the importance assigned in it to certain historical facts. It is true that the importance of the historical element is greater in Christianity than in any other religion, and that this circumstance exposes Christianity more than any other religion to that particular kind of doubt which is called historic doubt. Yet Christianity is not thereby stamped as a less philosophical religion than one which is not so much exposed to this kind of doubt, but rather as a more philosophical.

There is no greater or more difficult problem in Philosophy than that of the relation of abstract or universal significance to concrete or historical fact. Philosophy, if it fights shy of facing this question, does but refuse, if it may be so put, to take its last hurdle, and surrenders its hope of winning the race set before it.

Hence, although religions which remain in the region of the abstract or universal significance and treat what is individual and historical as illusory or unimportant may seem to afford the philosopher a quieter shelter than Christianity,

they do so at the cost of tempting him to abandon the supreme venture to which as a philosopher he is committed—the venture of understanding, not universal principles merely, but the real world of historical individuals, in which these principles can live and move and have an actual existence. In saying this, however, we must not be understood to deny or dispute the right of historical criticism to examine any historical statement, whether in Bible or Creed, just as it would any other. Though Philosophy has itself no jurisdiction in matters of History, freedom of thought everywhere is the greatest of philosophical interests, and there is a real solidarity between the claims of Philosophy and those of History to reject external dictation each in its own department. It is, as was said, a philosophical merit in Christianity to attach importance to historical facts; but this does not guarantee the truth of any particular fact to which Christian teachers have attached importance—that must be ascertained by an examination of the evidence in each case.

Our second point was that the relations of Christianity to Philosophy had been intimate, and its services to Philosophy great.

In the earlier ages of Christianity, as soon as the Gospel came to be preached to educated people, those who accepted it began to use the

philosophical conceptions of the world and life which were current in their day to help them in the understanding of their new beliefs; and to this day the language of the creeds and other statements of doctrine used in the Christian Church cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of the philosophies which influenced those who in the early centuries of Christian history formulated these beliefs. The principal of these philosophies were the Platonic and the Stoic; the former especially affected the Christian teaching about God and the soul, the latter that about the rules of Christian conduct.

In later days, when Christianity had become the established religion of Europe, philosophers, bred in Christian traditions and writing for others so bred, have constantly had Christian doctrines in mind when thinking about the ultimate nature of Reality; and, even where they have not themselves been seriously concerned to find a place in their view of the world for their own religious convictions, they have not been able to ignore the problem of the relation of the teaching of the Bible and Church to the results reached by their independent reflection. Thus if, as we said just now, the language of Christian theology is not intelligible apart from a knowledge of ancient philosophy, that of much

modern philosophy is barely intelligible apart from a knowledge of Christian theology.

But not only have the relations of Christianity with Philosophy been intimate, the services of Christianity to Philosophy have been great. In virtue of the comprehensiveness of the religious experience for which Christianity stands, Christian theology has frequently borne useful testimony to aspects of Reality which the philosophical fashion was apt to neglect. Thus a type of thought has sometimes prevailed which is content to acknowledge the obvious distinctness of individual persons from one another, and can see nothing but, at the best, a mere metaphor in speaking of a common consciousness in which many may share, or of one's responsibility for what others than one's individual self have done. Such a type of thought is bound to misconstrue or ignore not only what is called mysticism, but some quite ordinary experiences, such as our pride or shame in the triumph or humiliation of our nation, even when, as individuals, we had no part in bringing it about. But Christianity can never surrender itself to this type of thought; for it empties of their meaning the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement. Hence, when it has been dominant, Christian theology has remained unsubmissive, and has witnessed to the

unity which is in the manifold, the identity which is in the diverse, until it has awakened Philosophy to react from the onesidedness of the prevailing doctrine. On the other hand, when a quite opposite type of thought, such as is often called—though not always properly called—pantheistic, has been in the ascendant, which can easily make room for such doctrines as I have mentioned, Christianity has more than once redressed the philosophical balance by inspiring a reaction against principles which would undermine the faith of Christians in a particular providence and their hope of an eternal life for individuals, and would also involve an abandonment of that insistence upon an historical revelation, upon "Jesus Christ come in the flesh," which in the Church's first period of controversy was her watchword against the Gnostics who sought to see in her Gospel only a symbol of something not historical at all.

Christianity has also rendered more positive services to Philosophy. The most remarkable of these were the result of the efforts of the Church in earlier centuries of our era to discover a statement adequate to express her consciousness that there had been sent forth into the hearts of her members a Spirit proceeding from her Founder, which (as St. Paul puts it) cried

in them "Abba, Father"—that is, made them aware of being by adoption through Him that which He already was—namely, sons of God. It was found impossible to be content with any formula which made the Fatherhood of God any less than an eternal characteristic of His nature; and this meant that the Son of God and the Spirit in which He is one with His Father and we may be one with Him must be regarded as necessary to the completeness of God's life. In this doctrine of the Trinity, as it is generally called, there was presented a conception of what a spiritual being at its highest and fullest must be which may fairly be said to be philosophically more satisfactory than any made during the same period on similar lines by thinkers outside the Church. Again, in connection with the elaboration of this same doctrine of God as Father, Son, and Spirit, Christian theology gave the greatest assistance toward the development of the notion of Personality, a notion of the profoundest importance, for which the ancient philosophers had no special name at all; but for which a name, which we still use to express it, was found in the course of the discussions carried on by Christian theologians concerning the union of the divine and human natures in Jesus Christ.

But, although Philosophy has thus profited

by its association with Christianity, it would be a mistake to regard Christianity as imposing a particular philosophy upon its adherents, or as forbidding such of them as are genuine students of Philosophy to explore the possibilities of any line of thought whatsoever. No doubt certain views may be more difficult to reconcile than others with a Christian's religious experience, just as other experiences—for example, those of an artist or of a lover—may indispose those who enjoy them to embrace opinions in which men of a different temperament might not find the same difficulties. But we have no more right to refuse to tolerate what we ourselves judge to be an inconsistency in a man whose philosophical convictions seem to us to clash with his religion than in one whose philosophical convictions seem to clash with his art or his love. History shows us that eminent Christians have often espoused and defended philosophical positions which appear at first to leave no room for Christian principles.

Thus, many might be inclined to say that what is called Utilitarianism is such a position. This is the doctrine in moral philosophy that we can ultimately desire nothing but our own pleasure, but that, when we come to recognize that other men's pleasure is as much to them as ours is to us, we shall feel constrained to set

before ourselves as the grand end of all our conduct the greatest happiness (meaning by happiness pleasure and the absence of pain) of the greatest number. Yet a doctrine of this sort was earnestly maintained by no less famous a champion of Christianity than Paley, whose work on " Natural Theology " was long regarded in this country as the standard exposition of the argument for the existence of God from the facts of the natural world, and his treatise on the " Evidences of Christianity " as the standard account of the historical grounds for believing the story of the Gospels.

It will repay us to consider a little more closely the problem thus presented to us. Nowadays it would generally be felt that the emphasis laid by Utilitarianism on the satisfaction of the individual's desire for pleasure was not consonant with the precept and example of self-sacrifice set before us in the New Testament. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in the New Testament there is no hesitation about the promising of rewards for virtue or threatening of punishments for wrong-doing—rewards and punishments described as everlasting in either case. We are apt to fight shy of such language, the use of which, to enforce moral teaching, agrees very well with the theory of Utilitarianism. We see here a reciprocal action between

Philosophy and Christianity, in which they may be said mutually to correct one another. It is principally on the ground of the fact, strongly urged by certain moral philosophers (and notably by Kant), that disinterestedness is of the very nature of Morality, which cannot in the end admit any reason for doing one's duty except that it is one's duty, that we are inclined to avoid the scriptural language about rewards and punishments; for it may be interpreted, we think, as meaning that such an external reason can be given, and as disparaging the intrinsic obligatoriness of benevolence and justice. On the other hand, the opposite philosophical theory, which accorded with the use in the Christian Scriptures of promises of future happiness and threats of future misery as inducements to the pursuit of virtue and avoidance of vice, is often discarded because it is felt to jar with the supreme dignity accorded in Christianity to the ungrudging sacrifice of self, illustrated by the Cross of Calvary.

I will take another instance, and this time I will choose a doctrine, not of moral but of metaphysical philosophy, and one which, instead of appearing to many people at first sight inconsistent with the Christian view of the world, has seemed to some to be the only theory fully in harmony with it. It is the doctrine of

Bishop Berkeley that the external world of material objects, whereof our senses make us aware, depends for its existence upon being perceived by some mind. For, since it is obviously very hard to believe that it depends for its existence upon being perceived by any one of us, who perceive it whether we will or not, we may thus be easily led on to the thought of an eternal Mind, to which this world is perpetually present, and which excites the idea of it in ours for the guidance of our lives.

Berkeley himself held that the one sufficiently convincing philosophical justification of a belief in God lay in the arguments by which he showed that the material world depends on the divine Spirit, not only in its origin, but for its very being at each moment as an object of perception, while, except as an actual or possible object of perception, we cannot think of it at all or attach any meaning to the language we use about it. And in our own day there are distinguished philosophical defenders of the Christian religion who find in this same doctrine, as modified in certain ways which we need not here consider, the most, if not the only, satisfactory basis of a faith in a personal Creator and Ruler of the universe. Yet a majority even of Christian philosophers have never held an "idealism" (as it is called) of this kind, and it is possible to

give reasons for thinking that it is not really so completely harmonious with the religious experience of Christian believers as its supporters have supposed and contended. And, on the other hand, there have been eminent Christian thinkers who have been, as philosophers, champions of materialism, the very theory by demolishing which the system of Berkeley and of the idealists who have succeeded him has earned its reputation of promoting the interests of Religion. The first of the Latin fathers, Tertullian, was a materialist; and it was not because of his materialism that he was denied the title " saint " usually accorded to the ancient doctors of the Church, but because of his action in separating himself from the main body of Christians and joining himself with a group which believed itself to be possessed of prophetic gifts, and insisted on an austere and rigorous rule of conduct, by failing to maintain which the authorities of the Church had, in the judgment of these Puritan sectaries, forfeited their title to represent the Christian name. In modern times, and in our own country, the materialist Hartley was an apologist for Christianity; and Priestley, though not an orthodox Christian, found a similar philosophy compatible with faith in a God, in the divine mission of Christ, and in a future life.

The lesson to be drawn from these facts is not, however, that which is sometimes drawn—that philosophical theories come and go, while the teaching of the Christian Church remains ever the same, unaffected by the fluctuations of opinion. On the contrary, the teaching of the Church has not, as a matter of fact, been unaffected by these fluctuations; and if it is true that very various philosophies have been found to be compatible with Christianity, it is also true that the same philosophy has often been held by adherents of various religions. The true lesson is rather that Christian experience is one of the facts which philosophy must take into account, just as moral experience is, or that of the artist, or, again, of the man of science; and that therefore one's philosophical view of the world must not be inconsistent with it, if it is to be satisfactory. Various views of the world may, however, be put forward as consistent with it, and it is possible that more than one may make out its claim to be so.

It may be well to end this paper with some suggestions on the attitude which should be taken up towards the religious perplexities of children and young people by their elder friends. The poet Tennyson has spoken in a well-known passage of " In Memoriam " of those who, when

doubt of the truth of Religion makes its appearance, would have us

> ". . . crush it, like a vice of blood,
> Upon the threshold of the mind."

Of late psychologists have been disposed to question whether this is the proper treatment even for a " vice of blood." Their investigations have led them to think that mere repression is apt, while driving the perverted instinct or mischievous tendency below the threshold of consciousness, to induce its reappearance in the form of morbid impulses which the will cannot control, and the true source of which is unknown to their victim, and can only be discovered by the skill of experts in the cure of nervous disorders. A full confession would often, it seems, be a better remedy in the eyes of the physician, as it has long been in those of the priest. But however this may be in the case of a " vice of blood," unquestionably it is so in the case of an intellectual doubt; it should be brought to the light, and met, not with shocked disapproval, but with sympathetic interest and rational arguments. Nay, the emergence of doubt in the mind of an intelligent child should be foreseen as a normal phase of intellectual development. The child should even be encouraged to look forward to changes of view

as he grows older, but meanwhile to acquire a real religious experience of his own by the practice of prayer and of thought about religion. It should never be suggested that religion is afraid of free enquiry. While a spirit of reverence should be cultivated, a superstitious dread of irreverence should be discouraged. Jests about words or things with sacred associations should not be indiscriminately treated as blasphemous. The right analogy here is that of a child's jests about his parents. There are some such jests which no child with a real respect or love for his parents would make; others which are compatible with such respect and love, and even significant of affectionate familiarity.

All genuine love of knowledge should be fostered, and a complete honesty of outlook recommended and encouraged, and the young man or woman should be taught to regard Reason, not as (according to an expression of Luther's) an evil beast to be slain in sacrifice to God, but rather (in a favourite phrase of Bishop Butler, borrowed from the Book of Proverbs) as "the candle of the Lord." Doubt should be looked upon as a natural incident in the life of a thinking servant of God, and as part of his appointed discipline, not to be got rid of at all costs, but to be allowed to play its proper

part in the religious development of the young, just as the discussion of controverted questions in the debating society does in their training as citizens of a free State.

I am, of course, speaking here of genuine intellectual difficulties. But even where there lies behind, and at the root of, discontent with the religion which has been taught, the insurgence of passions which seek to escape the restraints imposed by religious principles, while a wise elder will certainly be on his guard against encouraging the probably only half-conscious hypocrisy which would put forward the speculative problem and mask the unruly desire, he will yet take seriously the speculative problem itself. For, even from the point of view of morality, resistance to temptation may be permanently weakened by recurring doubt as to the reasonableness of the principle which prescribes resistance.

In according to religious doubt such recognition as has here been recommended of its legitimate place in spiritual development, we shall only be assenting to methods actually employed by God in the education of humanity, and obeying the apostolic injunction to be fellow-workers with Him. And it is precisely in the possibility of this co-operation with God that the capacity of man for Religion consists.

II

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS

By H. U. WEITBRECHT STANTON, Ph.D., D.D.

The present-day student of religion has an immense advantage over his fellow of a generation ago in the wealth of material to his hand. The progress made in knowledge of the religions of the world is almost incalculable, and the perception of orderly connection in the great mass of beliefs and worships has greatly increased. In place of two or three historical religions and a dozen mythological ones, surrounded by a mass of confused and savage cults, the student now sees religion, like language, as a living, growing function of man's nature. The missionary and explorer in many lands have lived with the primitive peoples, entered into their manner of life, got to understand their feelings, and learned their ideas of things unseen which the savage is very shy of expressing to an unsympathetic questioner. On the basis of these observations, and on deeper research regarding the greater religions, a new science has been built up, the

Comparative Science of Religion. Time was when some writers freely asserted that the human tribes of low culture had no religion. The very contrary has been proved, as in the case of the Australian aborigines, who were once supposed to be without religion, but are now realized to be tied up in their whole life by a multitude of religious beliefs and observances far more complicated than our own. In fact, primitive religions, like primitive languages, are more highly articulated than those more advanced. Amid this great variety are seen both excellences and deformities of growth, both progress and decadence; yet with all the great dissimilarities there is everywhere a fundamental unity: man is seeking adjustment or reconciliation with an unseen power or powers that rule his life. Nothing less than this is sought by the lowest, nothing more is revealed by the highest.

We and our children are thus able to view religion from a new angle. So to explore the religions of the world and to teach about them is a fascinating and inspiring task, yet in setting ourselves to it certain difficulties arise. If there is this fundamental unity, and if there are so many similarities and excellences in other religions apart from Christianity, have we any longer the right to regard the faith of the Bible as unique? The missionary who has to deal with non-

Christian religions of higher or lower culture has to answer this and the like questions both in thought and practice. Perhaps the thinking of a missionary may help some fellow-thinkers.

The main difficulties that I have come across have to do with the origin of religion, the process of religion, and the aim of religion, and I propose to deal with them in this order.

I. The Origin of Religion.

The material offered to us in the primitive religions of the world is so vast and varied that one can only select a few of the most outstanding features for consideration.

(*a*) These religions are often classed under the common term "Animism," because their belief and practices are governed by the conception of a soul or souls in men and things. This soul is often imagined as a kind of fine stuff which inhabits the body, leaving it at times, as in dreams, and permanently at death. It may be increased or diminished, and much of the magic and other observances of these religions has to do with the preservation or strengthening of this soul-stuff. The same kind of life-principle inhabits animals, plants, and even minerals, and all these have to be dealt with, as need demands,

by the priest or medicine-man who knows the secret of their connections. When the savage is perplexed by the movements and general behaviour of many men and things, he lays it to the account of this unseen stuff as producing effects the reason of which he cannot see or feel. Can this be the origin of belief in a soul as distinct from the body ?

Again, the belief in the survival of the soul in some fashion is practically universal among primitive races. The life of the ghost is regarded as a faint continuance of the man's bodily existence, and the ghost has a desire to remain in the neighbourhood of its body. If balked or ill provided with what is necessary to its comfort in the spirit-world, it becomes an enemy of the living who have neglected it, and it may injure them by bringing disease, death, or loss of property, and the like. Therefore, many of the religious observances of the survivors are intended either to drive away the ghost or to propitiate it, and the ritual connected with death and burial, or other disposal of the dead, becomes important and elaborate. Among more advanced tribes, who have learned to value and honour age and experience in the living, departed ancestors are regarded with special veneration and regularly worshipped. Such worship may develop into divine honour, so that a specially

famous ancestor comes to be regarded as a god. This has been offered by writers of ancient and modern times as a sufficient explanation of the belief in a god or gods. The deity is supposed to be like the spectre of the Brocken, a magnified shadow of man cast by his imagination on the mist of tribal traditions.

(*b*) But it is remarkable that among the most different races, and in regions of the earth most widely separated, we find a persistent belief in a supreme God and creator of mankind; yet equally general is the practical conviction that, though benevolent, or at least not harmful, He is a remote being whom men need not much trouble about, and that the beings with whom they are really concerned in their religious observances are the spirits of men or beasts or plants or places, who will hurt them if not worshipped or propitiated. Almost all animistic rites have to do with these spirits. The dread of them dominates the life of the animist, and no feature of the Christian faith is more attractive to him than the message of a Saviour who has overthrown these evil powers, and an Almighty Father who is not far off, but near by, and who cares for His children. In fact, this aspect of primitive religion does not so much suggest the origin of later beliefs as the deterioration of an earlier and more really childlike belief in

a good God who has created and also rules the world.

(*c*) These minor deities that dwell in natural objects, and more or less control them, are naturally thought of as intimately connected with the life and phases of nature, such as the growth and decay of vegetation and the changes of the seasons. In some cases worship is paid to the great objects of nature on which man's life or welfare depends—the sun, moon, and stars; the ocean or the river; the wind and the rain. The priest or magician is he who knows how to make these powers propitious to man. If they have done him harm the deity must be angry, and some kind of sacrifice must be brought which will turn away his wrath. The more costly the sacrifice the greater its effect, and most precious of all is the sacrifice of a man, a world-wide rite. But animal sacrifices and offerings of food or other possessions are even more general. If the substance of the sacrifice is destroyed by fire or otherwise, it is regarded as being consumed by the deity; but far more often it is consumed by the priests and the worshippers who become guests at the table of the god. In those cases where the god is the personification of a nature process, such as that of the seasons, he may be conceived as dying in the winter and rising to new life in the spring, and this may be repre-

sented in a sacrificial rite, followed by a meal in which the worshipper is regarded as feeding upon the god. But the more general idea is that of an appropriation by the sacrificial meal of the soul-stuff of the victim and the power inherent in it. We cannot wonder that some have sought in such observances and ideas the origin of the Christian ideas of atonement and sacramental communion.

In a word, then, there are striking analogies, entirely independent of missionary contact, between certain widely spread pagan beliefs and rites and certain great teachings and observances of the Christian faith. What is the real relation between them? To get a clear reply we must first ask: What is the true origin of religion as such? That religion is an essential element in human life is not nowadays disputed. It is, then, like other factors in human life, the expression of a need and the effort to satisfy that need, but, unlike those other factors, it has to do with powers or forces that are not discerned by the senses. Now religion, like all other growths, is truly understood, not by its rudest and most elementary forms, but by its highest development. The universal sense of man that he must adjust himself to a higher power to whom he is in some way accountable is nothing but man's universal and elemental need of God,

and of the fullest revelation of God which he is capable of receiving. Viewed in this light, the ideas of soul-stuff distinct from the body and of the ghost after death are a dim recognition of the spiritual element in man, and a reaching out after the hope of immortality; the notion of a great but remote God, and of the dangerous spirits with whom man has practically to do, is a distorted perception of the fact that we fail to reach the good God by reason of the powers of evil that surround us. The sacrifice and the feast on the victim express the need of reconciliation with God and of participation in His life. In other words, these and similar analogies between primitive religions and Christianity are the strivings of man, often pathetic, sometimes heroic, to satisfy the hunger of his soul after those spiritual realities which are revealed by God in Christ.

II. The Process of Religion.

When a comparative review is made of the history of religions which has resulted in their present distribution, we observe certain lines of growth and progress, though not without indications also of retrogression and decay. It is possible to classify the growth of religions in different ways. Thus, according to the object

worshipped we may distinguish the primitive religions of fetish worship and magic, the higher nature religions which adore and eventually personify the higher powers of nature and sometimes lead up to something like theism, and the theistic religions which ascribe a moral character to the one sole God. Or, again, the types may be distinguished according to social evolution as tribal and national and universal. Such classifications are useful as enabling us to understand and visualize the main features of religion, but they are not like partitions in a set of pigeonholes: they cross and interlace; features of one type crop out in another, as, for instance, fetishism appears in a theistic religion in the case of the Black Stone in the sanctuary of Mecca. A gradation from lower to higher forms may be established, but it by no means follows that one form succeeds another in time according to the scheme laid down.

It is necessary to remember this when certain conclusions are drawn from the application of the theory of evolution to the comparative study of religions. This application has been made both as regards the outward conditions of religion and its inward consciousness.

(*a*) Viewing the world religions as a whole, their variety exhibits different stages of development. It is therefore supposed that religions, like other

aspects of life, are the natural products of various objective factors. There is environment, such as that of the Semite, whose spacious deserts and mountains, with their droughts and cloud-bursts, are supposed to incline him to sombre and elevated notions of a stern and powerful deity. There is the influence of race, as with the virile races of northern peoples of Europe, whose gods are fighters and their heaven a banqueting-hall of heroes. There is the influence of history, as when the age-long, orderly social life of China has minimized the importance of distinctions of belief, and concentrated religion on the worship of the social order as represented by ancestors. It is often argued that religion, by adaptation to successive environments, has thus developed into the forms that we now find, and that, therefore, each such form represents the stage of the religious life which is best suited to the pitch of development at which its adherents have arrived. An advanced form of religion which may in itself be higher would not, it is argued, be so well suited to promote their general well-being. There are those, for instance, who say that though Islam may be, as a religion, inferior to Christianity, yet it is better suited to the culture and temperament of the negro races than Christianity. Such a religion may, they think, by its very

imperfections, such as the institutions of domestic slavery or polygamy, supply a useful social element that Christianity lacks; or, as in the case of Hinduism, it may teach doctrines, such as that of reincarnation, which are lacking in Christianity, yet seem to meet a need. Why, then, should we insist on the acceptance of Christianity by peoples of every stage of culture and thought ?

(*b*) If, in reply to this, reference is made to the need of deliverance from the moral mischief of sin witnessed by man's conscience, the question is raised: May not conscience itself, after all, be a result of evolution ? That the standards of right and wrong, and with them the judgments of conscience, vary much in different times and places cannot be denied. There are the taboos of primitive religions, the ceremonial food regulations of a higher stage, the ordeal of battle for vindication of honour (still surviving in the duel), the enforcement of religious profession by violence, and a hundred other matters in which the moral standards of mankind have changed and are changing still. Accordingly, there are those who maintain that the development of conscience is nothing but the growth of social sanctions from stage to stage of culture. What is conceived as useful to the well-being of society at a given stage is regarded as good or right; what is injurious to it is bad and wrong. As the con-

ception of the social whole is extended and clarified, so the scope and level of morality is raised: social and good, antisocial and bad, are synonymous. If so, then to demand from a people a moral standard above their stage of development is really antisocial and wrong.

(*c*) When the attempt is made to explain the facts of religion by the theory of evolution, we must needs ask what exactly is meant by evolution. Very often it is spoken of as if it were a force which produces such and such results, but it is, of course, nothing of the kind. The word simply means unrolling or unfolding, as a flower from the bud, and the theory means that things in nature have in an immense number of instances been observed to work out in this way, and therefore by the constitution of our minds we cannot help expecting that they will do so in other cases also. But in itself evolution is simply the name of a process or way in which a great many things have happened, and its test is that of fact. Do they or did they actually so happen ? How does this test apply to the cases in point ?

The influence of the outside factors of environment, race, and history on the shaping of religion is not a negligible quantity, but it is so varied, and sometimes contradictory, that it is utterly insufficient, even as an explanation of how matters religious work out as a rule. The

Christian religion, which sprang from a Semitic source, has had its greatest vogue in surroundings which are most alien from those of its original home. The same race which gave birth to the pantheism of Hinduism produced the atheism of original Buddhism. The same history of a people under a foreign Power resulted in one part of the Jewish nation expanding into the world-wide community of the Christian Church, and the other confining itself permanently within the limits of its old traditional law. The fact is that things in religion do not happen simply on the lines which may be observed in unconscious or subhuman nature. These outward factors have their undoubted and important influence on religion, but the form in which that influence appears is determined by the factor of human wills which no scientific formula can express. The adoption or shaping of a religion may be affected by a hundred outside influences, but ultimately it is determined by an act of yielding or resisting—in a word, of choice.

(*d*) This is even more evident when we come to the development of the moral sense, which we call conscience. The operation of conscience is a kind of thinking, and, like other thinking, it may include error as well as truth. But the reason for giving conscience a special name is not its infallibility, but that it passes a particular kind

of " value judgment," and it is not true that this judgment is ultimately regulated by regard for the well-being, in an external sense, of the community. The value standard of conscience, whether for the individual or the community, may, and often does, rule out the values of pleasure, profit, honour, and life itself, and substitutes for them one ruling value of " oughtness "—*i.e.*, right as against wrong, however much the wrong may comprise of other values. In history this has again and again been shown by the example of nations or communities who have preferred the risk of being wiped out rather than be unfaithful to the moral demands of honour or religion. The rejection for conscience' sake of other human goods is a thing which all of us witnessed in war-time. Even if in the case of " conscientious objectors " the general sense has stamped their refusal to fight as contrary to the common interest, that has not meant a denial of respect to the person who acted according to the ideal of right as he saw it. The standard of a particular conscience may not be in itself the highest, but it must be the highest that a man knows, or else it could not override all other standards. Can we, then, believe that the moral tribunal of conscience, which is prepared to negate all other standards of well-being for the man or society, has its origin in a regard for

social standards as supreme? It would, indeed, be a strange thing if the result of increasing clearness of thought about the ultimate moral standard were the complete dethronement of it. As a concrete thing conscience may be ill-informed or degenerate and in need of complete renewal, but ideally it can be nothing less than conformity to a perfect standard, and that standard is to be found, not in the crude and unshaped beginnings of development, still less in deviations and set-backs caused by sloth and selfishness. It comes from above, and is found where the unity of all perfection is realized—that is, in God.

Nor is this a mere ideal. I have spoken above of the universal need of man for God, and this involves a judgment of himself in the light of the perfect standard when and as he perceives it, and this judgment results in the sense of sin as a falling short of, or an opposition to, the perfect will which that standard expresses. It is sin rooted in the wrong desires and thoughts of man which is anti-social. It is deliverance from sin which is the one fundamental need of man, and the gospel of Jesus Christ which offers that deliverance has gone and is going to every race of man, and everywhere it meets the need without distinction of stages of culture or differences of race, provided only that it is truly presented, not merely in word, but in life, and that it is sin-

cerely received. The claim of Christ to uniqueness and universality is sustained by the facts of experience, and nothing but the highest as revealed in Him will serve the true interests and growth of humanity. The theory of evolution is a very convenient mind garment at our present stage of growth, but it is one which has not a few rents and gaps. It may passably cover the nakedness of our ignorance by helping us to trace how things came about, but it reveals to us nothing of why they are, or what for, and these are the questions which religion is bound to answer.

III. The Aim of Religion.

The aim of religion is both to answer an enquiry and to mark out a course of action, and the value of the answer is tested by the worth, both inner and outer, of the resultant action. Accordingly, in all religions we have some teaching about God or, at least, an unknown power under whose control we are, and about behaviour towards our fellow-men. When men and women go abroad for the first time to non-Christian countries, the impression produced upon them often amounts to this: Here are people who don't believe in Christianity, and mostly have never heard of it, but they worship a deity of some

sort, and their religion teaches them to do good much as ours does, and, like us, some of them are good people and some bad. In the last resort it looks as if all religions teach pretty much the same thing. What do the differences matter, and why should we trouble them with our doctrines, if they are decent people? It is the attitude summed up in Pope's couplet:

> "For forms of faith let graceless zealots fight;
> His can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

The same thing in a more constructive way is put by so-called theosophy, especially as regards the higher religions of the East. In all of them, it is said, the real adepts in religion put aside the popular mythology or theology in favour of the belief that God is indwelling in all men and things, and that those who thus recognize Him may find a direct spiritual approach to Him through meditation, asceticism, and rites handed down from ancient sages. The customary beliefs and traditions need not be interfered with; they serve, according to the mentality and habits of different peoples, as avenues to the one centre of ultimate truth, which is the same for all. Can it be that this gives us the reality of spiritual religion without the exclusiveness of Christianity?

Here, again, we do well to have recourse to

facts. Do all the religions, even the higher ones, teach us much the same about God and morality, and about the relation of God to morality ?

The fact is that we have in the different religions widely different ideas of God. We have noticed how, in the primitive religions, the idea of a supreme God is so thin and unsubstantial that it has little practical effect on life or even on worship. In the religions of India and the Far East we find two aspects of deity. There are for the people gods and godlings innumerable, frankly treated as independent powers; for the more thoughtful worshipper a few main deities, addressed by some as co-ordinate powers, by others as manifestations of a supreme divine unity. Polytheism—that is, the worship of gods many and lords many—is in clear evidence over a considerable part of mankind. Such divinities are necessarily imperfect and mostly disfigured by sins and blemishes like those of men. In the philosophic interpretation of polytheism, as in India, the essence of all life, divine or human, or in nature, is held to be absolutely one. While, therefore, the deities, one and all, are manifestations of that one Life, men, animals, and all things else are no less so. In it there can be no ultimate distinction of good or bad: all emerge from the same infinite ocean of existence and sink back into it. Over against the pantheism

of the Hindu religion we find in Islam the contrary conception of a personal God who has laid down a moral law; but His essence is defined as pure power, and the ultimate distinctions of right and wrong are not based on the moral attributes of deity, but on the power to lay down what omnipotence pleases. He may allow as right to a favoured slave what would be wrong in others, or He may go back from the principle that His kingdom is not to be established by earthly warfare to the command that it shall be propagated by fighting.

In fine, the different religions do not say very much the same about God, but, on the contrary, they put forth very different and even contradictory conceptions of Him. And from this it follows that their teaching about morality is not and cannot be identical, for the conception of God radically affects, as we have seen, the conception of morality. So it works out in fact. Rules for individual and social behaviour as a whole are bound to be fairly similar throughout the world, because they represent the conditions under which men get on tolerably well with one another. But where the conception of God is defective it repeatedly happens that there is flat contradiction between the sanctions of religion and the dictates of morality. Religious prostitution is a practice of immemorial antiquity which still

survives in modern times, as in the case of the temple girls in India, who are married to the god in childhood and brought up to be used by his priests and worshippers as a religious act. Similarly the brotherhood of Thugs, now extinct, had their own divine patroness whom they worshipped with peculiarly solemn rites before each expedition for strangling and robbing travellers. Instances of this kind might be multiplied from among many nations.

Religion is a doctrine, and it cannot be indifferent to the truth of the teachings which are put forward in its name, because its doctrines should be founded on facts by which God has made Himself known. Sincerity in belief is an indispensable condition of true religion, but the truth of a fact does not depend on the sincerity or warmth of the conviction any more than the satisfaction of hunger depends on the firm belief that a meal is ready. To say that beliefs in mutually destructive doctrines will all lead up to the same truth is as futile in religion as in science. The question whether there can be an absolute religion such as the theosophist postulates is on the same plane as that of a knowledge of the Absolute; it is an academic discussion which we may leave to technical philosophy. But that is not to deny that we may have, and should strive after, clearness of

thought in matters of religion. The aim of religion on the side of the intellect is to apprehend God as He has actually revealed Himself in history—that is, in the affairs of men as we know them in the past or present. But religion is more than a doctrine; it is a life, and the aim of the doctrine is to show how the new life for sinful man flows out of the great fact of God's revelation of Himself in Christ. As we study the comparative science of religion we see the universal need of that life. It is our part to take hold of it, to live it out, to witness it to all the world.

III

THE BIBLE AND SCIENCE

By W. M. BELL, B.D. (Lond.).

Although it may safely be asserted that there is not, and cannot be, any quarrel between true religion and true science, that the discrepancy which was supposed in Victorian times to exist between the two is now happily defunct, it is still a fact that among the masses a vague idea exists that the Bible is no longer credible or of any value, and that science has "exploded" the faith of past generations. The Christian Evidence lecturer in public places finds himself heckled with morsels of Strauss, aphorisms of Haeckel and Huxley which percolated down to the crowds twenty years ago, and have not yet been replaced by anything more modern. The Christian believer, on his side, is at times in no better case; too often he meets a ridiculous attack on his faith with an equally impossible defence of it, with memories of Paley's evidences, or of the arguments of some champion of bygone ages. Worse still, he sometimes believes himself, quite wrongly, to be unorthodox and dis-

qualified from active Christian work on account of a general acceptance of the idea of evolution, or owing to some failure to see the true bearing of the Old Testament on the Christian religion. The writer knows of a devout and religiously-minded day-school teacher who felt unable conscientiously to teach a Scripture lesson to children by reason of non-belief in the literal truth of some quite unimportant portion of the Old Testament narrative. The object of this essay is to save would-be defenders of the faith from helping a good cause in a wrong way; to assist those who have to teach Scripture to a scientific point of view; and to show that if the Bible is regarded from that standpoint, difficulties and disbeliefs simply do not arise.

If the cardinal doctrines of Christianity were the basis of all religious and biblical teaching, most of the contents of this essay would be unnecessary; for in that case every child would understand that the Christian religion does not stand or fall with the story of Balaam's ass, or with the account of any single incident recorded in the ancient documents, but that the Church's One Foundation is Jesus Christ her Lord. If the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments were the bed-rock on which all Scripture teaching were based, then nobody's faith would be troubled for more than ten seconds

on end by hearing an atheist in the Park make merry over Cain's wife; but, unfortunately, in England, where the difference between being taught religion and learning lists of Kings of Israel and Judah is not clearly apprehended, where most of the anti-religious attack is directed at the Bible, it is very necessary that special instruction on the best methods and principles of studying and teaching the Scriptures should be given.

In practically every English school the pupil has at least one Bible lesson a week and an increasing number of lessons in natural science; and, where the teaching of science is separated from all mention of religion, it is inevitable that he will feel certain discrepancies between the two; but before dealing with such disagreements it is necessary to issue a caution against wrong and dangerous methods of treating them.

I. Wrong Methods.

(*a*) *The Method of Water-tight Compartments.*—By this method the teaching of religion and the teaching of science are kept entirely separate, so that one department of the mind is kept for biblical knowledge and another for scientific, and all interplay of the two, as far as possible, prevented. If Scripture seems to teach one thing,

well, that concerns religion. If geology teaches something different, that affair belongs to science, and science and religion are different things. This method is impossible in practice. The mind cannot be subdivided into thought-tight compartments, and any new idea presented to it instantly collides with all other ideas in the mind and must either settle down happily with them or be rejected. That religious ideas are no exception to this rule is illustrated by the following incident which happened recently in the writer's experience: At the conclusion of a chemistry lesson he was approached by one of his pupils, and asked whether he thought that in the days of Abraham there was more oxygen in the air than there is now, and would that account for the long lives of Abraham, Methuselah, and the patriarchs generally? The answer was, of course, simple, but the incident is of interest as showing that an intelligent boy could not keep what he had heard at home and in his Sunday-school apart from what he was taught in the school laboratory.

(*b*) *The Method of Reconciliation.*—A survival, perhaps, of the days when it was thought necessary to "reconcile" all discrepant statements in Scripture. Thus, when Genesis vii. 17 says that the flood lasted forty days, Genesis vii. 24 says that it lasted one hundred and fifty days,

and Genesis viii. 13 implies a longer period still, commentators used to " reconcile " the difference either by saying that the greater number included the smaller, or by some other exercise of mathematical ingenuity. The modern expositor, knowing that the story of the flood in Genesis is pieced together from two distinct narratives, does not attempt to reconcile the discrepancy, but says the compiler of Genesis, finding different statements as to the length of the flood in his authorities, and feeling unable to decide between them, gave both statements, just as a modern historian would do.

Again, when it is stated in one place that David paid fifty shekels of silver for the threshing-floor (2 Sam. xxiv. 24), and in another that the price was six hundred shekels of gold (1 Chron. xxi. 25), the two assertions have been harmonized by supposing that each of the twelve tribes paid fifty shekels, and so made up the six hundred; or that David paid the fifty shekels for the threshing-floor and oxen, and afterwards bought the entire estate for six hundred shekels of gold, neither of which suppositions is even hinted at in the sacred text. To-day we should have no hesitation in saying that the Books of Chronicles, being much later in date, are less trustworthy authorities, and that, where there is a discrepancy between the very early Books

of Samuel and the late Books of Chronicles, the earlier books are probably right.

In the same way endeavours at harmonizing the teaching of science with statements in Scripture have been made. The story of creation in Genesis demands a period of six days, whereas geology demands an immense period of time, and attempts have been made to reconcile the two demands by saying that "days" mean "ages." Again, the Bible regards the sky as consisting of a solid hemisphere called the firmament, which protected the earth from water-floods: "The sky, which is strong as a molten mirror" (Job xxxvii. 18). We read that the flood was caused by windows being opened in the heaven (Gen. vii. 11, and viii. 2), through which the waters poured. Science, of course, teaches something very different as to the position of the stars in the sky and the nature of the upper atmosphere, and the attempted reconciliation—that the word "firmament," itself implying something firm or solid, only means the air—does not sound very convincing.

Such methods of reconciliation are mischievous, because they distract attention from the Christian interpretation of the Old Testament; they are, moreover, unnecessary, as will be seen when the purpose of the Bible and the right principles of its interpretation are grasped.

II. General Principles.

It is impossible to deal with every case of discrepancy between the Bible and science within the limits of a single essay, but if certain general principles are laid down and applied to one or two cases, the reader can himself apply them to others.

The general principles which must be borne in mind, if a right view of the relations between biblical and scientific knowledge are to be held, are three in number, and concern the purpose of the Bible, the nature of inspiration, and the nature of the revelation contained in the Bible.

Purpose of the Bible.

1. The Bible is a religious book. Its purpose is not to teach science, but to teach religion. It tells us about God and our duties towards Him. Its writers took the learning and science of the day, subordinated them to that end, and made them teach men some truth about God, just as a modern preacher will sometimes use an illustration from current science to reinforce his message. The science may grow out of date, but the religious lesson does not. Similarly, the biblical writers took the old national traditions and songs that we find in the Book of Judges, re-edited them, and made them tell us

some religious truth. In the later books they took the national records (what we should call history), and interpreted it from a religious point of view. Parts of the old traditions may have no basis in fact, but the religion that they teach is true; parts of the biblical historical records may prove to be faulty in details, but the Bible's religious interpretation of history is valid for all ages. No biblical writer ever regarded himself as a man ordained to teach natural science, nor does the New Testament regard the Old Testament as an encyclopædia of information on every subject. Speaking of the Old Testament, St. Paul says (2 Tim. iii. 15): "*The sacred writings which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus. Every scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness.*" The purpose of the Scriptures is here stated to be for instruction in faith and morals. There is not a hint of a claim that Scripture is meant to teach anything else.

The Nature of Inspiration.

2. It is not the printed word of the book that is inspired, but the soul of the writer. The man himself is inspired to see some new truth, or to revive an old one that has been forgotten,

and if we wish to enquire into the inspiration of Scripture we must enquire into the inspiration of the prophets, using the word in its widest sense of all those men and women who have proclaimed religious truth to the world. On examining the written records about them, it is as obvious as anything can be that the inspiration of a prophet did not destroy his individuality nor make him incapable of error. He was not sent into a trance to utter divine words that were not his; he chose his own words to express the truth that God had planted in his heart. Amos, for instance, was inspired to see the truth that God was a Judge, and would visit even His chosen people with punishment. If Israel did not reverence the Creator, nor behave with justice and charity to men, then the divine powers would raise up Assyrians to chastise even the holy people. When opposed by the official priest of Bethel, he prophesied a speedy judgment on both priest and people: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall fall by the sword, and thy land shall be divided by line; and thou thyself shalt die in a land that is unclean, and Israel shall surely be led away captive out of his land" (Amos vii. 17). Evidently Amos expected that the judgment would take place in the priest's own lifetime, whereas the captivity of the northern kingdom did not occur for another two

generations. The prophet's historical foresight was inaccurate, but his religion was right. The article which he added to the creed, "God is Judge," was true. Just as the divine influence which made Newton see the law of gravitation did not make him an infallible authority on all topics, so the inspiration which guided the great men of the Bible to see new truth about God did not make, and was never intended to make, them incapable of error in science, politics, or other mundane affairs.

The Revelation of the Bible.

3. The third principle is that laid down by Westcott. It is that the Bible is not in itself a revelation, but the record of a revelation. It tells us how God revealed Himself progressively from age to age, until that revelation culminated in the coming of Jesus Christ. The work of biblical critics, in spite of occasional extravagances, has done us immense service in elucidating the progress of this revelation by making clear what is the chronological order of the writings of the Bible. Under their guidance we can briefly summarize the main stages of the religious advance as recorded in the Scriptures.

(1) Abraham withdrew from association with human sacrifice and began to serve one God.

(2) Moses, many centuries later, introduced a moral law into religion.

(3) The prophets taught men to make religion an affair of the heart, and to banish conventionalism from the service of God.

(4) The exile and its disasters turned the Jews into strict monotheists.

(5) In the latest books of the Old Testament we find growing the desire for personal communion with God, a sense of sin, and the need of atonement, and the idea of a Catholic religion which would overleap the boundaries of Judaism.

(6) Finally, thousands of years after Abraham, Jesus Christ comes to make real communion with God possible, to deal effectively with sin, and to found a universal Church.

The Bible is the record of these great stages in religious advance, which came by the inspirations given to gifted men in order that mankind might have knowledge of God and His will.

III. Particular Cases.

Having stated the fundamental laws of Scripture interpretation, we can apply them to some special cases of discrepancy between the Bible and science.

(*a*) *The Story of Creation in Genesis.*—In accordance with the first principle laid down, we must ask the question: "What religious message does this story teach?" Answers come crowding thick and fast. It teaches that the universe is the creation of God, the expression of His will; that it is something separate and distinct from Him, and that in His sight it is good. The story tells us also something of the nature of man, that he is the crown and climax of creation, that he was made so that he knew God naturally; he was made to be religious.

In teaching the story to children who have learned something of physical geography and the solar system, the teacher might explain what was a Jewish boy's idea of the earth and sky in the year 100 B.C.; how he regarded the earth as immovably fixed on foundations (Ps. civ. 5), as having a solid firmament above it on which the heavenly bodies moved; how he thought there were waters above the firmament; and how, finally, he regarded God as enthroned above all. "The Lord sitteth above the water-flood: the Lord remaineth a king for ever" (Ps. xxix. 9). Then the teacher may ask, "Was the Jewish boy's physical geography correct?" and the answer will be "No." Then he may put the query, "Was his religion right?"

and the answer will be "Yes. He knew that God was exalted above all created things."

(*b*) *The Story of Jonah and the Great Fish.*— Here, again, the religious message is so obvious that we can only marvel how men can have wasted their time in trying to discover what kinds of fish have gullets large enough to swallow a man. The story is a magnificent missionary lesson telling us of God's love for the heathen Ninevites, of Jonah's wicked pride as a Jew in not wanting foreigners to be saved, of how God's will triumphs in spite of man's rebellion, and in the last chapter tells a very human story of Jonah's mental reaction after the success of his preaching, and of how God deals with it.

The writer's biological knowledge was distinctly imaginative rather than accurate, but his knowledge of religion and human nature can hardly be surpassed.

* * * * *

Finally, the significance of the principle that the Bible is the record of a revelation must be dwelt on in its relation to science. It will be seen at once that religion had a humble origin, that man's early ideas of God were crude and like those of a modern child who imagines God in his simple, artless way to be a larger edition of a man like his own father, and that very long

ages of time elapsed while primitive notions were being improved. Scripture testifies that the first man was in a low state of spiritual development; he had not the discriminating knowledge of good and evil. Anthropology reveals to us the immense age of human life on this planet; between the first man to whom was revealed the idea of God and Abraham countless centuries must have elapsed, and the time between Abraham and Jesus Christ must be measured in thousands of years. The slowness of religious progress need not be considered as a stumbling-block, for biology will come to our rescue, saying that this conception of religion is consonant with what the science of life teaches. The spiritual side of man, as well as the physical, developed from small origins. Psychology will step in as well and say how imperative it is that man should have started with rudimentary ideas of God, to be improved in the slow process of time as his mental power grew.

In these three principles, which are necessary for the right understanding of the relations between the Bible and science, there is nothing repugnant either to what Scripture says of itself or to Church tradition. No special view of the inspiration of Scripture has ever been laid down by a General Council, no theory of its verbal inspiration making every word and sentence of

equal value, no theory of plenary inspiration (*i.e.*, an inspiration which covers all subjects treated of) has ever been made binding on the Christian conscience. On the question of the literal accuracy of every sentence, of the literal truth of every story related in the Bible, the official Church is silent. And when we reflect that at one time the majority of Christians accepted without question as literally true all statements in the Bible, we cannot avoid the conclusion that in her silences, as well as her utterances, the Church has been guided by the Holy Spirit.

IV

THE RELIGIOUS VALUE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

By R. H. KENNETT, D.D.

I.

It will be admitted by all who are familiar with the thought of the present age that on no subject is it more important that the Christian Church should know and speak its own mind than on the Old Testament. On the one hand, many who are hostile to Christianity imagine that in the Old Testament—not only as regards its historical and scientific statements, but also in the more important matters of its morality and theology—they have discovered a vulnerable point at which they can aim a death-blow to Christianity itself; and, on the other, there are not a few Christians who, while acknowledging Jesus as Lord and Saviour, are sorely perplexed to reconcile His teaching with the Scriptures, on which they believe Him to have set His seal.

At the outset, therefore, it will be well to enquire what was the attitude of Jesus to the Old Testament. If He corroborated all its

statements, it is obvious that a Christian cannot criticize or repudiate a single one without undermining His authority; while, on the other hand, if Jesus Himself criticized or repudiated some of its teaching, those who endeavour to maintain it as a whole are disloyal to Him.

It must, of course, be remembered that biblical criticism, as the term is understood nowadays, did not exist in the time of Jesus. There were, indeed, disputes as to the meaning of various passages in the law, and rival schools of interpretation; but the authority and permanent value of the law was unchallenged, and the question of its authorship or of its absolute inerrancy had never been raised. Jesus, therefore, was never asked His opinion about what we should call the Higher Criticism, and we can only discover His attitude towards the Old Testament by comparing His teaching on various matters with the statements therein contained. It has, indeed, often been supposed that at least on one occasion Jesus used language so clear and emphatic about the authority of the Old Testament as to make any further investigation unnecessary. For in St. Matthew v. 17 *f.* He is reported to have said, "Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot

or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all things be accomplished." It may be well to point out here that the "Sermon on the Mount," from which the above quotation is taken, does not represent a discourse all delivered at one time, but is a collection of sayings of Jesus which were doubtless uttered on various occasions during His ministry. We cannot even *assume* that verse 18 had originally any connection with the preceding verse. Indeed, the fact that, whereas verse 17 mentions both "the law and the prophets," verse 18 mentions only "the law," rather points to the original independence of the two sayings. It is not impossible that the Evangelist placed the latter immediately after the former simply because it also contained a reference to the law.* We must there-

* Both in the Prophets and in the Gospels the arrangement is frequently not in accordance with any logical or chronological principle, but is one which was natural enough to those who were trained in oral tradition—that is to say, it is based on the merely mechanical method of placing in juxtaposition passages which contain certain outstanding words or topics. Thus, for example, the first and second paragraphs of the book of Isaiah are not in chronological order, for the second is the earlier of the two. The catchwords which have caused them to be placed together are "Sodom" and "Gomorrah." Similarly, Isaiah ii. 1-4, 5, and 6 *ff.*, are arranged together because they contain the words "house" and "Jacob" (see verses 3, 5, and 6); Isaiah v. 1-7 and 8-10 are arranged together because

fore consider the meaning of each verse by itself. In verse 17 the interpretation turns on the meaning of the word "fulfil." What did Jesus mean by "fulfilling" the law and the prophets? It is important to remember that the Greek word here translated "fulfil" is also used in the New Testament with reference to concrete things, where the rendering "fulfil" would be quite unsuitable. It is used, for example, of filling a fishing net (St. Matt. xiii. 48) and a ravine (St. Luke iii. 5). It is scarcely possible in English to adopt a uniform translation, but in general the Greek word might be rendered "to make full." Jesus therefore protested that He did not want to destroy the law and the prophets, but to make them full; and we must accordingly examine His teaching, where it is concerned with matters which are also treated of in the law and the prophets, in order to discover what He meant

---

they contain the word "vineyard"; the following paragraphs, 11-17, 18-19, 20-21, 22 *ff.*, come next because they begin with the word "woe." So St. Mark ix. 49, which has no logical connection with the preceding verse, stands after it because it contains the word "fire," and 50 follows 49 because it refers to "salt." Similarly, in St. Luke xiv. the paragraphs 7-11, 12-14, 15-24 are arranged together because they all contain some reference to a meal, and in the case of the last two, "the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind," are mentioned both in verse 13 and in verse 21.

by the assertion. Did He mean to " make full " every statement of the law and the prophets, or to " make full " only that which was capable of development in accordance with the highest teaching by separating it from that which could not be so developed, and was in itself mischievous or misleading ? It will be convenient to consider Jesus' attitude towards the law and the prophets under five heads in relation to (1) history, (2) morality, (3) religious ritual, (4) theology, (5) national hopes. In respect to each of these Jesus made the most definite statements, which are found to be quite incompatible with the supposition that He set His seal upon everything contained in the law and the prophets. Let us, then, consider them in order.

1. *History.*—In Genesis ii. 2, 3, and Exodus xx. 11 it is asserted that after six days of creative activity God " rested " on the seventh day. It is to be noted, however, that the Hebrew word here translated " rested " is quite distinct from that which is similarly rendered in Deuteronomy v. 14 (" that thy manservant and thy maidservant may rest as well as thou "). It means " to be inactive," " to be at a standstill," and it is the word which is translated " ceased " in the sentence, " How hath the oppressor ceased " (Isa. xiv. 4). How, then, does the teaching of Jesus agree with the statement that God " ab-

stained from activity" or "was at a standstill" on the seventh day; or with the injunction based upon that statement, that on the Sabbath day there must be abstention from activity, that work must be at a standstill?

It is evident from several passages in the Gospels that Jesus' attitude towards the Sabbath differed widely from that of His contemporaries. He affirmed that "the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath" (St. Mark ii. 27); He healed on the Sabbath day a man with a withered hand, who was not in pain, and who could have waited another twenty-four hours (St. Mark iii. 1-5). But He went further; He told the sick man at the Pool of Bethesda on the Sabbath day to arise and take up his bed and walk; and when He was persecuted by the Jews for thus breaking the Sabbath, He defended Himself, not by affirming that what He had done and had caused to be done was not work, but by appealing to the precedent of God Himself, Who, He declared, had never ceased from work: "My Father worketh even until now, and I work" (St. John v. 8-17). It is evident that the Evangelist, in relating this incident, means us to understand that the teaching of Jesus involved a denial of one of the most definite and solemn historical statements of the law. But if Jesus denied the account, contained in

the law, of God's abstention from activity on the seventh day of what the law represents as the first week, is there any reason to suppose that He must necessarily have "fulfilled," "made full," the previous account of God's activity on the preceding six days? Clearly, in "making full" the law He did not corroborate all its statements about historical events.

It is undoubtedly a fact, however, that the Old Testament writers themselves had little interest in history as the word is understood nowadays, and that they cared for the traditions of the past more on account of their value as parables to inculcate certain lessons than on account of their historical truth; and it may reasonably be contended, therefore, that in repudiating an historical statement Jesus was not, after all, setting any startlingly new precedent. We may, therefore, consider His attitude to the law under the next heading.

2. *Moral Teaching.*—Here it is important to note that the same Evangelist who has recorded Jesus' words about "making full" the law has recorded other sayings which are a direct repudiation of some portions of its moral teaching. "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: but I say unto you, Swear not at all" (St. Matt. v.

33, 34). Here Jesus not only goes beyond those passages of the law which forbid *false* swearing—*e.g.*, Leviticus xix. 12 (*cf.* Exodus xx. 7)—He sets aside those passages which require that people shall swear by Jehovah's name only—*e.g.*, Deuteronomy vi. 13, x. 20. It is surely a misuse of language to call a prohibition of all swearing a "fulfilling" or "making full" of an injunction to swear by Jehovah! But St. Matthew has recorded (v. 43, 44) an even more striking instance of the setting aside of the law by Jesus: "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies." It is true the actual words, "Thou shalt hate thine enemy," are not found in the law; it cannot be denied, however, that they are a perfectly correct summing up of such passages as Deuteronomy xxiii. 2-6, xxv. 17-19. It is a curious mental perversity which can find in the words "Love your enemies" a "fulfilling" of the injunction, "Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their prosperity all thy days for ever." Further, according to St. Mark (x. 5), in response to the Pharisees' statement that Moses suffered a man to write a bill of divorcement and to put away his wife, Jesus retorted, "For your hardness of heart he wrote you this commandment." Did He desire to "make

full" a commandment originally given only because of the hardness of men's hearts?

3. *Religious Ritual.*—What, then, we may ask, was Jesus' attitude towards the religious ritual of the law and its kindred injunctions? It will be remembered that the law lays down the most stringent regulations as to what food is to be regarded as clean and what as unclean. See, for example, Leviticus xi., Deuteronomy xiv. 1-21. But Jesus declared (St. Mark vii. 18 *f.*) that "whatsoever from without goeth into the man, it cannot defile him, because it goeth not into his heart, but into his belly." That is to say, according to Jesus, in themselves all meats are clean, and it matters not whether an animal slaughtered for food chews the cud and parts the hoof or not. Meat cannot defile, and therefore the teaching of Jesus makes null and void such injunctions as Leviticus vii. 19-27. It must not be overlooked that the sacrificial laws are so closely bound up with the laws concerning cleanness and uncleanness that a repudiation of the latter must seriously affect the attitude towards the former.

St. John (vii. 1-24) implies on the part of Jesus at least a disparagement of an even more important injunction of the law. The making of a man every whit whole on the Sabbath by Jesus is evidently contrasted with the wounding

in circumcision, also performed on the Sabbath, in order to conform to the law.

4. *Theology.*—In regard to the theology of the law—that is to say, the teaching about God which is found in many parts of it—the teaching of Jesus is equally uncompromising. It is not only that Christian doctrine (*e.g.*, St. John iv. 24) makes impossible the acceptance of such crude anthropomorphisms* as are found, for example, in Genesis iii. 8, Exodus xxiv. 10, 11; the *character* of God, as set forth by Jesus, differs wholly from that conception which is found in many parts of the law, and, indeed, in much of the Old Testament. The central point in the teaching of Jesus is the Fatherhood of God, and He appeals to the best instincts of human fatherhood (see, for example, St. Matthew vii. 9-11) to enable His hearers to understand the character of the Heavenly Father (*cf.* St. Luke xv. 11-32). But such teaching stands in sharp contradiction to the idea of God found in more than one passage of the law, which regards Him as giving way to paroxysms of anger, and as needing to be appeased with offerings (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Numbers xvi. 44-49).

* It is important to distinguish between expressions which imply a really crude conception of God and those which are obviously merely metaphorical, which neither the author nor his original readers ever dreamed of taking literally. To the latter belong such utterances as Psalm xliv. 23 (*cf.* Psalm cxxi. 4).

Further, whereas in the law, and, indeed, in nearly the whole of the Old Testament, every sort of disaster whatsoever is regarded as due to a withdrawal of the divine favour, Jesus emphatically declares that suffering is not necessarily to be attributed to any such cause (St. Luke xiii. 1-5, St. John ix. 1-3).

5. *National Hopes.*—In regard to the national hopes of His people, the teaching of Jesus shows a wide divergence from many parts of the law and the prophets. Almost throughout the Old Testament Israel is regarded as standing in a special relation to Jehovah, and as receiving from Him favour which is not bestowed upon the Gentiles. See, for example, such passages as Deuteronomy xv. 1-6, xx. 10-18. Similarly, Jehovah is represented as not caring whether the Gentiles do the things which are required of Israel or not (*cf.* Deuteronomy xiv. 21). But the teaching of Jesus, though originally addressed to Jews, burst the bonds of Judaism, and is correctly summed up in St. Matthew xxviii. 19; howbeit, the Evangelist has probably given here, not the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, but what he rightly believed to be the will of the risen Lord.

In view of the facts considered above, it is clearly impossible to maintain that it was the purpose of Jesus to "fulfil," to "make full," every part of the law and of the prophets.

What sort of "fulfilment," then, did He contemplate? Now some years before He began to preach the Rabbi Hillel, who lived till Jesus was about twelve years old, and who may actually have talked with Him on the occasion of the visit to the temple recorded in St. Luke ii. 41-51, had summed up the law to an impatient Gentile inquirer as follows: "What is hateful to thyself, that do not thou to thy neighbour. This is the whole law; all the rest is commentary." Hillel's heart in respect of this saying was better than his head. "Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their prosperity for ever" cannot be a *commentary* upon "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." There can be little doubt, however, that the saying of Jesus recorded in St. Matthew vii. 12 is an adaptation of Hillel's dictum; and the account given in St. Mark xii. 28-34 makes it clear that in the mind of Jesus the two essential commandments of the law are those which inculcate love to God and man (Deut. vi. 5; Lev. xix. 18). These two commandments He made the touchstone to apply to all the rest. That which was in agreement with them was to be "made full"; that which was contrary to them was to be pruned away, that it might not interfere with the development of that which was capable of "fulfilment." If, therefore, as we must infer from the sayings which

the Evangelists have preserved, Jesus affirmed that the law which He had come to "make full" meant all that was in harmony with the two great commandments, the saying recorded in St. Matthew v. 18 is in perfect agreement with the rest of His teaching. Even one of the apparently least important commandments, *if it embodied the principle of love towards God and man*, could not lightly be set aside.

It will thus be evident that Jesus was the first Higher Critic. Those who treat the whole of the Old Testament as on one level of inspiration are not loyal to His teaching, but disloyal. As a matter of fact, they reject the Gospel in favour of Pharisaism.

II.

We have seen that, according to the teaching of Jesus, the Old Testament contains some passages which are capable of infinite development in the light of the highest truth, and some which are incompatible with that truth. It would be a mistake, however, to include all the latter under one category. There are some things which are wholly false, and there are others which contain an important element of truth, but truth so mixed with alloy that the effect is harmful rather than good—at least, in an

age of higher spiritual development. It is sometimes contended by those who desire to maintain the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture that, although certain passages of the Old Testament are incomplete, every passage is free from error as far as it goes. But freedom from error is incompatible with incompleteness. The maxim that "nature abhors a vacuum" is just as true in regard to matters intellectual or spiritual as in matters physical. If a man does not possess the whole truth, he will inevitably combine such truth as he does possess with error to fill up the gap; and according to the proportion of truth the result will be mainly good or mainly evil. Thus, for example, there can be no progress in human society till the principle of justice is recognized; but true justice cannot be done unless it be administered in accordance with some understanding of, and some sympathy for, human nature. A mere mechanical application of the *lex talionis*—a giving of tit for tat—will, in many cases, not be justice at all, but a clumsy vindictiveness. Again, individualism is a late development in the progress of human thought. Whereas with us the unit is the individual, among primitive races the individual is scarcely taken into account, the family or clan being regarded as essentially one. By many of the more backward peoples of the world at the present

time all Europeans are regarded as forming practically one whole; the "untutored savage," therefore, considers it perfectly just and right to avenge himself on any European who may come in his way for a wrong inflicted upon him by another. Hence, in ancient Palestine the execution of seven descendants of Saul for a wrong done by Saul to the Gibeonites would not shock the ideas of justice held by the great majority of the nation. Probably even the innocent men who suffered would not dispute the justice of the sentence. In this and in many other stories of the Old Testament the discriminating reader, while recognizing the superiority of the precept in Deuteronomy xxiv. 16, may yet discern an element of justice, though the justice is rendered almost entirely null through the absence of that individualism which to our way of thinking is all-important.

The above will serve as an illustration of many passages in the Old Testament where the incompleteness of the truth causes, indeed, serious error, but where, in spite of the error, the truth is not entirely obliterated. There are, however, other passages which are wholly erroneous, or in which the germ of truth is discoverable only by a student of comparative religion and of primitive thought, such as the law which enjoins, or at least sanctions, the sacrifice of the first-

born (Exod. xxii. 29 *f.*; *cf.* Gen. xxii. 2), the trial by ordeal (Num. v. 11 *ff.*), the wrestling of Jacob with God (Gen. xxxii. 24-30), the belief that Samson's strength lay in his hair (Judg. xiii.-xvi.), etc. Sir J. G. Frazer has familiarized our generation with the idea that the Old Testament contains *folklore*. It remains to be shown how this folklore came to be combined with Scriptures which Jesus declared that it was His mission to "make full."

Now, although the Old Testament was not intended primarily to teach history, it will not be intelligible as a whole apart from the study of history. It is only when we know of what elements Israel was composed, and what events and what environment moulded its character, that we are in a position to understand the Old Testament and to estimate its value.

III.

The history of Israel begins with the deliverance from the Egyptian bondage. It is to that great event that the prophets appeal as the beginning of Israel's peculiar relation to Jehovah. Not that the narratives contained in the Book of Genesis are all devoid of historical value, nor that we can entirely reconstruct the history of the period subsequent to the exodus. It is fre-

quently difficult to decide whether a name denotes an individual or a tribe, and even more difficult to determine the exact chronological order of the events recorded and their precise relation to one another; but we can at least sketch in outline the history of Israel from the exodus onward with a tolerable degree of probability, whereas any reconstruction of the history of the preceding age is extremely uncertain.

It was believed by the authors of the earliest portions of the Old Testament that the ancestors of the Israelites had lived in Palestine before settling in the land of Egypt; but even if this belief was well founded, there is no evidence that the tradition of the reputed ancestors of Israel was preserved during the Egyptian sojourn; it is, indeed, more probable that it was only relearnt after the conquest of Palestine from the Canaanites, who worshipped at the holy places which the patriarchs were said to have founded. In other words, the stories of the patriarchs came to Israel through a Canaanite channel, and, whatever they were originally, they have been coloured by Canaanite tradition.

From the evidence at present available it seems probable that the exodus from Egypt took place in the last quarter of the thirteenth century B.C. The exact date is, however, of comparatively little importance; the essential fact is that

certain clans of a nomad race known as Hebrews, on whom some of the Pharaohs had imposed forced labour, broke away from Egypt under the leadership of Moses, and returned to their nomadic life in the oases of the desert south of Palestine. The accounts of this period in the Books of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy are coloured by the thought of a much later age, when the fusion of Israelites and Canaanites was almost complete. In the utterances of the great pre-exilic prophets, however, we find references to a tradition of the sojourn in the wilderness in many respects widely different. Thus, whereas a large part of the Pentateuch is wholly concerned with the ritual of the tabernacle, the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. assert that in the wilderness there was no sacrifice, and that the religion of Jehovah which Israel* there learnt was concerned solely with justice and mercy and truth. The *provenance* and the original meaning of the name which we know as *Jehovah* (properly *Jahveh*, shortened *Jah*, as in *hallelu-jah*) is uncertain. Two of the Pentateuchal documents—viz., those commonly denoted by the symbols

* For clearness' sake those whom Moses led in the wilderness are called here Israelites. It is, however, possible that the name Israel was not assumed before the conquest of eastern Palestine.

E and *P*—represent it as first revealed to Moses. The Judæan document *J*, on the other hand, states that the invocation of God by this name originated in very early times (Gen. iv. 26). It is possible that the name came from the eastern side of the great Syrian desert, and that it took root in southern Palestine some centuries before the exodus. It may be that Jehovah was worshipped among the Kenites and other tribes who occupied the wilderness to the south of the land of Canaan, and that during the stay at Kadesh Barnea Moses adopted it as the name of the God of the people whom he led. On these points it is impossible at present to arrive at any certain conclusion. The origin of the name, however, is of merely antiquarian interest. The outstanding fact is that Moses associated with the name ideas which, so far as we know, were not at that time associated with any other deity. Certainly the patriarchal conception of Jehovah and of the essentials of His religion—at least, as indicated in the Jahvistic document of the Pentateuch—was very different from the tradition of Israelite religion in the wilderness to which the prophets appeal. That tradition entirely ignores all ritual obligation, expressly asserting that sacrifice was not offered during the sojourn in the wilderness. In one important matter, indeed, the Pentateuch itself and the allied book of

Joshua have preserved traditions startlingly at variance with the priestly law. Moses himself had never received circumcision, and those whom he led who were born in the wilderness were uncircumcised (Exod. iv. 24-26; Josh. v. 5)—a fact which can only mean that Moses rejected the rite, since there would have been nothing to prevent its performance at Kadesh Barnea. This tradition of the non-circumcision of Moses and the Israelites in the wilderness is of great importance as proving that the religion which Moses taught his people was not derived from Egypt. If Moses' religion had been learnt by him in Egypt, he and his people would all have been circumcised, for the Egyptians practised circumcision.*

It is not easy to form an exact idea of the religion of which Moses was the exponent. It is to be noted, however, that the prophets believed themselves to have preserved the true tradition of it, and that they repudiated as something extraneous the popular religion of their time which in many respects has found expression in the laws of the Pentateuch. They were not merely henotheists or monolaters, but mono-

* The text of Jeremiah iv. 4, ix. 25, 26 has perhaps come down to us not quite in its original form. It is not impossible that Jeremiah rejected circumcision as an ordinance of Jehovah.

theists—that is to say, they believed Jehovah to be the God of the whole world. Probably none of them would have called the Moabites "sons and daughters of Chemosh," as does the poet of Numbers xxi. 29. This monotheism was not derived from Egypt.

In another respect also the religion, or at any rate the ethics, of the prophets would seem to have differed from that of the majority of the population of Palestine. There is not a hint in any of the prophets, whether pre-exilic or post-exilic, to suggest that they approved of polygamy, and there are several passages which imply monogamy. Here, again, it is probable that the prophets' ideas about marriage belong to the general tradition of what was learnt in the wilderness—in other words, the teaching of Moses.

But this brings us to the question, "Whence had this man this wisdom?" and it is a question to which those who deny all inspiration will find it hard to give an answer. Moses did not learn his doctrine from Egypt,* nor from the rude tribes of the wilderness. It has sometimes been supposed that he learnt the religion of Jehovah

* A negative proof of the complete independence of the religions of Israel and of Egypt is the absence from the former of any idea of a future life and of a judgment to come. Even among the highest teachers in Israel down to the post-exilic period there is no hint of a doctrine of a future life.

from the priest of Midian; but at all events this was not the belief of the writer of Exodus xviii. 11.

The people whom Moses led were by no means as numerous as the authors of the latest sections of the Pentateuch imagined, and probably they did not number more than a few thousands. After a sojourn in the wilderness, which tradition estimated as lasting forty years—*i.e.*, a generation—an attempt was made, probably in conjunction with other nomadic tribes, to gain a settlement in the cultivable land of Palestine. At this time the Egyptian rule over the Canaanites was at an end, and from various quarters invaders were pressing forward, anxious to possess themselves of a country which in that age appeared so desirable. Before the death of Moses Israel had found a settlement in eastern Palestine between the Arnon and the Jabbok, and after his death an attack, or, more probably, a series of attacks, was made on the country west of the Jordan. The invaders made little progress in the valleys, where the Canaanites were able to employ cavalry; but at length, after hard fighting, they established themselves firmly on the mountain range which forms the backbone of western Palestine. For some time, as in England after the Saxon invasion, the land appears to have been divided up under a number

of petty chieftains. Here the Israelites predominated, there the Canaanites. By 1000 B.C., however, Israelites and Canaanites were united under one king, and the Israelite conquest had been so far successful that the name of Israel was applied to the whole people, and the God whom the Israelites called Jehovah was regarded as the national God. The fusion of Canaanites and Israelites was greatly expedited by the need of making common cause against other invaders of the country, prominent among whom were the Philistines. The fusion was, however, greatly facilitated by the fact that the pre-Israelite inhabitants of the land of Canaan were in the main of Semitic stock, and spoke a language closely akin to that of the invaders.

In material culture and in religion, however, Israel and Canaan differed greatly. Before the Egyptian supremacy in Palestine the country had been subject to Babylonia, and the Canaanite civilization was mainly Babylonian. Many elements of Babylonian religion and mythology had also taken root in Palestine, such as the story of the flood, etc. It is possible that some points of resemblance between the laws embedded in the Pentateuch and the ancient Babylonian code of Hammurabi, which are not very numerous, may be due to this early Babylonian influence on Canaan. Since, however,

Babylonians were transported to Palestine in the seventh century B.C. (see 2 Kings xvii. 24 *ff.*; Ezra iv.), it is possible, if the earlier documents of the Pentateuch took shape as late as this—which is on other grounds probable—that Babylonian customs exercised a direct influence on Israelite law. There is, however, no trace of Babylonian influence on the religion of the pre-exilic prophets.

At the time of the Israelite conquest the Canaanites were nature worshippers, venerating a mother goddess Ashtoreth, and her male partner Baal—*i.e.*, Lord—besides other minor deities. Sacrifice, including human sacrifice, especially of the first-born, played an important part in their religion, and their sanctuaries, which were very numerous, resembled in some of their worst features, especially their *personnel*, certain Hindu temples at the present day. They practised circumcision, which was commonly performed in manhood, and they had numerous idols, some of which were of an obscene character. In some cases their kings, like the kings of Bunyoro in recent times, were priests; or perhaps it would be more correct to say that they were regarded as the embodiment of the tribal god to whom sacrifice was offered.

It was scarcely possible that a people whose religious ideas were of such a character should

accept at once the higher religion which the Israelites brought with them. The Canaanites were indeed compelled to acknowledge Jehovah as the God, or, as the Canaanites would have phrased it, the *Baal* of the land; but they ascribed to Him the attributes of the Canaanite Baal, continuing at their sanctuaries their ancestral worship, which was little changed except that it was ostensibly performed in honour of Jehovah.

There can be little doubt that the Canaanite element in the nation was greatly in excess of the Israelite, and this being the case, we should expect to find the religion of the Israelite minority influenced by that of the majority. Some families doubtless preserved in a pure form the tradition of the teaching which Moses had given in the wilderness;* but probably many, though holding aloof from the worst of the Canaanite superstitions, would take over other practices which were equally foreign to the religion of Jehovah. It was almost inevitable

* How long a time a section of the people could remain entirely apart from the religious observances of the majority is seen in the case of the Rechabites (2 Kings x. 15 *ff.*; Jer. xxxv.). Since the Rechabites rejected agriculture, they could have taken no part in the great agricultural feasts—the only feasts which are obligatory in the earlier documents of the Pentateuch—viz., Unleavened Bread, Harvest, and Ingathering.

that it should be so; for the Israelite nomads, when they took up agriculture, could only learn it from the Canaanites, and to the Canaanites certain ritual was as essential to agriculture as ploughing or sowing.

But though the Israelite leaven was hidden in a great many measures of Canaanite meal, it had power enough gradually to leaven the lump. Sometimes a king, imbued with something of the old Israelite tradition, would make an effort to abolish the worst of the superstitions which had survived from Canaan. Such were Asa and Jehoshaphat. Sometimes a king naturally superstitious or weak would yield to popular sentiment, and there would be a recrudescence of the old abominations. But with few exceptions the Canaanite system of sacrifice held its ground, and the Canaanite feasts became the feasts of Jehovah.

Nevertheless, we can trace certain definite stages in the progress of religion. In the ninth century B.C., under Jehu, the way was paved for monotheism by the prohibition of the worship in the land of Israel of any god other than Jehovah. In the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. an attack was made by the great prophets on the idols, on the system of sacrifice, and on the religious prostitution associated with that system at the various sanctuaries. The prophets were, indeed, unable to induce their people to abolish

sacrifice; but their attack on its concomitant superstitions led in the seventh and sixth centuries to the limitation of it to one altar; and with the consequent diminution in the number of times when sacrifice was offered, it became easier to lay stress on the weightier matters, justice and mercy and truth. Josiah's reformation, which continued sacrifice, though limiting it to the one altar, was, in fact, a compromise between the Israelite and Canaanite elements of religion; and although in the fifth century B.C. under Nehemiah the sacrificial system was developed to an amazing degree, the apparent triumph of the Canaanite over the Israelite element was not so great as might appear at first sight. The ethical teaching of the prophets came to be accepted as part of the religion of Jehovah without any enquiry whether the ritual system was in accordance with it; and the ritual system had this practical utility, that it separated Israel from the polytheistic nations with which it had to deal—such as the Babylonians and their imperial successors, the Persians and the Greeks—protecting Israelite monotheism from that which might have destroyed it, just as a husk, worthless or even injurious in itself, protects the kernel till the latter is ready to germinate and the husk is no more needed.

Present limits forbid the tracing out of the later developments in the religion of Israel, the rise of individualism, the gradual emancipation of thought from the terrible doctrine that all disaster presupposes a withdrawal of the divine favour, the recognition of the value of martyrdom, the perception that if Jehovah is the God of the whole earth He must desire that other nations also besides Israel should know His will. It must suffice to say that a critical reading of the Old Testament shows us a picture of a ceaseless struggle of mercy and truth against selfishness and superstition, and of the triumph of the good over the evil.

IV.

If the Old Testament were nothing more than the history of a struggle between a lofty conception of God and dead and degrading superstition, its religious value would be very great; for as the prophets laboured to purify the religion of Israel from the Canaanite elements which threatened to overwhelm it, so in these days the Christian Church must strive unceasingly to purge Christianity from the many pagan influences which dilute and pervert the teaching of Christ. Those who labour for the truth of Christ are indeed " the children of the prophets ";

and in their struggle the record of their spiritual ancestors cannot fail to inspire them to more vigorous effort.

But this is not the sole merit of the Old Testament. In every great crisis men find in it a spiritual tonic, giving courage to endure in sure and certain hope of the victory of the good. It was given to Israel to manifest to the world what faith means—that is to say, absolute trust in One Who is the refuge of those who know Him, and Whose everlasting arms uphold and protect even the weakest. Moreover, as Israel has taught the world faith, so from Israel the world can best learn to worship. Hebrew poets have set forth in inimitable language the greatness, the righteousness, the holiness, and, above all, the unspeakable tenderness, of the love of God. In the Old Testament we have an ideal of life ever directed Godward: "I will sing unto the Lord as long as I live; I will praise my God while I have my being."

It is right that we should read the Old Testament with discrimination. It is futile to represent an earthen pot of Canaanite heathenism as a chalice of pure gold divinely wrought; but even the Canaanite pot, when its real nature is recognized, may serve to enshrine a lesson which ought not to be lost. A story which bears unmistakable marks of its Canaanite origin may

yet be profitably used as a parable to teach a lesson worthy of the God of Israel. We know, for example, that God never required the sacrifice of a man's children in the original sense of the word sacrifice, that He "commanded it not, neither came it into His mind"; but Genesis xxii. may nevertheless serve to us as a parable to remind us of our duty. How many a husband or father tries to justify to himself some unworthy practice on the ground that otherwise his dear ones may suffer. To such the story of Abraham, taken as it stands, may serve as a parable, to teach the truth which Jesus taught, that if a man would come to Him, he must, as it were, hate even those who are nearest and dearest to him. God perpetually tries us, as He tried Abraham, by requiring of us a course of action which must entail loss or suffering to those whom we love, bidding us, as it were, sacrifice wife or children for the truth's sake.

But besides the help which the Old Testament, when rightly used, can supply both in our devotion and for our direct spiritual edification, there is another use to which Christians may apply it—a use too frequently overlooked, but of the utmost importance. It was of Israel that, according to the flesh, Christ came. He spoke the language of Israel; He taught as a

prophet of Israel; and, therefore, if we would understand His words, we must study the idiom of the language of Israel, for which purpose the whole of the Old Testament is of inestimable value. We know what absurdities are produced by translating a French book, for example, literally into English, regardless of the idiom of either language. It is, however, commonly overlooked that as great perversion of the sense may result from translating Hebraic idiom literally into English.

No small effort is necessary in order to apprehend the thought of Christ. If such an effort is to be successful, we cannot afford to discard the help which we have already to hand—viz., the study of the Scriptures, which Jesus knew and loved so well, and which, by the application of a searching criticism, He "fulfilled" to the building up of His Church in the knowledge of God.

V

THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY

By R. WEBB-ODELL, B.A.

Suppose one of our soldiers in the late war, smitten down into unconsciousness and escaping with his bare life in the tragic days of March and April, 1918. His last thought had been of confusion, defeat, and despair. The high hopes of earlier days had been shattered. The enemy was pressing in force, apparently irresistible, on Amiens, on Paris, on the Channel ports; and our armies, with their backs to the wall, seemed to have no means of withstanding his onset. Our soldier lingers unconscious for two years, and then is restored by medical science to find our troops at Cologne, the Kaiser in exile, the German, Austrian, and Turkish Empires dismembered, and a crushing indemnity laid upon the fragments which survive. He will hear many explanations of the causes of the change. Some will ascribe the victory to the genius of Marshal Foch, some to the advent of the Americans, some to the miseries entailed by the blockade, some to the campaign of

propaganda. On deliberation, he will make up his own mind, doubtless; but one thing he will not be so foolish as to doubt, that the war was well and truly won.

Suppose a Galilean disciple, so stricken by grief at the defeat and crucifixion of Jesus that he lingered for two years in the delirium and exhaustion of mental trouble in his remote home, ignorant of what was passing elsewhere. He recovers to find that the same Apostles, whom last he had heard of in panic flight, were the heads of a busy and confident community which had covered with its propaganda all Palestine and Syria. He finds that the same priests, who had had no throne for Jesus but the cross, had in great multitudes become obedient to the faith. He finds that a new power of overwhelming force had descended upon the very humblest of the disciples, transforming them into the likeness of their Master. He finds that all agree that that Master is alive, not dead; that all date the beginning of the wonderful change from the third day after the Crucifixion; that all speak of a tomb found empty, but none can produce the body that once it contained. He sees a joy and a certainty hitherto alien from the earth, and a contempt of death and suffering springing from the certainty of that joy. Already, if he be a man of enquiring mind, he

will discover that the details of that first Easter Sunday are obscure. The wonder of the revelation and the daily expectation of Christ's return will forbid a connected story. Some will place the first appearance of the living Lord in Galilee, and assert that He so revealed Himself to Peter. Others will connect it with Jerusalem, with Mary Magdalene, with the empty tomb. He will notice, perhaps, that the accounts are not irreconcilable. But one thing he cannot doubt, if he have any regard for evidence at all. On the third day that happened which turned defeat into eternal victory. On the third day the Crucified One rose from the dead. The greatness of the *effect*, here as everywhere in history, witnesses to the greatness of the *cause*. We may see, in the changed lives and expectations of the disciples, the central and inexpugnable evidence for the Resurrection, and therefore the central evidence for all our Christian faith. Those who would analyze, critically and soullessly, the documentary evidence in the Gospels, start their enquiries a generation late. When this or that detail has been ascribed to varying tendencies of influence in the Church which gave us the *Gospels*, the questions have yet to be faced: Whence came the *Gospel?* Whence came the Church? Assign the historic origin of Catholicity, if you will, to a Pauline syncretism

of Hellenic and Semitic aspirations after righteousness, and the prior question yet remains: Whence sprang the belief which Saul of Tarsus persecuted? Whence the vision that appeared to him on the Damascus road? The presence of the Holy Spirit, the ministry of evangelization, the observance of the Lord's Day, the Eucharist of praise and thanksgiving on the same Lord's Day (no pathetic yearly memory of the prelude to a tragedy, but a remembrance parallel to that of the exodus from Egypt)—these things, in their essentials, Saul of Tarsus *found*, and did not institute; and their historic origin must be sought.

That origin is either grounded on delusion or on truth. If on delusion, we must accept the situation manfully, but must yet observe how utterly hopeless is the pessimism concerning human nature and human progress involved in such an absence of belief. A spring of enthusiasm, of martyrdom, of sanctity, hitherto unknown—and behind it all a lie! The foundation of hope for the woman and for the slave, the widest influence for beneficence the world has yet known—and it all came from a hysterical delusion! Jesus, the great idealist, went down to the grave defeated and deserted; and Caiaphas, and not He, was right in his cynical summing up of the situation. Thus, on

the supposition of "delusion," moral and intellectual integrity were sharply dissociated in the persons of their protagonists that first Good Friday and first Easter Day, and have ever since remained divorced! Surely, since evidence against the Resurrection is not obtainable, only presuppositions of the weightiest kind, only counter-theories of the highest plausibility, can avail to maintain so monstrous a conclusion as this.

From external facts, as all reputable rationalists now admit, no such counter-theory can proceed. The hypotheses either that He did not really die, or that His body was secretly removed from the grave, are seen to be inconsistent with evidence and common sense. The theory of subjective, self-generated visions fails to account either for the definitely early date of the first appearance—"the third day"—or for the equally definite and early close of the series of appearances, just when on the vision-hypothesis it should have been at its ecstatic height. Moreover, no men would have been less likely to see visions and to dream dreams than these Jews, whose conception of Messiahship had been so rudely falsified on Calvary. Kein's objective vision theory is at least respectable. The Almighty despatched "telegrams from heaven" to produce the Apostolic faith. But this view, while

escaping none of the difficulties of tradition, carries with it other grave and peculiar difficulties. Could God only convey a stupendous spiritual truth to men by wrapping it in the grave-clothes of a lie? What Christians believe is not merely that Jesus lives, but that He rose from the dead.

Two concluding observations before we leave this branch of our subject. The objections to the Resurrection are based on a crude conception of matter which the whole trend of modern knowledge tends continually to revise. The Gospel narrative and its deduction, the Catholic Creeds, do not dogmatize as to the nature of the risen body in the manner of some provincial confessions. Some portions of the story assign to it a greater, some a less, corporeity. All the story yields the impression of human faculties endeavouring to grasp, and human language seeking to describe, something hitherto unconceived, something incredibly wonderful and new. We may well emulate in this its reverent agnosticism, content to wait for exact information till that day when we shall know even as also we are known, and confident also that no advances in science can discredit the Gospel narrative. To sum up, the Resurrection is the completion of what was initiated on this planet at Bethlehem: the intervention and the vindica-

tion of God in history, not merely in psychology, but in the arena of human interests and of human life.

So irresistibly cogent is the evidence adduced above that the Christian apologist might well rest there, and not pursue his subject further. Granted the Resurrection, what need we any other witness? There are many other considerations, however, solemn and confirmatory, which may be taken into account. Four only of these will be dealt with in these pages.

The first is the account of the life and character of Jesus presented to us by the Evangelists, only one of whom has any pretensions to education or literary skill. Let us contrast with them for a moment Shakespeare, the greatest of dramatists in his knowledge of the human heart, of whom it has been said, by a not irreverent exaggeration, that, "after God, Shakespeare has created most." What is it that gives to Shakespeare this pre-eminence? As critics point out, it is that his characters *live*, and therefore share with living men that quality of *unexpectedness* which is utterly lacking in the creations of lesser artists. We cannot explain Hamlet, or account for his actions, as we can explain Sam Weller, for example. Yet we feel that Hamlet is a man; Sam Weller a pleasant imagination. As a merely literary problem, the same is true of the

synoptic Jesus as of Hamlet. Many explanations have been given of the historic Jesus. He has been accounted for eschatologically, didactically, mystically, ecclesiastically; and, at most, each endeavour to ascertain the secret of His personality has just added something of value to the study of an inexhaustible problem. This, in itself, gives food for thought. We have either to maintain that the Evangelists, within their limitations, confined themselves to rendering a faithful record, or to assert that unlearned and ignorant men have placed themselves on a level with the greatest human genius. But there is more to be said. Shakespeare—may we say, knowing what was in man?—never once attempted to portray a perfect human being. Inferior artists—Richardson, Thackeray—did so attempt; and, with the whole weight of the Christian tradition behind them, succeeded in little more than the creation of preposterous lay figures. The Evangelists have succeeded where these failed, and where Shakespeare never adventured. Rationalists, such as Mill and Lecky, acknowledge generously the unique moral supremacy of Him whom they would own merely as a Palestinian Jew. Sinless, needing never confession, and yet needing the aid of prayer. A detail surely beyond the compass of the Evangelists' invention, or of any! Perfect,

with all the strength of the strongest man and all the tenderness of the most gracious woman. *In* His age, and fallible, doubtless, in all that was irrelevant to His mission, and yet not *of* His age, transcending its moral delusions and its spiritual limitations; giving to the world an eternal and unconditioned ethic, in which all classes in this troubled twentieth century can at least *see* the one way out from sorrow and calamity, and yet not primarily a teacher, but rather straitened till the accomplishment of a dread baptism. A miracle-worker, and yet—not primarily a doer of good; and yet—limited by the faithlessness of man. A social reformer who yet could envisage the emptiness of mere social reform, and held Himself determinedly aloof from the political ideals of His time. A pious and orthodox Jew who yet could speak with authority, and take upon Himself to re-interpret and to cancel the most binding religious traditions. One who claimed for Himself the most unhesitating allegiance, the most utter self-sacrifice, and yet was meek and lowly in heart, the servant of the servants of God. Optimist and pessimist, poet and seer, obedient to the uttermost, and King to the uttermost—such is the personality of Jesus as revealed to us in the Gospels. He was seen, and His life was recorded, by men, some of whom could little

understand Him, and none of whom could know Him perfectly. That was inevitable. But he who would ascribe the portrayal of Jesus in the Gospel to human invention is not to be congratulated on the acuteness or honesty of his intellect. He who will not yield Him the tribute of his service can little boast of the integrity of his heart.

Yet, if we stop here, the story is maimed of its conclusion, and the secret of Jesus still eludes us. Forced so to record it—as it were, not knowing what they say—the Evangelists assign even the life of lives in a rank subordinate to His death. The work and office of Jesus was to die. Just as Calvary was infinitely more than tragedy, so was He infinitely more than saint. The more we place ourselves in the atmosphere of the Gospel narrative, the more we are led to conclude that He of Whom it tells was more than man, the nearer we are brought to the Catholic doctrine of the Deity of Jesus Christ our Lord.

Our next evidence is the witness of the saints. Jesus has not vanished from the world which He made. The spiritual history of mankind is rich with the wonders of answered prayer. The succession of those called mystics, who have fulfilled the conditions of discipleship, and so have inherited the Master's promises, is the most indubitable Apostolic succession known to the

Church on earth. "Old and young, rich and poor, one with another"—all "have climbed the same mount, and their witness agrees together." Francis of Assisi, Mother Julian of Norwich, Catherine of Sienna, John Wesley, Pastor Hsi, the Indian Sadhu of our own day, all unite in a threefold testimony, and are only units out of thousands through the ages whose message is the same. Differing in every outward circumstance and mental endowment, they witness to an overruling unity in spiritual life. First, they tell us of an ordered, definite progress in the discernment of God—"The Mystic Way"—of a *going on* from grace to grace, parallel to the development of the man Christ Jesus. Secondly, they assert that this is no mere subjectivism or self-hypnotism, but rather a progressive revelation of deity at once transcendent and immanent—in short, a growing knowledge of God. Finally, they would claim that God's strength is so made perfect in weakness that they who *in themselves* are nothing can, *in God*, perform the otherwise impossible. As a matter of fact and history, this witness is entirely true. Statesmen, warriors, men of science and letters, these had their little day and ceased to be. The pageants of empire pass; the august political imaginings of a Dante are as the shadow of a shade; even the inspiration of a Chatham may

endure but for a time. The work of Francis and of Wesley remains, and Francis and Wesley, and all the rest, agree in ascribing the glory to God alone. What are we to make of this unique unanimity in spiritual experience, of this strange empowering of the weak ones of the earth? Nay, what are we to make of the humbler order of facts, that even here and now, in lives not entirely dedicated, that have fulfilled but few of the conditions of discipleship, Jesus is still the greatest world power? What but this? That what some *have* accomplished, all *may*. That ready to all our hands, close to all our lives, there is the regenerating, transforming power of the risen Christ. Even in these days there must be many in London wholly ignorant as to the origin and generation of electric power; but no one can doubt that the power on which our lighting and transport depend *exists*, and that knowledge concerning it may be obtained. May we suggest a like attitude with regard to the existence of the spiritual power revealed in Jesus and conveyed by His Spirit?

Our next appeal is made to the witness for Christ in history, and first to the recurrent miracle of the survival and extension of the Church. Whether Jesus intended to found a Church or no is a question of criticism which need not detain us. It is enough to say that the

first company of disciples was a nucleus from which the Church developed. At the outset it was little more than a party or sect within the Jewish Church, differing only from others in its proclamation of the Messiahship of Jesus. Gradually, and with controversy, it enlarged its borders by admitting Gentiles without the preliminary of circumcision. Gradually there was effected, with St. Paul as the human instrument, a syncretism between Semitic and Hellenic elements, which, while retaining all that Jesus gave of revelation and of ethic, yet made Christianity possible as a European religion. Even the Churches of St. Paul's foundation, however, derived their being and inspiration from the "great hope" of the imminent end of the age, and reverenced very deeply the immemorial sanctities of Jewish Church and temple. The temple fell, the nation was scattered abroad, and the end was not yet. "Where," men said, "is the promise of His coming?" The answer came in the teaching of the Fourth Gospel and in the formation of the Catholic Church. Then—and the comment will equally apply to the subsequent crises of Christian history—the Gospel passed out of one age into another, the same in its eternal content, differing in stress and application to meet new needs, enriched for the changing time. That which

should have been for its falling became to it an occasion of wealth. Four hundred years on we find the Church as thoroughly identified with the cause of the Roman Empire—the greatest secular civilization the world has ever known—as once it was with Judaism. The Empire fell before the barbarians of the North; but not all the courtly subservience of Church officials could make the Church so feeble as to share that fall. Leo, confronting the Goths, is but the type and symbol of the undying Gospel facing new problems and bringing all into allegiance to Christ. Teutonic Christianity takes its place beside Jewish and Greek and Latin presentments of the Christ, one more "broken light" of the many-coloured wisdom of God. Six hundred years more, and Christianity is again faced with ruin, this time through the pride and folly of its own chief pastors. The unity of the Church, God's chief external witness to the world, is broken. East and West separate, each claiming to be the whole Church, and all our Christianity is the poorer to this day for that first and greatest schism. Yet the Gospel lives in spite of the unworthiness of its professors. The great Latin Church is stronger, more spiritual, more devout in the twentieth century than in the eleventh. The Eastern Churches, then, it would seem, so incredibly Erastian and corrupt, how have they

fared? Let the martyrdom of thousands upon thousands testify, laying down their lives for Jesus under the brutal Turkish rule; let the great Church of Russia—now, too, being purified through suffering—add its witness that, though men sin, though human institutions perish, the Gospel does not die. Four centuries on, and the Western Church itself is riven asunder, again not without grave and universal fault. Much was lost at the Reformation which has yet painfully to be recovered. Yet the corruption and worldliness of the Roman Curia, the coarse ambition of secular princes, the conceited theorizings of theologians, could not "doom to death" the faith of Christendom. It was "fated not to die." The national and confessional Churches, begotten at the Reformation, have made, and are making, their full and worthy contribution to the Kingdom of God.

In the eighteenth century a great Bishop declined the throne of Canterbury on the ground that it was too late to prop a falling Church, a great Frenchman boasted that he had extinguished the lights of heaven. The Churches of England and of France to-day are the most eloquent commentary alike on these assertions, and on His prescience and authority who proclaimed to the few at Cæsarea Philippi, "On this rock I will build My Church, and the gates

of hell shall not prevail against it." If mere survival has pragmatic value as a test of truth, how much more to have survived and grown against all expectations and in defiance of all prophecy. This, as some of our opponents are acute enough to see, is in itself a miraculous evidence for the Christian faith.

There is no need to dwell at length on the more obvious witness to Christ, drawn from the course of history since His coming. We need only mention—what is brought out so fully in Brace's "Gesta Christi"—the reforms which have followed the spread of the Gospel. Woman has been enthroned; the sick, the poor, the children cared for; the slave set free. Slowly, with God's slowness, but surely, with God's sureness, the work has been done. A word, too, will suffice for the uniqueness of Christianity as a religion for the whole world. Other faiths are provincial (Islam, for example, only for the torrid zone); this alone is ecumenical, for it is faith in the Universal Man. Once Asiatic, now European, but to be in all likelihood predominantly Asiatic again, it can yet find a home for the African native—witness the Uganda Church—can give a message, and receive from him a message in return.

All these mighty issues spring from the impress of the personality of Jesus upon a few disciples

in an obscure Roman province in the first century. Even in this narrower field of facts the question forces itself, "Who was He?"

Finally, let us consider the evidential value of the Christian doctrines of God and of man, agreeing as they do with the profoundest speculations of modern philosophy and of the surest discoveries of psychology and of science. This evidence is the more valid as theology and, still more, philosophy are but by-products of the historic faith, which is essentially the revelation of a Person and of a Life, and which has been deeply wronged in past ages by being wholly identified with passing systems of thought. We take but two examples from the Christian doctrine of man, and two from the Christian doctrine of God.

Psychology has been forced to recognize that, most deep-seated of human instincts, is a rooted repugnance to reality, the undue yielding to which is, as alienists tell us, the root cause of all mental trouble. Man is ever seeking a way to escape from the pressure of circumstances, from the burden of an unintelligible world. Some find this way in alcoholism, some in drugs; others in field sports, art and letters, religion. But all must find *some* way. It is imperative for human nature. Man, alone of created beings, is out of harmony with his environment. What is this but

the doctrine of the fall, of original sin, of the need of regenerating and prevenient grace? Attenuated or ignored as this teaching has been, especially by us self-relying Englishmen, given from the first to Pelagian theory, it now stands out as affording the only satisfying explanation of a whole range of obstinate psychic facts. A man gets drunk, as the story goes, because that is "the shortest way out of Manchester." But he who finds his way of escape in a loyal acceptance of Jesus is regenerated himself, and reforms Manchester as well. For our purpose, however, the point is this. The conclusions of experimental psychology were anticipated *and accounted for* by Christ and His Apostles nineteen hundred years ago.

The many appearances of pain in the world, the spectacle of nature, "red in tooth and claw," have led men to discredit not only the old argument from design, but also the goodness of God, if, indeed, He exist at all. It would be sufficient, indeed, to indicate that Christianity is based, not on dogmatic reasonings at large upon the relation of God to the world, but on the personality of Jesus, revealing to us as much of God as we are able here to know. "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." We are not now compelled, however, to take refuge in a necessary ignorance, but can boldly challenge the

facts of the situation.* The capacity for feeling pain depends, as we now know, on the development and organization of the nervous system, specifically upon the brain. Only the highest orders of vertebrates are susceptible of pain in the human sense at all, and the capacity for pain possessed by animals is exceptionally low, lower even than that of the less advanced races of mankind, whose insensibility is the constant marvel of competent observers. Moreover, there is a mass of evidence, collected in part from first-hand human experience, that beasts of prey bring with them a natural anæsthetic, abolishing pain and apprehension in their victims. Man brings with him no such anæsthetic, and there is every ground for presuming that the only true pain, other than human, on the earth is that of the domesticated animals, brought under the shadow of the tragedy and of the sin of man. Startling truths, brought recently to light by anatomists and zoologists, but again anticipated nineteen hundred years ago: "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth together until now, waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God." When man is redeemed, nature will be redeemed

* The author owes his knowledge of these facts as to the physiology and sensibility of animals to an interesting lecture by the Rev. Theodore Wood. The inferences from the facts are the author's own.

too, and all, as at the first, very good. But a deeper consideration arises. If Jesus were unique, His sufferings, whether physical or spiritual, were unique too. His exquisite constitution was capable of pain, transcending, both in kind and in degree, that possible to coarser beings. It was a sure instinct of prophecy that so laid stress on the Passion of Jesus, and that so linked with tribulation the possibility of progress. It knew not why. It only knew what the Master taught and His Apostles recorded. It is certain that Christian experience has already verified the truth of the message. The prophetic instinct could afford to wait through all the centuries for the further vindication by human research, and now the vindication has come.

To turn, in conclusion, to the Christian doctrine of God. Physical science, in itself and by itself—and we must remember, of course, that it only purports to deal with a narrow and specifically separate range of facts, and pretends not to account for the essential things of life—has removed Him farther from the universe. No longer is the lightning His visitation, the thunder His voice. The Creator of such a universe as is revealed by modern astronomy is virtually unknown to human faculties, is not even remotely conceivable as a tribal God. The philosopher, for his part, will tell us of an

Absolute, in whom all things have their necessary unity, impassible and unconditioned, more remote still than the God of physical science. And yet, by an aboriginal and universal instinct, the heart of man cries out for God, and is restless till it finds its rest in Him. No Allah, throned irresponsible despot of the skies, nor yet any Buddhistic abstraction, can meet the cravings of the modern man, imperative alike on the side of reason and of devotion. To a people complacently self-satisfied as to their knowledge of God Jesus came, with claims and revelation which earned for Him the blasphemer's death. His proclamation of God as the eternal Lover, Worker, Sufferer, as the universal Father, transcended the needs of His own time, to meet those of the present day. Our reason and our devotion alike crave for a reconciling unity, and we find it in Him in whom God and man, heaven and earth, eternity and time, are united for evermore. Christ had first to be interpreted in terms of God. The problem now has shifted, and God is interpreted in terms of Christ. It is surely most highly evidential that the revelation of our Master should meet such widely differing needs, that all problems of thought are so solved in Him.

Man is differentiated from the rest of the animal world by the possession of an individuality

which can transcend the law of his species. Reason, not instinct, is his primary guide; and in the endowment of free will he has the proof of his creation in the divine image.

Personality, therefore, is God's special gift to man; and unity, which is the attribute of personality, is man's greatest, unaided thought of God. When the Jew degraded the gods of the surrounding nations to the status of demons or of nonentities, and thus substituted monotheism for monolatry, there was a great stage marked in the development of the religion of mankind. But personality is not an ultimate truth, and unity in diversity is the prerequisite of social life. A God Who is only one cannot be known by His creatures unless He be conceived anthropomorphically, unless man has created Him in his own image, which is, indeed, the human origin of all theologies. A God Who is only one cannot *be* love, for it would be in Him at most an adventitious attribute, and He would also be essentially devoid of that seeking sympathy which unites with the loved one, and gains the interior knowledge which alone is knowledge indeed. Very slowly—overheard, as it were, rather than heard in Scripture—the doctrine of the Trinity came to formulation. A treasure, doubtless, in earthen vessels, couched in forms of thought which the world has out-

grown, and needing—in the writer's opinion, at least—a restatement in terms of contemporary thought and science; yet, even so, the nearest approach in speculation to a satisfactory philosophic conception of God, though gathered, at any rate in its main conceptions, from the message of simple folk of the least speculative and metaphysical of the nations. Can there be a surer evidence of our holy Faith than this—that from such earthly beginnings it is yet able to meet the intellectual as well as the religious needs of man?

To sum up briefly. The need of the present day is an aggressive, missionary, forward-looking Christianity, aflame with the fire of its first love. Entrenched ecclesiasticisms no longer suffice. Nowhere is this more to be desired than in the specifically evidential field. The Christian is ready to answer questions, but should be readier to ask them. The Faith and the Church are here, and have to be accounted for. The burden of proof is upon those who oppose, not upon those who uphold the Gospel. We would ask in all seriousness of all men of good will, What estimate can *you* give of Jesus, of His resurrection, of the Gospel story, of His saints, of His Church, of His teaching as to God and man, which is intrinsically as probable as that which Christians give—nay, which has in it any shadow

of probability at all? If, then, the weight of presumption be on the side of Christ, is it not your duty to your intellect as well as to your conscience to make full trial of His claims, to become His disciples, in due course His Apostles too? So will experiment pass into experience; so will the promise be fulfilled, "Whoso doeth My will, he shall know of the doctrine." Not by dialectic, indeed, does God will the salvation of His people; but he who changes his viewpoint (which *is* repentance), and begins to see things as Jesus sees them, must end in confessing, "Truly this is the Son of God."

VI

THE NEW TESTAMENT RECORD

By ARTHUR S. PEAKE, M.A., D.D.

Christianity is an historical religion. It stands or falls with an historical personality, with a life lived here upon earth, with events which happened in space and time. If Jesus of Nazareth never lived, if He lived but we have no trustworthy record of His life, if He died and death meant for Him a return to non-existence, then the Christian religion would rest upon illusion. It is true that the Gospels would remain great literature. They would offer us a wealth of moral teaching, and move us profoundly by their deep spiritual quality, and the central figure would remain for us an imperishable ideal. But much even of this value would disappear if the story were just a romance. For the critic would say that the ideal was too remote from our common life, the moral demand was pitched too high, the religious teaching it contained had no guarantee of reality, while the ethical principles were exposed to serious objections. If, however, the Gospels paint a sufficiently accurate portrait of

a real personality and describe with reasonable fidelity the outstanding events of His career, then the moral principles He proclaimed and illustrated in His own character and action, the faith He taught to others, in the strength of which He lived and died, are not the ethics of a paper Utopia or the religion of cloud-land, but find no little of their guarantee in historical facts.

When we affirm the inseparable connection of Christianity with history, we create serious difficulties for the modern mind. These difficulties are, in fact, so grave that many would view with relief the dissolution of so entangling an alliance. But we cannot accept this way of escape, partly because it would mean the abandonment of Christianity as it has always been understood, partly because other difficulties would remain, and, apart from the historical guarantee of the truths for which Christianity stands, it would be much harder to meet them. We must then face the formidable problems involved in the historical basis of our religion. The Christian position involves both an affirmation of facts and an interpretation of facts. When we say Jesus of Nazareth died upon the cross, we are affirming an historical fact; when we say Jesus died for our sins, we are putting an interpretation upon the fact, transforming a bare event into a Gospel. Difficulties arise in

connection with both sets of affirmations. Our present concern is with the former. One principle must be laid down at the outset. The investigation of alleged facts must follow the method proper to historical enquiry. It is illegitimate to demand that it shall satisfy the standard applied to other types of investigation, such as those of physical or biological science or those of mathematics. Further, the enquiry must not be split up into a series of mutually independent investigations. We cannot, for example, reach a final decision on such a question as the supernatural birth of Christ or His resurrection apart from the general conviction we have formed as to the real nature of His personality. Once more, we must seek to make our study of the evidence as honest and as scientific as possible. We must be guided, not by our wishes, but by an austere devotion to truth. We must rid ourselves, so far as we can, of presuppositions and prejudices, and seek with a single eye to see the past as we can recreate it by historical research and scientific use of the imagination. On the other hand, we should avoid unfairness to the witnesses whom it is our duty to cross-examine, and approach our task in a temper and attitude other than that of a suspicious, captious, and bullying counsel for the prosecution.

The first question we must face is this: Did

Jesus ever live? No reasonable student of history would deny that the evidence for His existence is overwhelming. But as we have to deal with unreasonable people, whose policy is to deny everything and who brush aside the Christian evidence, we must see if we can establish the fact independently of the New Testament. We know that the Jews expected a Messiah—that is, a king of the lineage of David—who would crush the foreign oppressor, lift His nation to unchallenged supremacy, and rule the heathen with a rod of iron. We can trace the Christian people back into the first century of our era by evidence independent of the New Testament, and we find that they, too, believed in a Messiah. But the Messiah whom they proclaimed was very different from the Jewish Messiah. They identified Him with a Galilean artisan who, they said, had been crucified by Pontius Pilate. How did such a sect originate, and how did the Jewish doctrine of a Messiah undergo so strange a transformation? It is said that the Jews had a doctrine of a suffering Messiah. It is just possible that this was the case, but probably it was restricted to quite small circles, and it is very questionable if it arose as early as the first century. But it would not, even if it was earlier and widely accepted among the Jews, account for the rise of a belief in a

crucified Messiah. What is all-important here is not the fact, but the *mode* of death. The Jewish law pronounced a curse on him who suffered by this form of death, and this has always been a great obstacle to the acceptance by Jews of Jesus as Messiah. Accordingly, no development of the Jewish Messianic doctrine could possibly have given rise to the belief in a crucified Messiah, nor could any founders of a new religious society among the Jews, except under compulsion, have hung such a millstone around the neck of their new movement. There is no explanation of this fact that they were driven to assert Messiahship for a Jew who had been crucified other than this—that a Jew whom they regarded as Messiah had suffered this accursed death, and in spite of it was believed by His followers to be the Messiah. We can accordingly deduce with certainty from the mere existence of a Jewish sect based on the belief in a crucified Messiah the following facts: First, the historical existence of Jesus; secondly, His death by crucifixion; thirdly, the belief that He was the Messiah. We can probably go somewhat further. They must, even before His death, have believed Him to be Messiah, for to maintain their faith at all under so staggering a blow was difficult, to rise to a loftier height of faith than they had previously reached was in such conditions a sheer

impossibility. But we can draw a further inference with great confidence. They cannot have reached and held this conviction without the cognizance of Jesus, and they must have known whether He approved or disapproved. If He disapproved, they could neither have continued to hold it in His lifetime nor have maintained it after His death. We are driven, then, to the conclusion that Jesus believed Himself to be the Messiah. Since, however, it is one thing to claim a position for oneself and quite another to convince others of it, we may infer that the impression He made on His followers was such that they willingly accorded this dignity to Him, and maintained their belief in it even after His cause had been irretrievably discredited, as it would seem, by a death which expressed, not simply repudiation by the leaders of His people, but the verdict of God Himself in His law.

So far, then, we have been brought, without any appeal to documents, by a series of irresistible inferences from the undoubted fact that a sect arose in Judaism tracing its origin to a Jew whom its members admitted to have been crucified, but whom they affirmed to be the Messiah. But this line of argument has been adopted only for the sake of unreasonable people. Those who accept the ordinary laws of evidence

will recognize that the direct documentary evidence amply attests the historicity of Jesus. In the nature of the case, this is mainly Christian evidence. But it is not entirely so. Tacitus, the Roman historian, writing early in the second century with a bitter prejudice against the Jews and their contemptible superstitions, and regarding Christianity as touching a still lower depth, gives an account of "Christus," the founder of this execrable superstition, and asserts that he was executed by Pontius Pilate. Naturally, however, it is to the Christian documents that we must turn for most of our information. It is unreasonable to ask for contemporary pagan or Jewish evidence, for Greek and Roman writers disliked and despised the Jews, while an obscure religious sect in Palestine, proclaiming that a Galilean carpenter had been crucified by Pilate, had risen from the dead, and was preached as Messiah, Saviour, and Lord by His adherents, would have been deemed by them too insane even to stir their contempt. Tacitus speaks of the Christians only because they had been executed with atrocious tortures, as scapegoats to divert from Nero the odium of having set fire to Rome. Nor would the Jewish authorities, who were ultimately responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus, who utterly repudiated His claims and regarded Him as a blasphemer,

have been specially interested in perpetuating His memory. We must accordingly go to the Christian records, and there is not the slightest reason why they should be denied a hearing. It must, of course, be an impartial hearing. We must recognize that they were written by believers who looked at the events from a favourable standpoint, who wrote to edify and strengthen their fellow-Christians, to defend the religion and its Founder against misrepresentation and attack, and to commend them to those who were without. And for our judgment on the origin and date and historical character of these documents we must turn here, as in similar cases, to the experts. In doing so, we must not forget that many of the experts in New Testament criticism have entirely broken with Christianity in its orthodox forms, and that some of them could scarcely be considered Christians in any tenable sense of the term.

The earliest documents in the New Testament are probably the authentic Pauline Epistles. The number of those who deny the genuineness of them all is infinitesimal, and the minimum of generally recognized Epistles is seven: 1 Thessalonians, Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Philemon, Philippians. Many scholars allow, in addition, the authenticity of Colossians; fewer, perhaps, that of 2 Thessalonians; some-

what fewer, again, that of Ephesians. The Epistles to Timothy and Titus are generally rejected by scholars who are not bound to traditional opinions, though even in them authentic fragments are frequently recognized. Paul was a contemporary of Jesus, and knew personally some of His leading followers, including St. Peter and St. James, the brother of Jesus. His letters leave no room for doubt as to the historicity of Jesus; they give us some facts as to His life and teaching, and imply more. The dates and authorship of the Gospels are by no means so assured. St. Mark is the oldest of our existing Gospels; it was probably written before the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, but may possibly have been a little later. St. Matthew and St. Luke are partly based upon St. Mark, but also on a lost collection of sayings and discourses of Jesus commonly referred to under the symbol Q. This was probably nearly contemporary with St. Mark, but may have been somewhat earlier. The dates of St. Matthew and St. Luke are uncertain, but they probably lie within the last quarter of the first century. The Gospel of St. John is still the subject of much debate. Its Apostolic authorship is now largely denied, and many think that it contains very little historical matter. I do not myself take so negative a view of it, but we are compelled to

rely in the main for our purpose on the Synoptic Gospels. And here some scholars would contend for earlier dates than I have mentioned. Harnack, perhaps the most distinguished of all, is convinced that the Acts of the Apostles was written by St. Luke early in the sixties, while St. Paul was still alive. This implies a somewhat earlier date for the third Gospel, so that St. Mark and Q would be put back into the fifties at the latest—that is, within thirty years of the death of Jesus. While I believe that this is too optimistic, we are justified in placing our oldest sources at a time when many who had known Jesus were still living, and the tradition about Him in the Church was still fresh. This also guarantees not only the historicity of Jesus, but the preservation of much trustworthy information as to His life and teaching and His personality.

This is confirmed by the presence in the records of elements which can hardly have been invented. With the growing reverence for Jesus, as the historical life receded into the past—a more timid reverence, we might say—there was a tendency to omit or modify features which created difficulties. Examples of such features are the apparent disclaimer of "goodness" in the question: "Why callest thou Me good?"; the confession of His ignorance as to the time of

His second coming; the cry of desertion on the Cross, which suggested that Jesus felt Himself abandoned by God and died in despair; the Evangelist's statement that at Nazareth Jesus could do no mighty works. These and similar features are reported, because they really happened. To have invented them would have been to run counter to the interests the writers were seeking to serve. Moreover, the character is portrayed with such consistency in the sources that it makes the impression of having been drawn from the life; and the personality, the events, and the utterances, are such as entirely transcended the power of the Evangelists to imagine.

I have spoken of the historicity of Jesus at such length because it is so fundamental, and because I think that the more negative criticism may find itself more and more driven to this extreme position. But I have desired to deal with it in such a way as to lay the foundation for further argument. Very few, in fact, question it, or doubt that in our oldest sources the main outlines of His teaching and career are reproduced with considerable fidelity. But several points emerge here to which some reference is necessary. In the first place, the miraculous element is very prominent even in our earliest narrative. The problem is complex and difficult, and demands a more elaborate examination than is here

possible. But the following observations may be made: There is a general tendency to allow that the cases of healing may, as a whole, be historical. They have already been largely paralleled, and it is felt that a personality so commanding as that of Jesus, gifted with faith so illimitable and contagious, may well have effected cures of the most marvellous kind. With reference to other wonderful works, it ought to be said at the outset that we are committed to no theory of the events, but at most to the fact that they occurred. The drift of recent thought and discussion has been to make us more cautious in drawing the line between the possible and the impossible. And we may find that they constitute no violation of natural order. Still, we justly demand unusually strong evidence for events so abnormal. The miracles, as a whole, are free from bizarre, extravagant, and repulsive features. They harmonize with the character of the central figure, fit naturally into the record, and are of a piece with the teaching. It is notoriously difficult to detach them from the general structure of the narrative. Moreover, we cannot finally judge the stories apart from the personality of whom they are told. If on other grounds we are convinced that the claims Jesus made for Himself and those made for Him by the Church from the beginning

are true, then the uniqueness of the personality makes more credible the unique events. The interests of His mission were of supreme moment to mankind, and for their sake, whatever powers over nature were needed could fittingly be granted to Him. To the ordinary man such powers could not safely be trusted, and even now the knowledge of natural forces has far outrun our moral fitness to use them. Even to very good men such powers would offer a great temptation. If Jesus was what His followers believed Him to be, they could securely be placed in His hands. It may be granted that the age was uncritical, ignorant of our ideas of the uniformity of nature, and apt to magnify the unusual into the miraculous; that the witnesses were not trained observers, and that the stories lost nothing in the telling; that parable may have been transformed into miracle; that Old Testament narrative or prophecy may have given rise to some of the stories; but it may be questioned whether the operation of all these forces together suffices to eliminate "miracle" in the strict sense of the term. This is especially the case with the resurrection of Jesus, the central core of which neither the discrepancy of the witnesses nor the explanations of the irreducible facts have sufficed to dissolve.

It is a mistake, however, to suppose that

critical theories are mainly inspired by the desire to get rid of the supernatural. They are largely suggested by the comparison of the documents with each other or of different sections within the same document. It is undeniable that the accounts of the same incident frequently differ. Moreover, we can see that one is likely to be a closer representation of the fact than another, and not infrequently it is possible to explain what causes were operative in creating the secondary out of the original version. There was a tendency to idealize and to soften, an apologetic interest was also at work, and there was possibly a certain influence of later dogma colouring the report of the teaching. But the action of all these forces has been greatly exaggerated. They can be traced more clearly in the later narratives than in the earlier, and, above all, in the Fourth Gospel. Perhaps we ought to be rather surprised in the case of the Synoptists that the contemporary theology has affected them so little. We might have expected the characteristic teaching of St. Paul to have been read back into the teaching of Jesus much more freely than proves to have been the case. But when all is said and done, we have first-rate sources in addition to the Pauline Epistles: St. Mark, Q, the special source employed in the Third Gospel, probably not a little in the Fourth Gospel.

Even the discrepancies are of service to us, for by comparison of different accounts we may be able to work back to the original from which they have come. Even legend, if legend there be, has its value, for it enables the historian to see what the impression made by the personality was. If we stipulate that a canonical document must be free from error in matters of fact, our Gospels will hardly satisfy such a test. But we must not demand too much. We have a right to expect that the sources should tell us all that it is essential for us to know. Judged by the requirements of a modern historian, our documents are meagre and unsatisfactory. They fail to tell us many things we greatly desire to know. But they give us what is vital and essential—all, indeed, that is necessary for their purpose and that we have a right to require. They give us a vivid conception of the personality, a sufficiently trustworthy record of the teaching, a knowledge of the critical events. It is, above all, the first of these which is important, for the chief contribution which Jesus made to religion was not His teaching, not even His teaching about God. His supreme contribution was just Himself, His personality, His character, what He was and what He did. And that is because to know Jesus is to know God. Our fullest and most vivid conception of God cannot be conveyed

to us by verbal description, however copious and exact. Personality alone can reveal personality in its richness and depth, its variety and flexibility, its subtle shades, its unceasing and automatic reaction to environment. And thus it is, as we steep ourselves in the Gospels and our knowledge of Jesus grows in depth and largeness and sympathetic understanding, that our apprehension of God's inmost character and His relation to us becomes more luminous and more profound. Even what may seem the trivialities in the record are not its least precious feature; for in these unstudied words and actions the true nature may be revealed at points which in great moments are apt to be submerged and lost to view.

Yet recent discussions have raised other difficulties which cannot be ignored. I refer in the first place to what is frequently called the eschatological theory. It has, of course, for long been a difficulty that Jesus seems to have anticipated that He would return, and the Kingdom of God would be set up on earth, while some of those to whom He was speaking would be still alive. But this has not been generally regarded as His central and most characteristic message which has been sought in His ethical and religious teaching. Recently, however, it has been urged that the whole thought of Jesus

was concentrated on the approaching coming of the kingdom. The existing constitution of society and its most fundamental institutions would be swept away, and a wholly new order would be introduced by God's sudden catastrophic intervention, and in this new order Jesus Himself, Messiah and Son of Man, would reign upon earth. True, He did give ethical teaching, but this was "interim ethic," designed to control men's conduct in the interval before the new era should come and prepare them to be citizens in that kingdom. No human effort could bring it nearer. Only when the predestined hour had struck would the new divine order suddenly replace the kingdoms of this world. This theory, while of service in calling attention to phenomena in the Gospels which had not received their due, seems to compromise very gravely the claim of Jesus. For it represents Him as the victim of a delusion which did not touch something that lay on the circumference of His thought, and was a mere limitation of outlook shared with the men of His time, but a delusion which lay at the centre of all His interest and was the absorbing theme of His mission.

But this theory in its thorough-going and radical form is grossly one-sided and exaggerated. It represents the Kingdom of God as still entirely in the future, though very near, whereas there are

sayings of Jesus which imply that in a sense it is already present, though not in its fulness. It throws the teaching and the career of Jesus out of focus, placing in the forefront what has proved to be but the temporary vesture of the conception He had formed of the kingdom, and pushing into the background what has proved to be of imperishable significance. And if this was really the essence of His message, and if on this hope the new religion was entirely based, we fail to understand why, when it proved a delusion, Christianity did not collapse. But, as a matter of fact, it advanced at an ever-expanding rate as though nothing at all had happened.

On another side the closer study of the Synoptic Gospels has suggested to many that the development which Christianity took, notably under the influence of St. Paul, was quite other than Jesus had intended. When we pass from the Synoptic Gospels to the Pauline Epistles we seem, it is urged, to be in another world. Jesus is a preacher to whom the common people listen gladly. He speaks with simplicity, charm, and power on the deepest themes, which He illuminates by His matchless parables; while St. Paul seems like a Christian Rabbi entangled in tortuous dialectic on theological problems which have for us long lost their interest. Jesus, it is said, preached a lofty ethic, marked by excep-

tional inwardness and delicacy, and had no concern for theology; while St. Paul defaced that lucid and precious Gospel by transforming it into an abstruse theology which he defended in arid controversy. But we must point out in answer to this that Jesus was concerned above all things with religion, and religion implies theology. To this the retort is made that with the theology of Jesus there is no need to quarrel, but that of St. Paul is quite another matter. Jesus made the Fatherhood of God His starting-point, the Kingdom of God the goal. But St. Paul placed Jesus in the centre, and gave an entirely new prominence to His Person and work. The Galilean teacher and martyr was turned into a divine being, the pre-existent Son of God; while His characteristic teaching was thrust into the background, His death and resurrection were viewed as a drama of salvation; in a word, theology became mythology. Not a few have argued that even in the first generation of the Church this radical departure from the pure and simple teaching of the Master was made.

Must we believe that St. Paul effected this fatal transformation? Not consciously, assuredly, since his devotion to Jesus was too deep to admit of such disloyal perversion. But it is asserted that St. Paul's mystical experience of Jesus made him feel independent of a know-

ledge of His teaching. This cannot be conceded, for, with his adoration of Jesus, His lightest word would have claimed his reverent attention. And in face of the bitter hostility of those who denied his Apostolic status and the genuinely Christian quality of his teaching, he could not have neglected to familiarize himself with the career and teaching of his Master without presenting his antagonists with a welcome and fatal weapon. His alleged mythology roused no controversy in the Church, such as was excited by his doctrine of the Law; and the leaders of the Church at Jerusalem recognized the validity of his Gospel, and had already interpreted the death of Christ as suffered for our sins. Indeed, it has become more and more difficult to fasten the responsibility on St. Paul, and much stress is now laid on earlier movements in the Church itself in this direction. It is urged in particular that before the rise of Christianity a Messianic theology had been elaborated in Judaism, and that the primitive Christians, convinced that Jesus was the Messiah, simply applied this doctrine to Him. But this could hardly have been done unless they had felt it to be in harmony with the character of Jesus as they had observed it and His teaching as they remembered it.

Really the hypothesis is unnecessary. For,

in the teaching of Jesus itself, this doctrine is essentially contained. It is sufficiently attested, even if we limit ourselves to St. Mark and Q. Jesus thought of Himself as Messiah. This is implied in the stories of the temptation and the triumphal entry, in the confession of St. Peter at Cæsarea Philippi, in the title over His cross. The very fact of the Crucifixion implies it, for the one charge which Pilate could not afford to disregard was the charge that Jesus was setting Himself up to be King in place of Cæsar. We may go further. Jesus believed Himself to be the Son of Man. This is attested by every one of our extant sources. The term all but entirely drops out of use as a title of Jesus except on His own lips. We may, therefore, infer that for some reason it was not congenial to the early Church, and was only retained in the Gospels because it was too deeply rooted in the tradition to be ignored. The Son of Man was known in Jewish apocalyptic as the pre-existent heavenly being who was to come with the clouds of heaven to judge mankind and reign upon earth. This rôle Jesus believed Himself destined to fulfil, but He expanded and deepened its significance by connecting it with the figure of the suffering Servant of Yahweh, whose mission was to reveal the true God to the world and to suffer for the sin of mankind. He lives

in an intimate and unshared relation to the Father as His Son. He stands above all His predecessors, and is of higher rank even than the angels. He forgives the sins of men, and will be their Judge. He claims an absolute obedience which overrides the dearest and most authoritative of human relations. His Blood inaugurates the New Covenant, and He gives His life a ransom for many.

It is true that the emphasis is different in Jesus and in St. Paul. But for this neither St. Paul nor his predecessors were responsible. It was fitting for Jesus to be more reticent than His followers in speaking about Himself; nor could detailed teaching as to the great redemptive facts which closed His earthly career have profitably been given to those who were incredulous of His predictions of the Passion. But if Jesus truly was what our earliest documents represent Him as claiming to be, the death and the resurrection must be momentous in their significance. They created a problem, and to its solution St. Paul contributed most. If his account of the Person and the work of Jesus is mythology, we cannot acquit Jesus from the responsibility of originating it.

But that He was deluded by megalomania is assuredly not easy to believe. For, by the testimony of the wisest and the best, no figure

in history is more marked by perfect poise and mental balance, none more utterly sincere, more searching in His moral judgments, more relentless in His exposure of unreality. Such was His inmost consciousness; for us it is decisive. Its truth is attested by the Gospel portrait. What such men as our Evangelists might have been expected to achieve had they been left to themselves may be guessed from the Apocryphal Gospels. They had, indeed, no skill to fashion such a figure from their own resources. It is convincing, because they drew it from the life. The Jesus whom they present to us is not the stiff and artificial product of laboured invention, but free and natural, moving as a living man among living men. He is a Jew of His own country and His own age. But He is more than the flower of Judaism, the heir to its rich and wonderful inheritance. He rises sheer above all these limitations of race and country and time. He is strange in no land or age, alien to no nation, but at home and welcome in every century and among every people. The passing of the years does not render Him obsolete. He keeps pace with all our progress, He marches at the head of each generation, beckoning humanity forward to new and higher endeavour.

But He is not merely the guide of the pilgrim, setting the goal plainly before him, and mapping

out the path he is to follow. He comes to us in our weakness and our despondency, our weariness and despair; He unseals within us the springs of courage and hope, and fills us with His divine energy and power. So no day passes over us but the claim He makes to be our Lord and Master and Saviour is confirmed by vast multitudes who have in their own experience verified its truth.

VII

JESUS CHRIST

By C. F. NOLLOTH, M.A., D.Litt.

An excited crowd is seldom to be credited with wisdom, either of word or action. Yet in one case, at least, this rule does not hold good. When Christ rode into Jerusalem, the first day of the week before His death, "all the city was moved," and out of the stir came a question, a very momentous and a very wise one, so wise that, wherever men have heard that name and have begun seriously to think about it, the same question has come into their minds: "Who is this?"

The object of this essay is to raise the question once again, and, so far as the space at disposal will allow, to indicate in outline what may reasonably be said in reply to it. That day an answer was at once forthcoming. It came from another crowd—the multitude who were accompanying Him. They had no doubt whatever. "This is Jesus, the prophet, of Nazareth of Galilee." A confident answer, and one based on personal knowledge. But does it suffice? It

could establish Christ's identity with the Rabbi who went about doing good, healing and teaching; and so far it appears to have satisfied the questioners. But there is much more in the question than a matter of identity. As time went on it gathered a deep and an enlarged meaning. Men began to ask themselves: "*What is He?*" They were not content to think of Him merely as Jesus, a prophet who had lived at Nazareth, and had moved on the ordinary plane of human experience. Other questionings arose within their minds. They came to see that He was not as other men, or even as other prophets. When those who had been with Him in the course of His ministry recalled well-remembered words and acts of which the marvellous and the supernatural elements were less surprising than the love and graciousness which gave rise to them, they had no doubt whatever that He had come from a higher world than this and, when His work was done, had returned to it.

Thus, the apprehension of those who first companied with Him moved along this line of growing knowledge and insight. They knew Him first as man. It took time to see in Him a personality of which the visible manhood was at once the veil and the expression, now disclosing, now hiding the true self. But time alone would not have sufficed to reveal Him.

Men saw in the Theophanies, which form so characteristic a feature of Old Testament religion, an intimation that God was very near to His people, and that they might look for "greater things than these." The question asked by Solomon at the dedication of the temple, "Will God indeed dwell on the earth?"* seems to have haunted the minds of devout people, and helped to attune them to a state of expectancy which the Gospels clearly indicate.†

We have to take account of this condition of things if we are to understand what the first Christians thought of Christ and—what is even more important—the light in which He claimed to be regarded by them. It prepared men for a disclosure. It enabled them to see that the perfection of human nature, as they recognized it in all that He said and did, could not explain the secret of His personality. He was man, indeed—man at his best; but, as we shall try to show, while they felt this, they realized that manhood could not account for heights and depths of character that now and again revealed themselves, nor for self-disclosures of His own which, though they proceeded from the lowliest of men, seemed to place Him on the throne of God.

* 1 Kings viii. 27.

† St. Luke iii. 15 (*cf.* St. John iv. 25, 29).

We shall therefore proceed to enquire:

I. What Christ said about Himself; what He claimed to be.

II. What His first followers thought and believed about Him.

I. It is very generally admitted that Christ regarded Himself as the subject of prophecy, and as the Messiah for whom His people had waited, with varying degrees of expectancy, through the greater part of their history.* If He had not done so, it would be difficult to explain the extreme importance which the Apostles attached to the proof that the crucified Jesus of Nazareth was none other than the looked-for Messiah.†

But our Lord put forth a higher and a wider claim than that of being the Jewish Messiah. He styled Himself "Son of Man." Whatever may be the precise value and meaning of this self-chosen title—a question much debated—there is little doubt that Christ adopted it in preference to "Messiah," not in order to reject the latter title—for that He never did—but because the latter title was too much involved in the political and mundane aspirations of the Jewish people. He Who came to save the world was the crown and glory, not merely of a separate

* St. Mark xiv. 61, 62; St. Matt. xxvi. 64.

† Acts ii. 36; iii. 15, 18; vii. 52.

nation, but of mankind as a whole: "the Son of Man," at once the offspring and (to use a later term) the representative, in His own Person, of the whole race.

So far we have not gone outside the limits of pure humanity in our statement of Christ's claim to be Messiah and "Son of Man." But He made a far greater demand on the faith and allegiance of men. It is quite certain that He thought of Himself as "Son of God" in the sense of an unique relationship shared by no one else. This appears from the expression, "My Father." He makes a sharp distinction in speaking to His disciples between "My Father" and "your Father."* There is the same connection in name and in the exercise of paternal love, but a whole world of difference in the inner and essential relationship.

In the one case, Sonship is due to creation and adoption; in the other, it is a necessary element of the Godhead, an eternal relationship, so that God has always been Father as the original source of all being, and Son in respect to its expression. For perfect love and goodness must find an outlet for its exercise; hence the fact of the Eternal Son, who, though said to "go forth" from the Father, to be "sent" by Him, is yet

* *Cf.* St. Matt. vi. 1, 14, 15, 26 with St. Matt. xviii. 10, 19, 35; St. John viii. 19, 28, 38, 54.

ever with Him,* bound by the spirit of love and unity, the Holy Spirit, who thus forms a third "Person" in that Divine Society which is God.

But we gather that our Lord made this claim to be in an unique sense Son of God, not only by inference from His use of terms, but from His express declaration. Challenged at the supreme crisis of His career, as He stood before the Council, "Art Thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" He said, "I am." It was on the resulting charge of "blasphemy" that He was condemned.† There is the same consent to the application of the title in His reply to the confession of St. Peter at Cæsarea, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God"; "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but My Father which is in heaven."‡ It implies full assent to the truth conveyed, irrespective of the question whether St. Peter was conscious of the full meaning of his words.

In the triple Synoptic accounts of the Baptism and the Transfiguration we have the testimony

* St. John i. 1, πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, "tourné ou dirigé vers Dieu," J. Réville, *Le Quatr. Évang.*, p. 98.

† St. Mark xiv. 61, 62; St. Matt. xxvi. 63-66.

‡ St. Matt. xvi. 16, 17 (*cf.* St. Mark viii. 29). Christ confirms the relation in which St. Peter acknowledges that He stands to God with the words, "My Father which is in heaven," an indication of the priority of the Matthæan source of the incident.

of the Eternal Father. In each case Jesus is acknowledged as "the beloved Son."* There can be no question that this voice from heaven, confirming the verdict of His own consciousness of Sonship, as it was gradually developed in the course of His experience of life, was intended to be, and actually was, a message of strength and comfort to the human heart of Jesus—an external sanction to the movements and impulses of His own spirit as it responded to the Father's love.

This consciousness of a divine and unique Sonship made itself felt in several ways.

He speaks as one who is perfectly at home with all the mysteries of the Godhead. His knowledge of the Father is on a complete equality with the Father's knowledge of Himself, and this is the ground of His capacity to be "the perfectly sure revealer of the whole wealth of divine mysteries."† He speaks, not merely as a man singularly possessed by the Holy Spirit, but, if we accept the assurance of the disciple who knew Him best, as "God only begotten, He

* The term ἀγαπητός appears to mean "only." *Cf.* Gen. xxii. 2 (lxx.).

† Dalman, "D. Worte Jesu," p. 232; *vide* St. Matt. xi. 27; St. Luke x. 22, a passage derived from the earliest Gospel source, "Q." It tends to prove the authentic character of the type of saying which the Fourth Gospel attributes to Christ, "He that seeth Me, seeth Him that sent Me," and others similar (St. John xii. 45; xiv. 9).

Who is in the bosom of the Father."* He is thus the exclusive bearer of revelation. All our knowledge of God comes through Him. His authority is original and it is supreme, for it is that of God Himself. He is "the Truth." All heaven lay open to Him. Hence, all that He said of life and death, of God and man and man's salvation, was said out of the fulness of knowledge. Christ as the teacher of divine things was infallible. "We speak," He says of Himself and those taught by Him, "that we do know, and testify that we have seen."† If He were not sure and unerring, He could be no guide to the wandering soul of man. We should still be waiting for one who could speak the decisive word on human life and destiny.

In all things pertaining to His mission from the Father He was infallible, unerring. But infallibility is not the same thing as omniscience. Though He came from God He lived here as man and, with His humanity, He accepted certain limitations on the full exercise of all His divine powers. He expresses surprise and He asks questions, clearly for the purpose of obtaining information.‡ He used the language of His time, or He would not have been understood.

* St. John i. 18, according to the true reading.

† St. John iii. 2.

‡ St. Mark vi. 38; viii. 5, and parallels; St. John xi. 34.

It is a mistake to expect from Him decisions on literary or scientific matters that would be in advance of the current thought. There is no trace in the Gospels of any willingness to relieve men of trouble by forestalling the results of study and inquiry, or to provide them with a royal road to learning. There were many things of which He Himself was ignorant, as His questions show. He had one end in view when He came among us—the glory of God in the salvation of man; and for this His knowledge and His authority were complete and all-sufficing.

But nothing discloses the Deity of the Lord Jesus so clearly as the wonderful assumptions which permeate His teaching. Himself "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," accepting without a murmur the place between two thieves which the world assigned to Him, "meek and lowly of heart," as He owned Himself to be, He speaks, when He has cause, as from the very throne of God. To what order of being do you assign one who can look a whole sorrowing, sinning world in the face and say, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest"?* Surely if to that of manhood merely, even at its best and highest, you must be repelled by the effrontery of the

* St. Matt. xi. 28. The "I" is emphatic in the Greek.

saying. Yet, from all you know of Him, that is a position in which you cannot acquiesce; and the experience of all who have taken Him at His word will uphold you. Or, again, what is the status before God and men of one who, looking forward to the Day of Judgment, when the Son of Man shall come in His glory, proclaims that the decisions of that day will turn on one thing—our service, or lack of service, to Himself in the persons of His "brethren." Here, too, the thought of mere manhood, exalted to however high a degree of excellence, is hopelessly inadequate. The idea shocks. It is safe to say that a religion based on claims such as these, if put forward within the ranks of mere humanity, would not have outlived the generation which was deluded by them. Nothing so revolts our sense of what is right and fitting as the inordinate pretensions of an overweening pride. But of this we can detect no sign in the bearing of Jesus Christ.

And here we touch on another characteristic, which is quite inexplicable if He was no more than man. Always, as we follow His footsteps, there steals upon us the conviction that here is one who is without sin. Twice, at least, He makes this claim.* "For Him, all men are sinners; He has no wounded conscience. They

* St. John. viii. 46; xiv. 30.

need repentance and forgiveness; He does not."* But to be sinless is not to be without capacity to feel for the sinner and to enter into his case. Already, before His ministry began, Christ had been brought face to face with sin. Temptation had assailed Him, and continued to do so all through. He knew, as none other, the awful nature of what, in its excess, is a "departing from the living God."† But it remained outside. His inner life was untouched. His human will, free to yield, stands firm. No discord mars the serenity of His bearing. The sins that He denounces—and who is so unsparing as He in face of the hypocrisy and hardness which block every avenue of grace?—are without Him. Between the Reprover and the reproved there is a difference which cannot be bridged. The sinless Son of God and the sinner in his sin are in this wide as the poles apart. Goodness is the possession of God alone.‡ And this Christ claims to share.

* Von Soden, "Die wichtigsten Fragen," p. 91.

† Heb. iii. 12.

‡ St. Mark x. 18 has been interpreted to mean a repudiation of moral perfection by Christ (Pfleiderer, Weidel, etc.). It is nothing of the sort. Our Lord will take no idle compliment. Goodness in its perfection is the property of God alone. "Why callest thou Me good?" The question is to make the young ruler think. It draws his attention to the Person with whom he is conversing, like those other

Now, in all these self-disclosures there is confessedly a spirit of assertiveness which is quite unparalleled in history. No one else has put forward such claims among the sons of men. They cannot be explained away. They lie embedded in the oldest Gospel sources, and as soon as the men who first heard and wondered at them have organized themselves into a Church, charged with a commission to go and make them known to all the world, it is Christ and these claims of His that form the staple of their preaching, His Name into which their converts are baptized. How is this to be accounted for? History is the grave of hollow pretensions by whomsoever they are put forward. But history has given its sanction, and admitted that the claims are well founded; while the Church points to them as the ground of her existence, and goes on her way with the song: "Thou art the King of Glory, O Christ; Thou art the Everlasting Son of the Father." He has been taken at His word. No demand of faith and allegiance put forth by Him has been refused. We ask again, How is this to be accounted for?

---

questions, "Whom do men say that I am?" (St. Mark viii. 27), "What think ye of Christ?" (St. Matt. xxii. 42). He should consider what his words imply if brought to the test of reality. Christ *probes* the imputation. He nowhere rejects it.

Certainly not through the mere impression made upon the first disciples by the character and teaching of Jesus, great as that impression was. Christianity was not built upon the Sermon on the Mount, nor upon the effect of a daily intercourse with a mind of singular purity and elevation. Doubtless the influence of companionship with Him formed a necessary step in the attainment of their subsequent belief. But there was the Cross—that overwhelming catastrophe, for which, as they acknowledge, all His warnings had left them quite unprepared.

To those who loved Him best it seemed the end of all things. Where now were the claims, the intimations, the veiled allusions which had so perplexed while they attracted them? "We trusted that it had been He which should have redeemed Israel, and beside all this, to-day is the third day since these things were done."* They do not complain—the spell of His presence is still upon them; but they have well-nigh lost all hope. And then comes the Resurrection, with all it meant of vindication of His claims, of confirmation of His teaching, of explanation of His purpose. Then these great sayings were not the ebullitions of a vain, self-centred enthusiasm. Those acts of healing and of beneficence were not the work of one who was playing

* St. Luke xxiv. 21.

a part. His trust in God, His constant reference to the Father's will, His days of labour and nights of prayer, were not so much struggling after effect. He is risen. He has overcome death. And sayings hardly noticed and never understood come back to their minds. Putting together all they had learnt in their daily experience of His companionship—all the humility, with all the majesty of His bearing, His tenderness and His strength, His love of children and His courage and endurance under wrong—putting all these recollections of the past beside the wonder of His re-appearing and the joy of once again beholding Him in His glorified manhood, they own Him Lord and God.*

II. We cannot stay to trace the steps by which the disciples arrived at this stage of their religious experience. They were rapid in the case of certain elect souls, who had been to school with the prophets and spiritual leaders of their people. Others were slow in apprehension, and were chided for their dulness by the Saviour Himself.†

* St. John xx. 28.

† Luke xxiv. 25. This double strain of perceptiveness is a stumbling-block to some of the critics, who, thinking that they can find a progressive receptiveness in the Synoptic Gospels, are inclined to doubt the truth of the early confessions which are a characteristic feature of the Fourth

But one thing is clear. The belief that Jesus was Christ and Lord and, in a sense shared by no one else, the Son of God was already the possession of the Pentecostal Church when, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, it came forth with its message of salvation.

The Gospel of the Apostolic Church—the "good tidings" that it proclaimed to the world—was from the first the Gospel of a divine Saviour. We can call two witnesses to prove this allegation: the preaching of St. Peter on and shortly after the Day of Pentecost, and the conviction of St. Paul that his teaching in no wise differed from that of the primitive Apostles.* To St. Peter, whose thought is dominated by the effect of the Resurrection, Christ is "the Prince of life"; "He is Lord of all"; "both Lord and Christ."† We may be sure that when engaged, after Pentecost with showing that "the Son of the living God" was identical with Jesus of

Gospel. As a matter of fact, the quickness of apprehension recorded by St. John rests on evidence quite as secure as that of the slowness of perception to which the Synoptists bear witness. "The idea of progress, when allowed to dominate the mind, is as fatal to the formation of sound judgments in historical theology as in other matters." With the early receptiveness of St. John the Baptist and Nathanael compare that of Simeon as recorded by St. Luke.

* Gal. ii. 2, 9.

† Acts iii. 15; x. 36; ii. 36.

Nazareth, he did not go back upon his confession at Cæsarea Philippi.* To St. Peter Christ is Lord, a title applied in the Book of Acts both to God the Father and to the Son.

St. Paul came into this heritage of faith at his conversion, a year or two after the Resurrection. It was the same Gospel that he began to preach: "I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received."† When he came to compare notes with those who were in Christ before him, and "communicated unto them that Gospel" which he had been preaching, they had nothing to say against it, for they gave him "the right hands of fellowship."‡ He claims to have received his Gospel "by the revelation of Jesus Christ," and to be indebted for it to no man.§ But the point to be emphasized is the complete agreement of his own Gospel with that of the earlier Apostles. Now we have every means of knowing what St. Paul's Gospel was. One outstanding feature of it was the divine personality of the Redeemer. Therefore, in

* St. Matt. xvi. 16; St. Luke ix. 20. It is untrue to the evidence to say with A. Meyer that "to the Jewish primitive community Jesus was still a human Messiah." Lepin is nearer the mark: "The Christ of the first days of the Church is the Son of God, sharing in the powers and privileges of God, the Christ all Divine."

† 1 Cor. xv. 3.

‡ Gal. ii. 9.

§ Gal. i. 12.

addition to the testimony of St. Peter, we have the witness of St. Paul that the primitive Gospel of the Apostolic Church implied the Godhead of Jesus Christ. It was into this faith, and nothing short of it, that the first converts on the Day of Pentecost and henceforward were baptized. Christian baptism, as soon as it was practised, as it could not be until after the descent of the Holy Spirit, was always in the Name of Jesus, and carried with it the promise of the Spirit. Who this Jesus was St. Peter plainly declares in the first Christian sermon—"both Lord and Christ."* But it is to St. Paul that we owe the first attempts to bring together and to harmonize the different conceptions which attach to the terms "Jesus" and "Lord" when applied to Christ. He is the earliest New Testament writer to state in clear terms the truth, which St. John tells us was taught by our Lord Himself, of His pre-existence with the Father.† He is the first writer who declares plainly that Jesus is God.‡

Thus, from the very heart of the earliest Christianity, within a few years of the Cross

* Acts ii. (*cf.* verse 38 with verse 36).

† Gal. iv. 4, "God sent forth His Son." Col. i. 17, "He is before all things." 2 Cor. viii. 9, "Though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor."

‡ Rom. ix. 5; Phil. ii. 6 (*cf.* Acts xx. 28; Tit. ii. 13).

and the Resurrection, comes that truth about the Person of our Lord which we connect with His incarnation. In other words, when men had time to think about Him under the guidance and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they at once perceived that He Who had moved among them during His ministry, Who appeared to Saul outside the gates of Damascus, was not merely the flower of humanity, the product of an age-long development, the pride and crown of His race. He was not so evolved from the bosom of humanity that He owed nothing to any force outside of it. On the contrary, His appearance among men was an incursion from another world than this. He " was with God " and He " was God " from all eternity; but " in the fulness of time," at a certain moment in the procession of the ages, He was " sent forth " from the side of the Father, laying apart the glory which He had with Him " before the world was," and " took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men."*

It is a great mystery. In the Person of His Son, God has consented to subject Himself—the infinite, eternal God—to the conditions of a finite life in time. In order to lead that life, without ceasing to be what He had ever been, He took to His unchanged divine personality

* St John xvii. 5; Phil. ii. 7.

human nature. He "was made flesh," "He emptied Himself" (of His glory). And yet, in this life of humiliation and self-sacrifice, there dwelt in Him "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."*

This, then, is the answer of the primitive Christian community to the question, "Who is this?" Embodying the personal experience of the Apostles, taught by the Spirit, confirmed "with signs following," it is the only answer that has been found to satisfy the conditions under which Christ manifested Himself to the world. He appeared a man among men. Otherwise they could not have consorted with Him. His glory was veiled, withdrawn from sight, or they could not have endured His presence. Yet such was His indissoluble union with the Godhead that He could say, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father"; "I and My Father are one."† Those who looked upon Him saw God. The self, the *ego*, the personality was divine, made bearable to the society of men by taking to Himself man's nature, in which He lived a true human life, suffered, died, rose again, ascended, and ever liveth at the right hand of the Father.

Only gradually did the first Christians arrive

* Col. ii. 9.

† St. John xiv. 9; x. 30.

at this conception, compelled to it by facts of their own experience as reasonable beings. Through knowledge of Him as man, they came to see that Manhood failed to furnish a category within which the actualities of His life and character could be contained. He was constantly transcending human nature. Not that He ever so acted as to do violence to what is best and greatest in Manhood. But now in a strange word, hardly understood at the time, yet coming back to memory under some spiritual stress or strain; now in an act which showed that all the resources of heaven were at His command; now by a mode of bearing Himself that was quite indefinable, and that attracted while it amazed them,* His followers were led irresistibly to the conviction that in Him they had had to do with one whose inner life lay within the circle of the Godhead. And so they came to worship Him—Him, the lowliest of men—and were not reproved.

The reconciliation and adjustment of the thoughts which jostled and surged in their minds they did not attempt. They were persuaded that He was Man, yet more than Man. It was reserved for later times and for subtler intellects to reduce the seemingly incompatible elements of His personality to a system. Even St. Paul, with all his training in Rabbinical

* St. Mark x. 32.

scholarship, his Greek learning, and his almost unequalled power of thought, if he had the capacity, did not try, to arrange in an ordered whole the constituents of his belief.

Faith came first, a faith that carried with it every force of heart and will. Theology as a science, a body of reasoned knowledge, was to come later. This order is natural. Apprehension of separate facts must always precede their co-ordination into the framework of a science. We should not demand from the Church of the first days what it is unreasonable to expect. Believers had their own experiences; they led their life, and they gave forth their message that others might share their certainty and enjoy their peace. "That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us."*

With ourselves in these later days things are different. We have not to work our way progressively from the Manhood to the Godhead in order to know Christ as our Saviour and Lord. We shall have our difficulties if we are serious thinkers. But we enjoy this advantage: in our Baptismal Creed and in every ordinance of our religion, as well as in the completed canon of Scripture, we have the full truth presented for our acceptance.

* 1 St. John i. 3.

But that which comes to us on the authority of Church and Bible has to meet the shock of contact with enquiry and criticism carried on under conditions very different from those of the time when the facts and the truths of the Christian Faith were being proclaimed by the Apostolic Church. Historical criticism has become a science, although its rules are constantly being set at naught by those who most loudly appeal to it. We have learnt to distinguish the primary and secondary values of the sources underlying our present Gospels. We have found that no great religion can be safely studied in isolation, and without reference to the light thrown upon it by comparison with the other religions with which at any period of its career it has come in touch.

In view of all this change of method and outlook, it is often asked whether we are justified in holding the Creed of our Fathers with the conviction that it is grounded in Holy Scripture, as well as in the personal experience of holy lives in every age of the Christian Church.

"The answer is in the affirmative." The critical study of the documents and the rigid application of new tests to the verdicts of history have only brought out into clearer light the Deity as well as the Manhood of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ.

VIII

THE ETHICS OF CHRIST

By PERCY GARDNER, D.Litt.

The foundation of Christian morality has been laid by Jesus Christ Himself so clearly and so strongly that it is beyond doubt or denial. Man, He said, has two duties: First, a duty to God, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength"; and, second, a duty to man, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." These two commandments are not put side by side as equally important, but an immense stress is laid on the first; it is the great commandment, and the second is but complementary to it—that is to say, all morality is to be rooted and grounded in the love of God; even the love of one's fellows derives from the love of God its power and its sanction. This is very noteworthy. Most ethical writers discuss man's duties, his duties to his family, to his friends, to his fellow-citizens; and then try to find for such duties a religious ground, to show that the service of

man is really a religious service. But there is a deep contrast between the way of the moralist and the way of Jesus in two respects. In the first place, the service of mankind is spoken of by Jesus as an offshoot and a consequence of the service of God; and, in the second place, He regards all service as only duly carried out when it is rooted and grounded in love—love of God in the first place, and love of man in the second place.

Thus arose the great feature of the earliest Christian teaching, which has been called by the author of "Ecce Homo" the enthusiasm of humanity. It was not so much the love of individuals, or even of humanity, as a love for the divine in every man, and the conviction that everyone, however perverted or degraded, could not wholly lose the divine element in his nature, which was worthy of infinite regard. And this enthusiasm, working like leaven, procured in time the victory of Christianity.

The precepts of Jesus concern us more in their relation to religion in practice and the ethics of the Church than in relation to their historic setting. But the historic setting also is a matter to be considered. The context shows that both the clauses of His ethical basis are quotations, and meant to be quotations, from the Jewish law. The clauses do not occur together in the books

of Moses; one is to be found in Deuteronomy and one in Leviticus, and the putting together of them was, as Mr. Montefiore has pointed out, a brilliant innovation. But the phrase as to the love of God in particular was, in fact, the nearest approach to a creed which Israel ever possessed, and it was constantly repeated at Jewish assemblies, so that it must have been familiar to every hearer. It expressed the fundamental devotion of the race, and its mission in the world, the conviction of a spiritual power in contact with man, a power devoted to righteousness, which inspired man with every power and virtue which he possesses—that is, throughout, the line taken in the Jewish Scriptures. It was God or the Divine Spirit who gave strength to Samson and wisdom to Solomon; who put words of power into the mouths of the prophets and valour into the hearts of the warriors of Israel. "The spirit of the Lord God is upon me," was the exclamation of Isaiah. "I was no prophet," said Amos, "neither was I a prophet's son, but I was a herdman and the dresser of sycamore trees; and the Lord took me from following the flock, and the Lord said unto me, Go, prophesy unto My people Israel." This overshadowing power, this very present help in trouble, was the inspirer of Jewish religion. And love for such a power, a love absorbing every

human faculty, dominated the leaders of the Jewish race. It finds constant expression in the Psalms: "I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength"; "Ye that love the Lord, hate evil"; "My heart and my soul crieth out for the living God."

Thus it was no new commandment which the Saviour gave to His Jewish hearers, but it was a new and loftier reading of a commandment with which they were familiar. And no one used to Jewish literature and history could doubt that the love of the deity whom they recognized was intense in the race; that it bore them through innumerable pains and troubles, brought back the nation from exile, sustained it amid bitter persecution, was its salvation and perpetual refuge.

But there is this to be said about love, that it grows up far more readily and is more easily sustained when the object of it is near and concrete. It was the limitation of the idea of God in Israel, its simplicity and anthropomorphism, which made love easy. A deity of the tribe and confined to the tribe, a deity who bestows worldly prosperity on his votaries, a deity who is thought of as closely like man himself, may become an object of intense affection even to the most ordinary people. Every Jew felt that if he fell away from Jehovah

he would cease to have any right to exist, would be without help and hope in the world. When the Saviour and His disciples raised the idea of God, so that the power they proclaimed was no longer merely Jewish, no longer merely anthropomorphic, but the creator and preserver of the world and all who dwell in it, the love of God became less easy, less simple, and the reaching up to it more difficult and far higher from the spiritual point of view.

If, then, we accept the general view of morality set forth by the Founder of Christianity, what does it imply? In the first place, what is this love of God, which is to be the basis and spring of action? What the love of our fellowmen is we all know in greater or less degree, for every man who is not a monster or a demon cherishes love for some person or other. But the love of God! Is it not some exalted state, reached perhaps by a few saints, but quite beyond the reach of those who mingle daily with the world, who have their living to make, who go on from day to day in a routine which is not of their own choosing, but which is fixed by the society in which they dwell? One can think of the love of God as a predominant motive in the case of St. John, St. Francis, Thomas à Kempis, Father Damien among the lepers. One can think of such men as these as

constantly inspired and lifted up by a love of God so pure and so urgent that it had become to them a second nature, and they lived in it as an atmosphere to breathe. If they lost it, they would be like shells from which the kernel has been taken, like corpses from which the vital breath has departed. But we are not of that kind, nor capable of such a noble transfiguration.

Yet it is quite clear that when the Saviour spoke as He did of the love of God, He was not addressing or thinking of such rare and exceptional souls. He was addressing a throng of very ordinary Jews, an audience of average people such as might be found in the streets or in Hyde Park. Not that He came down to their level, or diluted the pure spirituality of His teaching to the thinness of daily life. But clearly He intended His words for them, thought that they bore a meaning for each of them, and that each could appreciate that meaning if he chose seriously to try to grasp it. He was stating fundamental facts of human life and conduct—facts not obvious, but certainly true—the truth of which would appear to all who reflected. The love of God, of which He spoke in language so calm and deliberate, was not out of the reach of all but a few people of highly spiritual nature, but at the door of every heart and close to the spring of every will.

That love is the most potent of all urgings towards action is a simple fact of psychology. Everyone knows how easily any deed is done when love prompts it. This is true in everyday life. We may help our friends from a conscientious principle, but we can do so with infinitely greater ease and far greater effect when we desire to please one we love. In the case of moral conduct also, if we act from a motive of love we are far more efficient and far happier. We may call to mind a memorable saying in "Ecce Homo": "No heart is pure which is not passionate; no virtue is safe which is not enthusiastic."

But Jesus transformed the love which the better sons of Israel bore to God by infinitely raising and expanding the idea of God. He made a new revelation of God by showing His followers that God was infinitely worthy of being loved, and thus Jesus laid the foundation of a new religion. He proclaimed that we should love God because God first loved us, that the Father in heaven is the source of every good, and that His providence watches over every moment of our lives. And, further, the life of the Saviour on earth was a practical exemplification of the love of God; "God was in" Him "reconciling the world to Himself." The doctrine of the Incarnation was worked out and put into words

at a later time, but it was built upon the love of Jesus for men, His suffering and dying for men, His revelation of God as the only object of the highest phase of love. And the love of mankind was in the life of the Saviour so closely blended with the love of God that it grew with it as two plants may grow from one root.

But let us turn from the primitive revelation of Christianity to the Spirit of Christ as working in the modern world of thought and action. What does the love of God mean for us ?

There are two radically different ways of regarding what the Greeks called the *œcumené*— the world of our fellow-men. The first is the way of secularity, which regards it as the sum of virtue to improve the physical and social conditions of the society in which we live. The secularist places the love of one's neighbour at the apex of virtue, and considers that to help him is the whole of morality. The first precept of Jesus, to love God more than one's neighbour, he sets aside as either an unmeaning phrase or as a pernicious perversion, the invention of priests and visionaries.

The immediate results of thus turning the eyes of conduct from heaven to earth, of giving up the divine sanction and the ideal character of goodness, are visible enough in the modern world wherever we turn our eyes. Such re-

striction is openly defended by the secularist moralists. Mr. Belfort Bax, for example, writes: "According to Christianity, regeneration must come from within. The ethics and religion of modern socialism, on the contrary, look for regeneration from without, from material conditions, and a higher social life." There is the contrast in a nutshell. The secularist thinks that morality can be established by legislation; that strikes are the chief means for securing the happiness of the proletariate; that State regulations as to housing and drainage and hygiene will produce not only a healthy but a happy people. The Christian thinks that God is the Source of all good, and that it is by working with God that man can improve his surroundings, first by striving for what is just and kindly in thought and action, and as a result in improving physical conditions also.

We may see by observation how the secularist principle, in setting the love of our neighbour before, and in the place of, the love of God, tends by an inevitable law of human nature to the degradation and demoralization of a society. For it sets aside ideals, shuts out the view of the infinite heaven above us, and makes us look with the eyes of practical materialism on the lives of people about us. Thus, more and more the visible and concrete—that which can be seen

and measured—becomes the one standard of conduct. One sees that better houses, more palatable food, more provision for ease and enjoyment, are the things which men most obviously desire and strive for. Social service becomes the systematic effort to improve the outside of men's lives. And since all these things can be provided by money, the search for it becomes the one absorbing object of life. After a while, even the ends are lost sight of in struggling for the means by which they can be attained. Everyone is battling eagerly for wealth: the meaner souls that they may spend it on their pleasures; the nobler souls that they may promote the physical well-being of their friends, their class, or it may be their town and their country; and in the battle for wealth, one after another the ideal purposes of life are set aside and disregarded. "Is not the life," said Jesus, "more than meat, and the body than raiment?" But in the struggle for wealth, men will easily disregard their bodies and their lives. The community is beset on the one side by the reckless and devastating competition of capitalists, and on the other by the hard selfishness of trades unions, which pursue their ends in complete disregard of the general good. Hence, an utter eclipse of real values and universal striving for material advantages.

One of the earliest recorded sayings of the Saviour, when He was hungering almost to death, is, "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of God." And all the rest of His ministry was devoted to the setting forth of the will of God, the doing of which is as necessary to man's real life as the bread is to the body. He taught that there exists, around and beneath the visible world, an ideal realm where God's will prevails, where righteousness and beauty and truth are the dominant principles; and that it is the primary duty of every man to do something to realize that world upon earth, to transmute the visible order of society into an ideal order, to bring down the city of God on to the earth. And as love is the source and origin of all life in the world, so the love of God, He taught, is the source of all higher and ideal purpose. It is only by loving the divine ideas that we can be stirred up to work for them, to suffer for them, to live in them. Only by such love do men become united to God, and through God to all men who love and live for the Kingdom.

But in reality the love of God, thus interpreted, belongs not only to the lofty spiritual natures, the mystics of the cloister, but in a greater or less degree to everyone who has in him the least spark of spirituality. Even the secularist

moralists, whatever they may say, do, in fact, usually accept ideals. They do not really believe that man can live by bread alone. Every touch of unselfish devotion has really in it something of the ideal. When a son or daughter accepts a more painful or a more narrowly limited kind of life in order that he may save a parent, he acts not merely for the love of that parent, but also for the love of God, even though he may not in words recognize God. When an artist refuses to be content with mere conformity to the popular taste, but endures penury in order to strive after the ideal in art, he shows that he loves God. When a man of science "scorns delights and lives laborious days," and even ruins his health, in order that he may learn more of the secrets of nature, he shows that he loves the God who is behind nature. When a lover sets aside the passion which burns in him in order that he may meet a call of duty, or in order that he may avoid any degradation or defilement of the loved one, he works by a higher love than human, and does something to bring in the Kingdom of God on earth. The call of the Kingdom is constantly sounding in every life, and in every day of our lives we are helping or hindering its appearance.

It is very likely that many or most men, when they are moved towards the higher life

by the urging of the ideal, would deny that they acted for the love of God, but put forward some far more trivial and mundane motive. This is the way especially with Englishmen, who in their quiet, inexpressive way look askance at all profession of high motives, and regard such profession as a mark of priggishness or of hypocrisy. Many of the men who were really swayed by high motives when they threw up professional prospects and the most cherished hopes of their lives to undergo the bitter hardships and cruel dangers of the Great War would, if asked why they had done so, merely say: "I wanted to do my share." "I could not hold back when others came forward." "I am not a cur." In old days people spoke of hypocrisy as the homage paid by vice to virtue; but with us hypocrisy is often the homage paid by virtue to convention. We are so shy and so averse from boasting that we English constantly represent our motives as lower than they really are. But we must try to look beyond lofty pretensions on one side, and cynical disparagements on the other, into the truth of things. And if we do so, we shall see that men cannot give up what they greatly desire, or undertake what they bitterly dislike, without some urgent motive. And all, except the thoroughly sordid, have beneath the surface a spring of idealism. When

they see clearly the ways leading upwards and downwards they will usually choose the former. "We needs," says Tennyson, "must love the highest when we see it." To many or most men, probably, the leading of the ideal would be represented by the thought of those whose opinion they valued; they would see the ideal reflected in human friends. But this does not really alter the case. When we walk by moonlight, we really walk by sunlight reflected from the moon.

The Founder of Christianity, in nearly all His utterances, contented Himself with stating the great underlying truths of religion. He did not attempt to apply them to practice, so as to form a moral code for conduct. In the eyes of Jews and Mohammedans it is a great defect of Christianity that the Founder did not draw up any scheme of duties or lay down any definite rules. The Mosaic books and the Koran contain a quantity of rules and regulations for daily life, rules which every adherent of the founders is bound to keep unless he would become a renegade. Undoubtedly the absence of an ethical code in the Gospels does make Christianity a more difficult religion for weaker brethren. But, on the other hand, it makes the religion capable of an infinite development, a constant adaptation to the temperament of

nations, of Churches, and of individuals. It was, as it was first preached, an essence which had to be diluted before it became fit for general preaching and acceptance. It was a spiritual religion, which might be embodied in more than one religion of authority or institution. And if the Founder had departed and left His deposit of teaching to be adapted to the conditions of the world by the unaided work of His followers, or of various groups of followers, the flowing spring of Christianity might have been divided into innumerable little channels, which might soon have disappeared in the sands. But the Spirit of Christ worked in the world after the visible Christ had departed, worked as a constantly active leaven, transmuting all values, conquering all opposing forces, establishing in the world a visible Church which carried on the work of the Founder and remoulded society. The Church was never really undivided; from the beginning there were visible different tendencies, and even when most at unity in itself the Church was never infallible. It suffered from all sorts of human frailties and shortcomings; it very soon became contaminated by the world which it was leavening; it suffered from want of wisdom, want of courage, want of charity. But, on the whole, it kept burning in all ages the torch which the Founder had lighted.

The divinely kindled enthusiasm was never wholly wanting, even in the darkest period of the Middle Ages.

The first to set seriously about adapting the pure spiritual teaching of the Saviour to the frame of mundane society was St. Paul. St. Paul had probably never seen Jesus in the flesh, nor heard Him speak; yet he was inspired by Christ to develop and adapt the spirit of His teaching. For him also the love of God was the root and ground of all goodness, and the Christian code of morals, which he was the first to draw up, arose from the application of the spirit of Christ to the conditions of life in the social world. St. Paul, whether we regard his spiritual enthusiasm, his keenness of intellect, or his practical good sense, was one of the greatest men of genius who ever lived. But his genius was shown, not by the promulgation of an entirely new scheme of duty and ethics, but by the adoption of what was best in the world of the time, and baptizing it into Christ, transmuting it by the Spirit of Christ into something of a higher type. The domestic and private morality of the Jews was, at the time, at a far higher level than that of the Gentile world; and it was therefore natural that St. Paul should build on Jewish foundations. It has been the domestic and family morality of the Jews which has preserved the nation amid

the terrible persecutions which the race has endured. And it is St. Paul's adaptation of that morality which has preserved Christian society from the laxity in sexual and social affairs which brought about the ruin of the ancient world. But it could not have exercised this saving influence if it had not been based upon the love of the God revealed in Jesus Christ. Stoicism, the highest morality of the Græco-Roman world, never had much influence beyond a narrow circle of the enlightened. But the Pauline morality was adapted to all classes.

Of course, St. Paul, in his practical rendering of the precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," was not infallible. Indeed, he expressly disclaims all infallibility. And in some respects, according to modern thinking, he made mistakes by supposing that the existing social conditions—slavery, for example—were permanent, whereas they were defective and transient. But the world's debt to him is enormous. On his foundations the Christian Church by degrees built up a system of morals, which, however defective, is incomparably the best which has ever been put forward. At the Reformation no great changes were wrought in it; it was the Roman venality and materialism against which the great reformers revolted. There were in those days revolts against Christian

ethics; but they were local and partial, and they were put down by the general voice of the Churches, Roman and Reformed. To-day there is a much wider, if a less definite, revolt against Christian morality, a revolt which has for the moment gained the upper hand in Russia, and which is strong in all the countries of Europe. But up to now its power has only been critical and solvent; it has never succeeded in setting up a new system of ethics, and, in fact, has never seriously tried to do so. It has assumed that if the old landmarks of morality are removed, an ideal state of things will immediately ensue. This is, of course, a delusion, almost an insanity. One cannot venture to say that it is not possible that some un-Christian frame of society may hereafter be discovered which may endure, but it is fair to say that no frame as yet suggested would have the least chance of endurance. All the new Utopias are built up, as was the first and greatest of them, in Plato's Republic, without any due regard to the essential facts of human nature; and they can no more stand than a house can stand which should be built in disregard of the law of gravity. "Every plant," said Jesus, "which My heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up." And so it has proved in every age. All attempts at a non-religious scheme of ethics have been overwhelmed

by degeneration and decay. The most notable of them, the attempt at the French Revolution to put liberty and equality in the place of the service of God, led in a few years to the military tyranny of Napoleon and to a great reaction.

Among the conflicting currents which appear on the surface of the troubled ocean of modern ethical tendency one must command, at least, the respect of all Christians. This is the endeavour to work back to the actual precepts of the Founder of Christianity, and to find in them a remedy for the selfishness and blindness of mankind. In particular, men of blameless character and profound earnestness, especially among the Friends, have turned to the Sermon on the Mount in St. Matthew's Gospel as a guide in the darkness. Their tendency has been to preach non-resistance of evil; that instead of fighting our enemies we should suffer in patience; instead of punishing crime we should try to convert the criminal by kindness; that we should regard all men, even yellow and black men, as brethren, and make love of all the ruling principle in life. One mentions these enthusiasts with respect, for some of them certainly have gone through suffering for their principles. But their position is one which a little consideration shows to be hopeless. In the first place, they are never consistent. Some of the precepts of the Sermon

on the Mount they accept; others they simply ignore. They go to prison rather than bear arms; they endure theft rather than appeal to the law; they devote themselves to works of mercy and kindness. They are ready not to resent injuries, but do they give to everyone that asks, and lend to every would-be borrower? In that case all private property would be doomed. Tolstoy, who had the candour to acknowledge this fact, made over all his property to his wife, who supported him: an obvious subterfuge. Non-resistance of evil and refusal to possess property has been sometimes practised in the world by small and devoted societies. It was accepted by the mendicant orders of the medieval Church, for a short time by the original society of Christians, and long before by the Buddhist monks of India. But to pretend to accept literally the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount, while living in a comfortable house and engaging in business in the world, is a mere self-deception. They are obviously inconsistent with any ordered civil society, unless interpreted with regard to conditions.

We cannot in this age of the world throw aside the experience of the Christian Church through all its ages of existence, and go back to the simple and child-like surroundings of the first century. Perhaps serious attempts to do

so in any age may help the world by a vision of pure and simple life. But it is much more to the point in the present complex state of society that those who call themselves Christians should in business rigidly observe the laws of honesty and honour, should devote such wealth as comes to them to high and ideal ends, and banish from their homes greed and luxury. Plain living and high thinking with charity will bring men nearer to the spirit of the Master than asceticism and the shirking of duties to society, except in the case of a few devoted souls to whom the way of asceticism may be the road to life.

In the ethical life of our time there is a thing quite as necessary as good intention and enthusiasm. That thing is a quiet and impartial intelligence, which will consider in a dry light the results of various courses of conduct in order to determine which are justified. The teaching of the Saviour in the Sermon on the Mount requires as a supplement His teaching that all principles of action must be judged by their fruits. To regard the consequences of beliefs was the Christian way long before it was the way of the Utilitarians. The difference between the Christian and the secularist Utilitarian is not in method, but in estimate of values. The secularist considers only consequences which can be seen and measured, and which belong to

the outward conditions of life. The Christian believes that life develops from within; that health in the souls of men will produce happiness and a nobler order in society; that it is the striving after the ideal, and not a struggle for the good things of life, which really helps. And although at present the enormous increase of wealth and spread of comfort have given undue advantage to the spirit of materialism, yet it is not in the nature of materialism permanently to satisfy the spirit of man. And we have only to look around us to see to what a quagmire it leads. Setting out to improve the circumstances of life and to produce wider happiness, it only succeeds in enthroning envy, jealousy, and discontent in our midst. In the last century the hunt for material prosperity was carried on by capitalists without regard to moral considerations. The earth far and near was exploited in utter disregard of the claims of other races, and of the degradation and squalor of the town worker. Even slavery was tolerated by most Christian countries. We are reaping the harvest then sown. The pursuit of wealth in disregard of moral considerations has spread to all classes of the community, and has had its natural results in short-sighted egotism, in dislike to steady and honest work, in the conflict of classes and the unsettlement of the financial world. And

the enmity and jealousy between nations seems even to be increasing, and threatens to wreck the noble efforts to establish a League of Nations, and to bring in a danger of terrible future wars. The way to a settled order must needs be long and difficult, and can only be followed if our leaders combine wisdom and moderation with a better and kindlier feeling between man and man.

It is easy to see the perilous condition of the modern world, and it is tempting to try short cuts towards the reconstitution of society. But we have to deal with facts as they are: the consequences of past lines of action cannot be easily set right; rather, they can only be remedied by high idealism combined with steady and persistent study of facts and of human nature. The Christian doctrine, that man is a spiritual being, and that society can only be healthy when it is based on the love of God and man, is eternally true.

As there is a widespread distrust between classes, so there is a general rebellion against the ethical teaching of the Christian Churches, which is accused of being unreal and out of date. Especially in regard to the morality of sex there is extreme unrest, and a readiness to try reckless experiments. But anyone who considers how the future morality and even the future existence

of the race is deeply involved in these matters will be unwilling to upset the family morality laid down by early Christianity, and more or less dominant in Europe ever since, unless it can be clearly shown to be inconsistent with happiness and with human nature. Mere revolt, unless it leads to a new and stable order, can lead to nothing that is good, but may easily lead to race suicide. But these are matters too great and difficult to be dealt with in so slight an essay as the present. They can only be rightly approached by a Christian heart combined with a scientific mind, on the possibility of which combination the future of Europe depends.

IX

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

By HASTINGS RASHDALL, D.D., D.Litt., D.C.L., LL.D.

There was a time when Christians were disposed to think of morality as a set of rules arbitrarily imposed upon mankind by God, and communicated to them in a series of supernatural revelations which were to be accepted solely on the evidence of miracles historically proved. This was never in its full extent the view of the greatest minds in the Church. The greatest Christian teachers have all with one consent believed in the existence and authority of conscience. Most of them have recognized the existence in the human mind of a power of seeing for itself what was intrinsically right or wrong. Most of them have believed in the view of Bishop Butler, that there is "a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions: which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good;

others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly." They have seen in this power a revelation of God's will, indeed, but not of an arbitrary will. They have taught that God commands things because they are intrinsically right; not that they are right simply because God commands them. "God's nature," in the words of the great Anglican theologian Hooker, "is a law to His actions." Still, in spite of this teaching, there has been at some periods, even among the learned, and there still survives in popular conceptions of Christianity, a disposition to think of Christian morality as consisting in a number of arbitrary rules imposed from without by an external authority like Acts of Parliament or the commands of a General.

I need not dwell upon the causes which have led to the abandonment of this way of looking at the matter. More and more Christians are disposed to treat revelation in the region of ethics—whether the revelation contained in the deliverances of the ordinary conscience, or the higher degree of revelation which comes through the great teachers and prophets of mankind—as a gradual development and enlightenment of man's natural, but none the less God-derived,

power of seeing the difference between right and wrong, and to base the authority even of Christ Himself very largely on the supreme and unique appeal which His teaching makes to the heart and conscience of mankind. It would be difficult to find a modern argument for the divinity of Christ which does not make much of the fact that now, after the lapse of nearly two thousand years, the fundamental principles of Christ's moral teaching appeal to the consciences of the best men as no less true than when they were first taught by Him. In the details of morality there has necessarily been continual development, continuous fresh applications to the changing needs and circumstances of successive ages; but when we look back at the most modern developments of Christian ethics, we can see how they are all really implied in the teaching of Christ, and the Christian will be disposed to see in this process a fulfilment of the promise that the Holy Spirit, working in the minds of men, and especially in that society of Christ's followers which we call the Church, should "take of Mine, and shall declare it unto you."

It is extremely important that we should recognize the necessity of such change and development in the details of morality. If it were claimed that Christ put forward a body of

detailed rules which should be equally binding upon all men at all times and in all stages of civilization, philosophy and ordinary common sense alike would protest against the possibility of such a code. What in detail any man ought to do in any complication of circumstances must depend upon a multitude of conditions, and these conditions are ever changing. It would have been impossible for a teacher who lived in an age which had no hospitals to lay down how much we ought to give to them, to insist upon the observance of sanitary laws at a time when such laws were unknown, or to give rules for the punishment of offences which should be equally suitable to the most barbarous and the most civilized state of society. No rules could deal with the infinite variety of circumstances and social conditions; had such rules been given, they could not have been understood, nor could they well, without a perpetual miracle, have been handed down to us unaltered. No religion which professed to supply such a detailed infallible code could possibly have become a universal religion. One of the great qualifications which Christianity possesses for being a universal religion—a religion equally adapted for all times and for all nations—is the fact that its Founder made no such attempt, and confined Himself to laying down a few general

principles of life and conduct. All else in His teaching takes the form of illustration or application to the simplest cases and the circumstances of His immediate hearers.

What, then, were these principles? They may all be reduced to the two great rules of love to God and love to one's neighbour. These rules were not unknown to the Jewish morality of His time. They are laid down in the most legal book of the Jewish Scripture—the Book of Leviticus—and the best of the Rabbis were quite alive to their supreme importance. But the morality taught by the Scribes and Pharisees laboured under two great defects: (1) It was the tendency of Jewish ethics to treat "my neighbour" as meaning—at least, in the full extent—at most "my brother-Jew"; and (2) the Mosaic law practically put on a level with eternal moral principles a multitude of ceremonial rules—laws about avoiding contact with a corpse, about sacrifices and offerings, about abstaining from certain kinds of food. Our Lord did not positively tell His hearers not to observe these rules; He observed them Himself when they did not interfere with the higher law of love, though not with the punctilious strictness upon which the Pharisees insisted. But He laid down principles which must, when they came to be thoroughly appropriated, lead to the sweeping

away both of Jewish exclusiveness and of Jewish legalism. "That which entereth the mouth cannot defile the man." These words contained the death-knell of the whole system of clean and unclean meats which was vital to Pharisaic religion, and constituted the great barrier between it and the Gentile world. It was especially the teaching of St. Paul which brought home to the Church what was really implied in this teaching of its Founder. He taught that the Mosaic law was not binding upon Gentiles at all, and it soon ceased to be observed even by Jewish Christians.

When we say that all Christian morality can be reduced to these two great principles, it must not be supposed that the value of Christ's teaching preserved in the Gospels is limited to the bare enunciation of these principles. The value of the Gospels to us consists, not in the bare enunciation of the "Golden Rule," but in the penetrating originality with which Jesus Christ brought out the full meaning of the rule, the way in which He applied it to the regulation, not merely of outward conduct, but of desire and motive and aspiration, and the thoroughness with which He attacked and pushed aside principles and ideas which were inconsistent with it. The Stoics had taught the duty of universal benevolence, but they never taught it

with the force and persuasiveness with which it is taught in the parable of the Good Samaritan. Rabbis had taught that love includes forgiveness, that God is forgiving, and that men should be so too; but they had not taught it so simply and beautifully as Jesus in the parable of the Prodigal Son. Hardly ever, if ever, had it been taught before that, if love is to be universal, it must extend to enemies (whether national or private enemies) as well as friends. We cannot fully appreciate the moral revolution introduced into the world by the teaching of Christ without dwelling in detail upon His most memorable sayings and parables, and on His applications of the great law of love to such matters as the love of enemies, forgiveness, self-sacrifice, the danger of riches, humility, purity, repentance, the duty of making others better as well as happier, the duty of avoiding "stumbling-blocks," the danger of hypocrisy. But for this there will be no space in this short essay. Our special subject is the application of Christian morality—that is to say, the fundamental law of universal love—to social problems. And this application may most conveniently be dealt with by discussing briefly some of the objections commonly made to our Lord's teaching when considered as a practical rule of conduct for modern communities.

1. *The Use of Force.*—It is often contended, sometimes by Christians—by the Society of Friends, for instance, and in a more consistent and extravagant way by such modern Christians as Count Tolstoy—that Christ intended altogether to forbid the use of force, and that no one can really be a consistent disciple of Christ without condemning all punishment, all war, all resistance to force. Is this the true meaning of His teaching? In reply to this question I would say:

(*a*) Jesus Christ was an Oriental teacher, and it is natural to an Oriental teaching Orientals to teach by means of paradox, by startling sayings never intended to be taken quite literally or without the modifications, exceptions, reservations which the application of all general precepts to the details of practical life demands.

(*b*) It is very easy to show that, in many cases where the literal application of His precepts strikes us as practically inconsistent with the welfare of society as we understand it, He could not have intended this command to be taken literally. We cannot suppose that He who taught that we are to love all men, even our enemies, meant us to take literally the command to hate father and mother. He taught that in certain circumstances to call a man a fool might be as bad as murder, because it might express as

much hatred; yet He is reported on several occasions to have used the very word Himself. He said, "Resist not the injurious person"; yet the "cleansing of the temple" was, in its way, an act of violence. We cannot suppose that, when He spoke of cutting off the offending member, He meant to recommend actual self-mutilation. We must therefore conclude that these paradoxical sayings were not intended to be taken as literal rules of action immediately applicable to the duty of all men in all circumstances, but as illustrations of the duty of universal love. What He meant to condemn was the spirit of revenge, of personal or anti-social hatred. It is always right to love—*i.e.*, to desire the true good of every human being with whom we come into contact. In very many circumstances love will prescribe the literal forgiveness of injuries in the sense of submitting to loss, the not exacting of penalties, the returning of good for evil. In other cases the interests of society will demand resistance to illegal violence, the expression of resentment by word or deed, the demand for reparation, legal prosecution. What is the right conduct to be adopted will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. One of those circumstances is the attitude of the offender. Sometimes our Lord's own injunction to forgive is qualified

by the condition that the offender repents of his wrong, and desires reconciliation: "If he repent, forgive him." The spirit of malice or personal revenge is always wrong. What the injunction to forgive means, when translated into the cold form of formal ethics, is "Act in such a way towards the injurer as will best promote the true good—not the mere maximum pleasure—of the offender himself, and of all those other persons who are no less our neighbours." Sometimes the true good of the offender himself will demand some expression of resentment or punishment: much more often that is demanded by the interests of society in general. "Resentment," as Bishop Butler puts it, "is not inconsistent with good-will; for one often sees both together in very high degrees, not only in parents towards their children, but in cases of friendship or dependence where there is no natural relation." "The injured person ought to be affected towards the injurious person in the same way any good man uninterested in the case would be, if they had the same just sense which we have supposed the injured person to have of the fault, after which there will yet remain real good-will towards the offender." Butler, perhaps, hardly does justice to the way in which forgiveness—of the most literal kind—touches the heart and conscience of the offender

and moves him to repentance. Nothing appeals to the better side of most men so much as love, and there is no such convincing proof of love as forgiveness of a personal injury—just because it is so hard.

(*c*) It is easy to show that in many cases we have to choose between contradicting the letter of these paradoxical commands and proving unfaithful to the spirit of His teaching. To stand by while a ruffian brutally assaults a woman, on the ground that he is a man and a brother, and that we are bound to love him, would be to show the reverse of love to the woman, who is no less our sister. Habitually to allow criminals to go unpunished would be very bad for the criminals themselves. Christ always put moral well-being above mere pleasure and self-indulgence; and such a policy would be injurious, and therefore unloving, to thousands of persons, no less our brethren, who would suffer if such indulgence should become universal. I assume that punishment must, from the Christian point of view, be remedial or medicinal, preventive or reformatory, not retributive. The "retributive theory of punishment" seems to me to be wholly opposed to the spirit of Christ's teaching, as it is to the enlightened conscience of mankind, though it is frequently defended even at the present day by some philosophers and

by theologians anxious to bolster up "theories of the Atonement" which have no foundation in the teaching of Christ.

2. *The Question of War.*—Exactly the same principles which justify punishment within the State justify the waging of war by one State against another in certain circumstances. So long as no international tribunals exist for the adjustment of international quarrels, or so long as the habit of obedience to such tribunals is not generally established, war is the only means of defending the rights and liberties of one nation against an aggression on the part of another. Exactly the same principles apply to the employment of force by one nation against another nation as apply to the use of force by the community against offending individuals. A Christian nation should go to war only when the common interest of all nations—not merely its own honour and glory, or even its own purely national interests—demands it. Patriotism is noble, because it represents devotion to the good of the community; but, as Edith Cavell said, "patriotism is not enough." A Christian nation can only fight in the maintenance of rights and liberties which it is for the common interest of mankind to defend. And when the war is over, exactly the same principles which demand a forgiving spirit in the individual will be applicable

to the settlement of terms of peace. For obvious reasons their application will be in many ways different, but the principle is the same. Terms of peace should be settled in the interests of human society generally, and the interests even of the offending nation must be given their due weight. After the conclusion of a righteous war, the punishment of an offending nation may often be demanded; but international punishments, like State punishments, must be preventive, deterrent, reformatory, not mere explosions of national hatred or revenge; nor must any attempt be made to impose upon the offending nation conditions which will involve permanent humiliation or unduly fetter its national development.

3. *The Question of Property.*—The same people who suppose that Jesus Christ taught the duty of unlimited non-resistance frequently, though not always, hold that He taught also the duty of unlimited giving, and that no one can be a genuine Christian who does not divest himself of all his property, and lead the life of a wandering mendicant. Much the same considerations apply to this part of His teaching as to the case of non-resistance. Here, also, we may show that our Lord clearly did not lay this injunction upon all men. It must be remembered that (as M. Paul Sabatier has remarked) Jesus did not,

especially in the earlier part of His ministry, think of Himself as founding a new religion (though in point of fact He was doing that), but rather a new Apostleship. It was not all His hearers, not even all His converts, whom He summoned to join His missionary band and to engage in preaching the good news of the Kingdom of God to their fellow-countrymen. St. Luke alone, among the Evangelists, represents Him as saying in a general form: "He that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be My disciple."* If He did use these words, and if He meant them to be taken quite literally, we must suppose that He meant them to apply only to those whom He called to be His "disciples" in the stricter sense, to those who were called to join His band of mission preachers. To lead the life of the mendicant friar was the form which the life of the religious teacher—the religious teacher anxious to proclaim new ideas—naturally assumed in that age, and he would be a bold man who would say that he knows of a way in which the new truth about God and human life could have been preached better and more effectively than the way which was actually adopted by Christ Himself. But He certainly did not lay down that such a mode of life was necessary to "salvation" or (as He would rather

* St. Luke xiv. 33.

have put it) to entering the Kingdom of Heaven. The penitent publican went down to his house "justified," though nothing is said about a total renunciation of property. When another publican or tax-gatherer, moved to repentance by His teaching, announced that he was ready to make fourfold restitution to those whom he had wronged and give half his goods to the poor, the Master pronounced that salvation had come to his house; He did not tell him that he could not be saved until he gave up the other half also. He did teach the perilousness of wealth; He did say that it was difficult for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; He did not teach that it was impossible. There is nothing in our Lord's strong sayings about riches to contradict our general conclusion that He confined Himself to the laying down of principles, and that the most detailed rules of action which He suggested were intended as illustrations of these principles. The universal principle is "love all men." The ideal of the Christian life is to be willing to make any self-sacrifice for the good of others which is really demanded by the true good of human society. What kind of life, what use of riches, what social and economic arrangements are for the true good of human society is a problem upon which He did not enter. The most obvious application

of the duty of love is to give, to lend, to feed the poor and clothe the hungry. But it is quite consistent with the spirit of Christ's teaching to recognize that the literal and universal practice of these injunctions would not be for the true good of human society. Indeed, to attempt to practise them universally would be self-contradictory. An individual who gave away all that he had could no longer practise the duty of giving; a society in which everyone renounced everything and devoted himself to preaching would have no property at all, and all would perish of hunger. To give the individual the means of living without labour would seldom be for his true good, even for his worldly, economic good, still less good for his character; to "give to him that asketh" in that way would obviously be fatal to the true interest of society.

The enlarged social experience of modern times, the scientific study of human society and its needs, the discovery of "economic laws" of which the ancient and the medieval world knew little, have altered materially the detailed rules of conduct which a teacher thoroughly embued with the spirit of Christ's teaching would prescribe, and which a society under the influence of that spirit would practise. The duty of literally feeding the poor, clothing the hungry,

and tending the sick has not been in any way cancelled, though we have discovered more scientific and effectual ways of doing these things; but new duties have been revealed on which conventional Christian teaching has not much insisted. We have come to see that, if it is a duty to relieve disease, it must also be a duty to prevent it by sanitation, by improved housing, by the discovery and teaching of sanitary laws. We have discovered that, if it is a duty to relieve poverty, it must also be a duty to prevent the extremes of poverty occurring, and this cannot be done by mere individual assistance to individual cases, but by so organizing human society as to secure to all the possibility of earning enough material wealth to give them the opportunity of enjoying the higher goods of human existence. And so it has at last begun to be recognized that the precepts of Christ may, and should, inspire not merely private acts of individual beneficence, but the life of politics and trade, commerce and industry. And so we are beginning to see that a man may be as actively carrying on Christ's great task of setting up the Kingdom of God among men by his work as a statesman or a town councillor, as a man of business or an author, as by adopting the career of a preacher or missionary or a professed philanthropist.

The characteristic feature of the best Christian ethics of our day is that it tends to substitute a positive promotion of that ideal life of human society which Jesus called the Kingdom of God for the observance of merely negative rules of personal conduct or the performance of isolated acts of personal self-sacrifice. I cannot illustrate the point I am making better than by quoting a paragraph from Seeley's great book, "Ecce Homo," which may now be considered somewhat obsolete as a study of the historic life and teaching of Christ, but which has, I believe, lost none of its value as an interpreter of the Christian ideal in its application to the circumstances of modern life.

"We have advanced by eighteen hundred years beyond the Apostolic generation. All the narrowing influences which have been enumerated have ceased to operate. Our minds have been set free, so that we may boldly criticize the usages around us, knowing them to be but imperfect essays towards order and happiness, and no divinely or supernaturally ordained constitution which it would be impious to change. We have witnessed improvements in physical well-being which incline us to expect further progress, and make us keen-sighted to detect the evils and miseries that remain. The channels of communication between nations and their

governments are free, so that the thought of the private philanthropist may mould a whole community. And, finally, we have at our disposal a vast treasury of science, from which we may discover what physical well-being is and on what conditions it depends. In these circumstances the Gospel precepts of philanthropy become utterly insufficient. It is not now enough to visit the sick and give alms to the poor. We may still use the words as a kind of motto, but we must understand under them a multitude of things which they do not express. If we would make them express the whole duty of philanthropy in their age, we must treat them as preachers sometimes treat the Decalogue, when they represent it as containing by implication a whole system of morality. Christ commanded His first followers to heal the sick and give alms, but He commands the Christians of this age, if we may use the expression, to investigate the causes of physical evil, to master the science of health, consider the question of education with a view to health, the question of labour with a view to health, the question of trade with a view to health; and while all these investigations are made, with free expense of energy and time and means, to work out the rearrangements of human life in accordance with the results they give."

The weak point of conventional religious teaching in the past has been to limit the application of Christ's teaching to the duties of private and family life, to occasional acts of private benevolence, or (for the few who take the commands of Christ very seriously) to the regulation of lives wholly devoted to religious teaching or works of charity. Sometimes this restriction has been formally enunciated, as when the late Archbishop Magee proclaimed that the Sermon on the Mount had no application to politics. Few really earnest Christians would say that to-day, though such language may still be used by " men of the world."

4. *Christianity and Socialism.*—At the present day there is among thoughtful Christians an almost universal recognition that, if the Christian law of love is valid at all, it must be applied to the whole of life, political, economic, commercial. And under the influence of this attitude many are disposed to run to the opposite extreme, and definitely to identify Christianity with some particular programme of social or economic reform. Many, convinced that the true road to that ideal state of society which Christ called the Kingdom of God is some form of socialism, tend to identify Christianity with socialism. The youngest of our English diocesan Bishops in his still younger days laid it down that a man

could not be a Christian without being a socialist. Of course, if by socialism is meant simply the doctrine that the welfare of society should be the ultimate criterion of conduct, and if that welfare is understood to mean, not merely the maximum of pleasure, but the highest kind of human life—including the highest development of character, as well as the highest kind of happiness—then no doubt there is no harm in saying that the Christian is necessarily a socialist. But that is not what is usually meant by socialism. If socialism means a particular scheme of economic reorganization, then no doubt Christianity would, for a man who believes that such a reorganization will be the best means of securing that highest kind of life, include the duty of being a socialist, and trying to make other men socialists. But there are those who quite seriously believe that, at present or permanently, the true welfare of society—the truest good for the greatest number—is best secured by some other form of economic and social organization. To such a man Christianity will prescribe that he should not be a socialist. To represent Christ as a socialist is historically an absurd misrepresentation. It is equally unhistorical to represent Him as teaching anti-socialism, because He habitually assumed the obligation of observing the rules of the then

existing social order. A voluntary renunciation of property is not socialism, nor is it "individualism" to teach that not everyone is bound to renounce all his property. If the question had been put to Him whether He approved of socialism or not, He would doubtless have replied, as He replied to the man who asked Him to bid his brother divide the inheritance with him, "Who made Me a judge or a divider among you?" Seeing that the Kingdom of Heaven was not at all likely to be realized by a revolt against the Roman Government (to which the sect known as Zealots were instigating His countrymen), Jesus did "take part in politics" to the extent of discouraging such schemes; but it was, He felt, no part of His mission to advocate any system of political reform.* But because our Lord personally kept aloof from politics, it does not follow that modern men and women can be true followers of Christ if they do not bring their Christianity to bear upon their

* We need not for the present purpose discuss the very difficult question how far the thought of the "Parousia," or "second coming," as destined to take place in the near future may have contributed to prevent His attaching much importance to questions of political organization. What is certain is that the Kingdom of Heaven was for Him primarily a certain spiritual condition of human society, and was not identified with any kind of political or social revolution.

politics. We may not identify Christianity with any particular scheme of social reform, but we must say that a man cannot be a Christian without applying the Christian law of love to his politics. And we may most confidently say that no scheme of political or social reform will ever bring about a true Kingdom of Heaven which does not include the acceptance and practice of His teaching. It is to my mind an exaggeration to say that if a human society were sufficiently penetrated by the Spirit of Christ there would be no social problem to solve; for even if all the members of a society desired each other's good as fervently as Christ bade them do, there might still be difficult questions about the best means of realizing that good. Knowledge and insight are required for the solution of social problems, as well as good-will. But it is true to say that the greatest social problem arises precisely from the fact that the most Christian statesman has to legislate for a society in which such mutual love is in the vast majority very imperfect, and nothing will contribute so powerfully to promote the removal of these difficulties as the wider diffusion and a more enthusiastic practice of that principle of mutual love or brotherhood which constituted the essence of Christ's teaching.

5. *Christianity and Culture.*—There is one more

objection to the ethical teaching of Christianity which I think it will be desirable to notice. It is felt generally, perhaps, by a different class of persons from those who urge the former objections. The objection is, indeed, upon a higher level, and implies, to my mind, less misunderstanding of the true meaning of Christianity than the others. There are many who, while thoroughly in sympathy with the teaching of Christ and Christianity about human brotherhood, feel that in the Christian ideal as preached by the early Christians, and in most modern representations of it, there is too little recognition of the claims of knowledge, art, science, all that is commonly embraced under the name of Culture. They feel that, while the essence of true morality does lie in unselfishness, subordination of the claims of self to those of others, willingness to sacrifice self to any extent which the true interests of society demand, this is not the whole of life. In a true ideal of life there must be some recognition of the claims of "self-realization"—or what is better called self-development—as well as of self-sacrifice. What are we to say to this suggestion?

First, as to our Lord's own personal attitude. It is true that there is no express recognition of the claims of art, literature, science (used in the widest sense). It is vain to seek

in the teaching of Christ any express sanction for the value which modern cultivated Christians do attach to such things. We may point to the saying about the lilies of the field as an indication that our Lord was not blind to the beauty of the world. We may note that His mind was saturated with the literature of His country—a literature chiefly religious, but of high intellectual and æsthetic rank. We may note that the most certain thing about Him is that He was condemned by the religious world of His day just because He was not in the ordinary sense of the word "ascetic." He attached no high value to ecclesiastical fasting (which He certainly disparaged, if He did not altogether condemn it). We may point out that His religious and moral teaching implies thought, and thought of the very highest order. If we look at Christ (without any theological presuppositions) simply as a human teacher, we can see in Him intellectual development of the highest order; and there is nothing in His teaching which is opposed to the fullest recognition of culture as an element in the highest human life. He taught that a man should love his neighbour as himself—not, indeed, better than himself: that would be illogical, for the very consideration which imposes the duty of love and the intrinsic value of every human life implies the

value of one's own life. He taught that we should promote the true good of all mankind. But it did not lie within the scope of His mission to analyse that good. A few broad principles are all that He lays down. He insists upon the superiority of the moral and the spiritual above the pleasures of the senses. He insists upon sexual purity as one of the conditions of that highest life which a man should seek for himself and promote for his neighbour, as something demanded by respect for oneself and respect for womanhood. Yet there is no condemnation of ordinary human pleasure, no suggestion that self-inflicted torture is meritorious or acceptable to God. He spent much of His life in the healing of bodily disease by spiritual means; He was not indifferent to human suffering or contemptuous of ordinary human joys. He put character, goodness above happiness, or (if we like so to put it) He made these things the most important part of human happiness. But as to the relative value of different kinds of pleasure, as to how far intellectual and æsthetic pleasures should be regarded as of higher rank—more important elements in a true human life—than mere sensual enjoyments, He is silent. There is, however, nothing in His teaching which can prevent our recognizing the value of these things—on one condition: that we apply to this side of life the

principle which He laid down as applicable to the whole of life—viz., that whatever we regard as part of true human good for ourselves we must also try to promote for others also. A life of self-centred intellectual enjoyment or dilettantism is, indeed, anti-Christian. It is not inconsistent with the Christian ideal of brotherhood that we should spend some part of our lives in intellectual enjoyment; it is self-contradictory to say that it is a Christian duty to give others enjoyment and un-Christian ever to enjoy ourselves. And the higher the enjoyment, the less does that enjoyment imply "selfishness." But even the highest kind of enjoyment must be subordinated to social needs; we may take our share of them, but we must try to secure that our neighbour gets his share too. And therefore the devotion of a whole life to science, or art, or the like, can only be justified when the fruits of such devotion are in some way shared with others. The lives of the artist, the scholar, the man of letters, are Christianized by the services which they perform for society, even when that service consists merely in contributing to the enjoyment of truth and of beauty for their own sakes in other men, without any further utilitarian results.

This is one of the directions in which the teaching of Christ, if it is to be made the basis

of a detailed code of ethics for modern life, requires development. Development in this direction, as in others which have been mentioned, may be recognized as part of that leading unto all truth which the Gospel itself bids us to expect from the work of the Holy Spirit in human society. How far has the Christian Church actually supplied the needed development? To a large extent it has undoubtedly done so. The actual ideal of the best Fathers of the Church—most fully so in men like Clement of Alexandria and Origen, to a less extent in men like Ambrose and Augustine—includes a recognition of the claims of culture. The same may be said of the great schoolmen. All that was good in the moral teaching of Cicero and the Stoics, much of the thought of Plato, was embodied in the teaching of the Fathers. The schoolmen Christianized the ethical system of Aristotle. The Puritan ideal was not averse to philosophy and learning, if it was somewhat hostile to art. No doubt there has sometimes been a disposition on the part of the austerer teachers to justify learning and art, so far as they are justified, under cover of their direct services to religion and what is ordinarily called morality. No doubt it should be more clearly recognized than it has sometimes been that a due appreciation of the claims of truth

and beauty is *part* of the highest morality. At the present day this is more or less fully recognised by cultivated Christian theologians and teachers. But it must be admitted that the popular religious teaching of all ages has been deficient on this side. Too often popular religion has actually condemned all intellectual pursuits which have no direct tendency to edification. Still more often it has condemned art or some particular and arbitrarily selected forms of art, such as the drama or even the novel.

And this tendency is by no means extinct. Outside the narrowest religious circles it seldom assumes the form of direct hostility to the pleasures of the ordinary cultivated man. It is to the higher manifestations of the intellectual life that "the religious world" is most indifferent or actually hostile—to the life and pursuits of the philosopher, the scholar, the enquirer into religious truth. "Science" escapes condemnation on account of its obvious practical utilities. But the discovery and proclamation of new truth about the universe in general, or about its history—especially when the new truth tends to the modification of some traditional theological belief—is still looked upon with dislike, suspicion, or positive hostility. It is constantly assumed that the man who questions

a traditional belief is moved only by " intellectual pride " or love of notoriety; and even Bishops of high academical record are found ready to suggest that, even when true, new ideas which are opposed to conventional opinion should be kept very dark. But it is not so much positive hostility as indifference to the claims of the intellect which is lacking in average religious teaching. During more than fifty years of church-going I have hardly ever heard from the pulpit—not very often even from the University pulpit—any insistence upon this duty of seeking for truth. The general tone of ordinary pulpit instruction and of ordinary religious literature suggests complete want of sympathy with this side of life. No doubt the main object of sermons is to enable men to resist temptations coarser, stronger, and more deadly than the temptation to think too little of truth. But, still, the common religious indifference to the pursuit of truth is one of the things which prevent many cultivated people from heartily identifying themselves with the Christian ideal, from taking an active part in Church activities, and, in particular, from attendance on Christian worship. And a vague feeling that the Church is not heartily in sympathy with much that is best and highest in modern ideals weakens its influence upon the more thoughtful

and educated minds in all classes. I have tried to show that, while it has been chiefly the mission of Greece rather than of Judæa to make men appreciate the intellectual side of human life, there is nothing in the teaching of Christ which should prevent our recognition of its claims, nothing in such a recognition which is incompatible with a whole-hearted following of Christ. No doubt righteousness, love, brotherhood, are the chief things; but truth and beauty are valuable too. They, too, must be included in the "good" which Christ bids every man to give to others as well as to enjoy himself. And no interpretation of the Christian ideal is wholly true which fails to recognize the fact. The love of truth and of beauty comes from God, as well as the love of our neighbour. They must be recognized as elements in the character of God Himself, and of that likeness to God which represents the true ideal of human life. It is as possible to follow Christ by ministering to these higher needs of the human soul as by ministering to the elementary demand for food, clothing, and bodily health. "Man shall not live by bread alone" has an application to the intellectual side of life as well as to the life of practice and of devotion.

X

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY: ITS BEARING ON RELIGIOUS TEACHING

By E. W. BARNES, Sc.D., F.R.S.

Psychology is the study of the working of the human mind. As soon as men began to think about the sources and meaning of their thoughts and emotions, and to consider how in their minds they formed pictures of the external universe, they entered upon psychology. It is a difficult subject, for it is an attempt to use the human mind to analyze itself. In the investigations of natural science we use the mind to explore the properties of matter or the phenomena of life. Inert matter and living tissue are, we believe, lower types of reality, more primitive things, than human consciousness. So we expect that our intellectual faculties will enable us to discover the laws of their behaviour. The remarkable advance in our knowledge of physics and biology seems to prove the soundness of our assumption that the mind of man is not merely a by-product of living matter, but a new and higher type of reality which has come into being in recent stages of evolution.

Now, if we possessed a something which represented a still further evolutionary advance—some super-mind whose nature we cannot possibly imagine—we might expect to use it effectively to formulate the laws of psychology. But we have no such faculty. We have to use the mind to explain the working of the mind; the instrument is not superior to the object. Therefore, as it seems to me, we cannot hope to solve the *ultimate* problems of human consciousness. We remain baffled, and we are likely to continue to remain baffled, when we attempt to demonstrate the reality of religious experience. Similarly, we cannot justify our belief that we form true pictures in our minds of the external world, neither can we prove that our criteria of beauty are right. We think that certain pictures, statues, or pieces of music are supremely beautiful: does our judgment correspond to the essential nature of the Universe ? We cannot prove the fact. Neither can we prove that the material universe is anything like what we conceive it to be. All that we can assert is that we have certain aspirations, emotions, and mental reactions set up by phenomena. These differ in different individuals, and, more markedly, as between races of men in different stages of civilization. We can compare the varied aspirations and emotions. We can see how they

are changed and refined as development takes place. But we have to *assume* that such development is progressive—that is to say, that it leads men to a truer understanding of, or at least sympathy with, the fundamental nature of the universe. Yet there seems to be no way of justifying our assumptions. Psychology cannot, in this respect, change faith into knowledge.

We must not, then, expect psychology either to confirm or destroy the value of the ultimate experiences on which religion is built. Man, when he reaches what we deem to be the highest level that he can attain, is compelled by something inherent in his nature to believe that goodness, beauty, and truth express the inner meaning, the spiritual foundation, of the universe. Similarly, many men and women in whom this conviction is strongest have moments when they seem to themselves to pass away from the spatial and temporal world to another realm. In this realm they find, as they believe, God, the source and stay of all things, the ground of being. With Him there appears to be love and joy and peace, activity unmarred by evil, the perfection of the highest which it is given to man dimly to realize in his normal life.

In so far as we individually have had religious experience, we cannot set aside our sense of the

value of prayer. However we may explain the occurrence, we have known the transcendent widening of our horizon which sometimes comes in solitary meditation, the occasional flooding of the soul with light. Psychology cannot reduce these facts to hallucinations any more than it can demonstrate that our intuitions deceive us when they compel us to think that beauty, goodness, and truth reveal the nature of absolute reality. There is, however, reason to hope that psychology will tell us something of how our minds work and describe their internal mechanism. It may be expected to show the relation between our spiritual instincts and other instincts, such as those of sex, which seem to be derived from our animal origin. We may discover reasons for the different ways in which spiritual fundamentals are used, and come to understand why religious inspiration seems to unify personality and to show its unifying power in physical energy and well-being.

Recent progress in our knowledge of the working of the human mind is due to the fact that psychology has been made an experimental science. The pioneers of modern research have experimented—sometimes dangerously—with the minds of their patients. They have elaborated theories to explain the results obtained, and they have then tested those theories by making

other experiments. It is necessary, however, to remember that, for the most part, the abnormal has been investigated to give a clue to the normal. Physicians have sought to discover how the mind functions by examining what has happened when it fails to function properly. Such a study of mental pathology has undoubtedly led to valuable results. But it may easily lead an investigator to believe that the abnormal is the normal. Freud, for instance, made the greater part of his experiments with patients in Vienna drawn from a sexually-demoralized class. In consequence, he ascribes to sex a dominating importance in mental life which we claim to know from our own experience that it does not possess. The instincts which are necessary to the preservation of the race are strong, but so also are those which preserve the life of the individual. Both types of instincts may be expected to combine with the consequences of spiritual perception. But to isolate sex and make it the groundwork of our mental constitution is surely wrong. It suffices in this connection to say that social reformers value religion just because of its observed power to control animal appetites. Religion, save when it is transformed into a false asceticism, neither drives sex underground nor does it cause us to ignore the well-being of the body. It makes man whole, gives unity and

balance to his life. "They that are whole," said our Lord, in one of those ironical touches which gave point to His teaching, "have no need of a physician." "I came to call, not the righteous, but sinners to repentance."

It is important to dwell on the obvious beauty and strength of the Christian life, and on the permanent enrichment of personality which often results from what we term "conversion." Especially nowadays must we emphasize such facts, because there exists a widespread and wholly erroneous belief that, in some undefined way, modern psychology has disintegrated these truths. Let us insist that theories will not alter facts. Any theory, for instance, which does not satisfactorily explain the vast moral uplift due to the Evangelical movement of Wesley and his friends in the eighteenth century is imperfect. Theories are attempts to explain facts, and so long as they do not explain all the facts they are inadequate. Many modern theories put forward by distinguished teachers we must consequently regard as provisional; but the discovery of the subliminal part of personality or, as it is also termed, *the unconscious mind* must rank as a permanent addition to knowledge. The very phrase "unconscious mind" seems at first sight to imply a contradiction. We are tempted to think that we know of all that

goes on in our minds. But—so modern teachers assure us—this is untrue. There are mental regions below manifest consciousness where past experience is stored, and where this experience is active, although we are not aware of the fact. We forget events of the past, but they do not necessarily cease to influence us. The experience of such events may remain with us, stored in the unconscious mind. The experience may have been unpleasant, its memory hateful. It may have been, as it were, thrust out of sight. But, though repressed so thoroughly that it has passed out of manifest consciousness, it may still be active below the threshold, subliminally. As, unknown to us, it there germinates, it may become the centre of a whole bundle of morbid ideas and emotions; it may, in technical language, form a repressed complex. And because this complex exists buried in the mind it will send up shoots into manifest consciousness. Thus arise impulses, of whose origin we are ignorant, which may powerfully affect our conscious lives. The crank and the lunatic will often reason with much shrewdness. On many subjects they may be sane. But certain false ideas they hold with invincible tenacity, the reason being that these ideas are products of the morbid processes that have been set up in the unconscious mind.

This theory of the unconscious mind appears to be confirmed by the success of the process of mental healing which has been founded upon it. If the physician can discover the origin of the repressed complex, he can at times bring it into manifest consciousness. By getting the patient to realize its existence, he can gradually lead him to destroy the morbid mental growth of which it has been the source. If he is successful, normal mental health will be restored. Moreover, this theory of the unconscious mind can be used to explain our inherited instincts. Undoubtedly, the past mental experiences of our ancestors contribute to some extent to make us what we are. We inherit mental tendencies. If we gave precisely the same education to the child of an Australian savage and to a child sprung from one of the English intellectual families, the results would be widely different. No doubt inheritance of physical structure, the conformation of the brain, and so forth, will in part explain the difference. But it does not seem possible in this way to explain all the facts of observation. We are, it appears, forced to the conclusion that our minds, below the level of consciousness, retain racial experience. This inherited experience combines with personal experience to make our personality what it is. Thus, in fact, are formed the *data* of the logical

processes of our conscious minds, the stuff which is the basis of thought.

Very naturally many psychologists are thus led to deny that we have free-will. They are, in philosophical language, determinists. If we know all the forces which act on a material particle, we can predict which way it will move. And it is asserted that if we knew all the experience, inherited and personal, which has affected any individual, we could predict his every action. On this view there is no such thing as sin. Christians reply that the theory is not true to their own experience. We are not automata, for we can conquer temptation. We habitually exercise freedom of choice. There is in us some power of originating courses of conduct. Of course, we do not claim to be independent of our past. Hereditary influences are potent. Our present lives, moreover, are affected by our past conduct. We are stronger for the conquest of past temptations. Character is weakened by past sins and follies. All this we admit; but still we have some measure of free-will.

Moreover—and this is the primary Christian claim—we assert that both among personal and hereditary experiences we must include divine influence. How is it that man, evolving from some ape-like creature, has developed spiritual instincts ? The fact cannot be denied. How is

it to be explained? Only, so far as I can see, by the moulding influence of the Spirit of God, by the work of the Holy Ghost among men.

There are times when we feel the power of righteousness, when we respond to it, when we know that we are the stronger and purer for our response. We are, moreover, convinced that by prayer and meditation we can enrich our personality; we feel that in such enrichment we have become more true to the purposes for which we were created; we have gained grace, spiritual power, which seems to have come from some infinite reservoir of enfolding love. The term *grace* has become old-fashioned. It has acquired an atmosphere of unreality. Christians badly need a more adequate doctrine of grace, and it appears probable that modern psychology will supply it. Natural grace, such as seems native to many children of good stocks, will be the result of divine influences on past generations—influences which have been inherited and stored subliminally. Acquired grace comes from the divine influences which we have personally received; the experience affects both the conscious and, more especially, the unconscious mind.

But, it may be objected, "no man hath seen God at any time." We may, indeed, be sure that the search for goodness and truth is re-

warded. Yet, save in most exceptional moments, we have never heard a personal God speaking to us; and even when we may think that we have had such a revelation, it may have been a delusion.

Now, in answer, I would allow that we do not know God; at best, we get emotional intuitions of His nature. If we *could* know God perfectly, we should have no need of revelation. Christ, we believe, did know God as fully as was possible for anyone who was perfect man to know Him. In fact, because our fragmentary intuitions of God find their completion in Christ's revelation, we deem Him *the* Son of God.

But how do those intuitions come to us? It is suggested that the unconscious mind is the region where we make contact with the Holy Spirit. If we agree, as seems necessary to explain man's spiritual evolution, that God directly influences men, and if, further, we admit, as I believe to be true, that normally we experience only the effects of God's activity, it must needs follow that communion with Him takes place below the level of manifest consciousness. It is in underground regions of the mind that His presence originates those spiritual impulses that are the foundation of the religious life. Our knowledge of God is thus secondary or derived knowledge: the primary experience is subliminal.

It is sometimes objected that, if it be in the unconscious mind that we make contact with the Spirit of God, then by our own efforts we can do nothing to know Him. But this objection rests upon a misunderstanding. As Christ taught, the pure in heart are they who see God. The unconscious mind is not normally an independent centre of consciousness; it is a part of the complete psychic organism, continually influenced by, and influencing, the mental states of which we are fully aware. To describe it as an aggregate of fringes of consciousness is inadequate, because experience stored there seems to be made the basis of logical processes of which we are unwitting. If, in ordinary language, we do not "overcome," but merely "thrust aside," evil acts or thoughts or distressing accidents, the danger is that they will, though apparently forgotten, lodge in our subconsciousness and be, as it were, the seeds of morbid mental growths which will contaminate manifest consciousness. If, on the other hand, we constantly seek to purify our minds, wrestle till we have overcome evil, dissipate bogies by "facing up to" them, we shall free our subconsciousness from sources of infection. By constantly seeking for righteousness and strength we shall find them; and they will be established both above and below the threshold. When the

unconscious mind is thus purified we have spiritual health, we are fit to receive the influence of the Spirit.

This account of spiritual progress agrees, I believe, with commonly observed facts. "Ask, and ye shall receive; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you." The more we rid ourselves of all that is bound up with selfishness and sensuality, the more do we understand what God would have us be and do. Sometimes after exhausting struggles for light there comes a sudden illumination. God seems to speak clearly, as Josephine Butler thought she heard Him speak during her great purity campaign. So, too, the Hebrew prophets thought they were His mouthpiece when they declared: "Thus saith the Lord." It may be that in such cases God directly makes contact with manifest consciousness. But, just as some uprush from the unconscious mind gives to the mathematician after long search a solution of his problem, so it seems probable that divine influences received subconsciously are unwittingly used to create the clear message of God. The really important fact, however, is that barriers, raised by evil lodged in the unconscious mind, tend to exclude the influence of God.

All great religious teachers have condemned

certain types of action, because they have instinctively felt that they tended to set up barriers against those spiritual influences which enrich personality. Christ's teaching is supreme, because He so accurately diagnosed the sources of spiritual ill-health. He showed men how to destroy the barriers which shut out God; and I suggest that, in the light of modern psychology, we must regard Him as one in whom those barriers did not exist. Dr. Sanday, some dozen years ago, first put forward, I believe, this way of understanding Christ. Our Lord had, of course, human limitations, mental no less than physical; otherwise He could not have been man. But there was in Him a spiritual and moral perfection unintelligible save on the assumption that His mind was perfectly open to, and perfectly responsive to, God. Now He would not have been truly man, for His knowledge would have been co-extensive with that of God, had His conscious mind been divine. But if there were nothing to separate His unconscious mind from the divine mind, the result of this perfect unity would have shown itself in exactly the kind of consciousness which all Christians believe Him to have had. Sanday's suggestion has been attacked from many sides, but it is probably destined to have an important place in future Christological speculation.

Questions raised by Christ's moral perfection and supreme spiritual insight may become less difficult as we better understand the more general problem of sin and regeneration. All modern research goes to show that, if we let sin, falsehood, or ugliness lodge in the unconscious mind, our personality, the soul, will be harmed. It is now emphasized that we must not repress evil experiences; we must not try to forget or ignore them; we must destroy them by conscious endeavour. The physician who seeks to heal a disordered mind helps the patient to effect such destruction. His methods are very similar to those of the wise priest in the confessional. I do not, of course, allude to perfunctory confessions, but to those unburdenings of a tormented soul which ought to be great and rare occasions. This use of confession to physician or priest is of undoubted value. But if by the guidance of Christ we learn to know ourselves, there should be no need of human aid to help us to get divine grace. By prayer, by meditation, by that private recognition of sin which leads to abasement before God, we can without human aid destroy the effects of evil. We can thus prevent it from contaminating the hidden recesses of the mind. We can, in Christian language, get the sense of God's forgiveness, the assurance that our sin is so far blotted out that we can still receive

the influence of His Spirit. "Lay bare your sins before Him, seek His pardon and love, and though your sins be as scarlet, they shall become white as snow." The old empirical teaching is fully confirmed by modern investigation.

Christians naturally wish to know whether modern psychology throws any new light on sacramental doctrines. How far does it confirm the Christian belief that there exist material channels of spiritual grace? All who are convinced that the Spirit of God is active among men will allow that His influence may come both directly to the human soul and indirectly. His indirect influence may be received through other human beings, who convey to us their spiritual experience. They may do this by explicit statement, or, and perhaps more effectively, by the process of suggestion. When suggestion operates, a bond of emotional sympathy is formed between different individuals. There seems to be reason to hold that the bond is strongest when it is established unwittingly as a link between mental regions that are below the level of consciousness. It is well known that a crowd, at a period of excitement, will be set on fire by some common emotion. Words spoken by a leader may be such as normally would have little effect. But

his unconscious mind somehow makes contact with the unconscious minds of his hearers. A wave of emotion then runs through the crowd. The emotion sets up similar trains of thought in all present, and "a collective consciousness" is established. The capacity of human beings to influence one another in this way, by communicating emotions subliminally, is probably much more important than is generally recognized. Whether explicit ideas can be thus conveyed is doubtful. It may be that what is conveyed is a vague feeling which, however, since men's minds work with a general similarity, leads to fairly uniform ideas. In view of man's animal origin, we must regard this process of unwitting communication as of the same nature as that which makes a herd of animals act as one when danger threatens. We do not know yet whether in man the faculty has been developed since he emerged from some ape-like stock, or whether it is in process of decay. Certain hypnotic experiments, however, seem to show that between individuals subliminal mental intercourse can be surprisingly complete. Many men of good judgment hold that telepathy, the communication of ideas without the use of material means such as speech or sight, is an established fact. If this be the case, it is probable that "thought reading" is effectively

limited to individuals whose mental development is exceptional, and that even with them success is by no means uniform.

Though the collective consciousness of a crowd is usually on a lower moral level than that of the individuals who compose it, the influence of suggestion on a group of men and women can be used with great value to spread spiritual understanding. The associations of the building in which a group assembles, the appeal of hymns and music, the earnestness and possibly the fame of the leader, all combine to arouse collective devotion. The Divine Spirit then enters and enriches those present through channels which experiment has proved effective. Grace is thus conveyed sacramentally through human agency, and through material media which men have discovered to be of value. Alike the silence of a Quaker meeting and the noise of a Salvation Army band are effective means of sacramental grace. Some may be repelled by the thought that the same psychological processes which lead a Communist crowd to wreck a jeweller's shop are at work in a devotional gathering. But, of course, the mechanism of the human mind, its susceptibility to suggestion, may be used well or ill. That the process of suggestion is rightly employed in religious worship is proved by the value which such

worship has in strengthening character and developing spiritual insight.

Great religious excitement may produce morbid mental states. Critics of "revivals" lay stress on "hysterical outbursts" which are sometimes witnessed, and the belief is prevalent that such movements increase the number of those who need to be cared for in our lunatic asylums. It is doubtful whether statistics confirm this belief. No one denies the existence of religious mania; but its origin almost certainly lies, not in true religious experience, but in some sin or shock which has led to morbid growths in the unconscious mind. The "religious" concomitants of the malady are accidental. Furthermore it must be remembered that a true revival calls sinners to repentance. The damage to the mind done by past sins and the effort to cleanse the mind from their corroding influences are factors sufficient to account for "hysterical" symptoms at conversion. Conversion does not always produce results of permanent value. But, in so far as the experience is not counterfeit and just so far as it is complete, it leads to that significant transformation which we term "newness of life."

One danger is common to every religious use of the process of suggestion. Whenever devotional fervour is quickened at some service of

special significance—whether it be a revivalist meeting or a celebration of the Eucharist—the religious beliefs of those whose influence is dominant tend to be uncritically accepted by the rest. The ordinary worshipper thus puts his religious experience in the mould provided for him. He accepts not merely the fact of the Spirit's presence and influence, but also the interpretation of that fact which is offered to him. As a consequence, he is convinced that an unexamined system of doctrine is absolutely true. Thus it comes about that a belief in the infallibility of the Scriptures or in transubstantiation may be held with fanatical zeal. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that sound theology is the result of prolonged and patient intellectual enquiry. Beliefs have no valid basis when they are acquired by passive obedience to suggestion. Of course, only theologians can develop their science so as to preserve its harmony with the growth of human thought. But religious leaders and teachers of the people are gravely at fault if they ignore the results of theological study. By doing so they must inevitably produce the sort of antagonism between faith and knowledge which showed itself a generation ago in the so-called conflict between religion and science.

Modern psychology, as we have previously

insisted, will not enable us to solve metaphysical problems, but it does show us how, by suggestion, men and women are led to assume that particular solutions of such problems are indubitably true. It is, unfortunately, not rare to hear from the pulpit that a particular view of the nature of the Christian sacraments is "proved by psychology." Such a statement merely shows confusion of thought. For a magical or *ex opere operato* view of the Eucharist psychology affords no support. As a means of enriching spiritual life, those who come with faith to the Lord's Supper find the service effective; their sense that Christ is always at hand to guide and help them is increased. Psychologists would point to the hallowed associations of the service with the Lord's Passion. It uniquely links the worshipper to Him who said: "Wherever two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them." Love and hope and trust, triumphant over death; the intimate common meal of the Earthly Life; the broken Body and the outpoured Blood—all come before the mind. Before us is the outward sign of the invisible grace. Faith works in us. . . . But psychology has nothing to say as to theories of the transformation of material substance into something other than itself.

All religious means of quickening spiritual life must be judged by their fruits. "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance." Just in so far as these qualities show themselves naturally and, as it were, inevitably as the result of particular forms of worship, such forms (though not necessarily the theories associated with them) are justified. But when religious devotion produces intolerance, mental inertia, extravagant asceticism, or hypocrisy in one of its many forms, it is psychologically harmful. In such cases there may be some measure of genuine spiritual insight, but it is incomplete. The study of primitive religion shows with what difficulty human worship has been separated from cruelty, lust, and superstition. Even now magic dogs religion like an evil shadow. To the Hebrew prophets humanity owes an immense debt of gratitude for their efforts to free religion from evil associations. Christ accepted their work as the basis of His own revelation when He called men to enter His Father's Kingdom, and there find spiritual health.

What should be the result of such spiritual health? I ventured to say that the lethargic contentment of the fat monk who, remote from the storms of life, is happy in a round of liturgical services and humble duties—such is a parody of

spiritual peace. Not the obliteration of human instincts which may lead to sins, but their control, should be our ideal. St. Paul describes the religious life at its highest when he says, "I beat down my body and bring it into subjection, lest I, when I have preached to others, myself should be a castaway." We degenerate unless there is internal tension in our minds. The finest spiritual life is a life of ever-victorious conflict. When Christ comes to a man He brings, not peace, but a sword; not apathy or stagnation, but a constant struggle for newness of life. The antinomian who says, "I am saved; no evil that I may do can deprive me of God's favour," reveals that his mind is diseased. The saint, on the contrary, says: "I die daily. Every day I am in danger of the wrath of God. Every day, through His grace, I put on the Lord Jesus Christ." One would think that such an approach to instability would be destructive of personal energy. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Spiritual tension is an amazing source of energy, as the lives of St. Paul, St. Catherine of Siena, John Wesley, General Booth, and countless others reveal.

Let me end with a quotation from Dr. Rivers,* one of our leading psychologists:

* "Instinct and the Unconscious," 1920, pp. 157, 158 (condensed).

"Many lines of evidence are converging to show that all great accomplishment in human endeavour depends upon processes which go on outside those regions of the mind of the activity of which we are clearly conscious. There is reason to believe that the processes which underlie all great work in art, literature, or science take place unconsciously. . . . Whence comes the energy of which this work is the expression? Many pathological facts point to the conclusion that the energy so arising is increased in amount through the conflict between controlled and controlling forces. Whatever be its source, we do not know how high the goal that it may reach.

"Exceptional accomplishment seems to need a certain degree of instability in those subconscious strata of the mind which form the scene of the conflict between instinctive tendencies and the forces by which they are controlled. This instability under the conditions of war produced disease. Now that the struggle is over, we may expect it to be a source of energy from which should come great accomplishments in art and science. It may also be that, through this instability, new strength will be given to those movements which under the most varied guise express the deep craving for religion which seems to be universal among mankind."

Dr. Rivers writes objectively, unemotionally, as a man of science. God grant that the religious revival at which he hints may come in power among us.

XI

CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY

By E. W. WATSON, D.D.

"The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took, and hid in three measures of meal, till it was all leavened." This parable of our Lord is the best starting-point for a consideration of the effect which the Church and the Christian mode of thought of which the Church is the vehicle have produced upon the world. The point of the parable is the reciprocal relation of the two forces. Each works upon the other, and each is changed in the process. The woman does not drop her wedding-ring, or some other intractable substance, into the dough, but a material which is sensitive to its environment. And so we learn the lesson, which is confirmed by all experience, that Christianity does not work in isolation, and cannot, except as an intellectual exercise, be contemplated apart from its relation to men and circumstances. Therefore, it cannot be judged apart from these, nor can we justly and reasonably say in regard to some particular combination of events that

Christianity has been a failure because things have turned out ill; nor, conversely, may we give the whole credit to Christianity, as distinguished from the general civilization of an age, when conspicuous graces of character and conduct have displayed themselves in Christian men. In either case, though not with equal rapidity or intensity, the leaven has been at work, and we must not allow ourselves to be disappointed or to think Christianity a failure if we can find occasions when its efficacy is not apparent, nor even if such an occasion thrusts itself upon our notice. It is not for us to be impatient or desponding; hope is one of the cardinal virtues.

The thesis of this paper, then, is that there is no unconditioned Christianity; that in the providential order the faith must work with or against, as the case may be, the wills of men and the broader forces of history and human nature. This was evident in the very beginnings of our religion. We cannot assign limits to the thought of our Lord, but we may say that sometimes He limited its expression so that it was intelligible to His generation. But His first disciples were encumbered by their hereditary Judaism. It was the meal which worked upon the leaven of the new doctrine, though it is needless to say that the leaven mastered it.

The point is that there was a conflict between the two, and that the faith which shaped itself was the resultant of the two forces. So also was the character and conduct that developed among Christians, though here the victory of the new leaven has been less conspicuous.

Let us compare the first Christians, missionaries as earnest as have ever lived, with those who have advocated the same cause in later days. They were not professional advocates, and therefore probably they were the more effective. But, being amateurs, if the term may be used, they had no special training; they spoke from inward conviction, but with nothing to separate their mode of thought, except in the one essential respect and in its implications, from that of the society around them. Our modern missionaries have the advantage, which is also a disadvantage, of appearing to primitive races as the representatives and teachers of a higher civilization. They have medicine and education, and many other desirable things to offer. They are above the level of those whom they strive to win. Or, again, they may be offering their faith to alien races which possess ancient creeds and philosophies of which they are proud. In this case they are outside the society they are trying to convert. The first teachers of Christianity were within the society

of their time, and shared its ignorances, its prejudices, and some of its vices. A Cambridge scholar, Dr. H. F. Stewart,* makes the striking assertion that "lying was never an ecclesiastical offence, and rigid veracity cannot be claimed as a constant characteristic of any Christian writer of the period, except Athanasius, Augustine, and (outside his panegyrics) Eusebius of Cæsarea." Some students might make reserves in the case of one or other of these great names. But, speaking generally, there is no reason to think that the Christians had surpassed the standard of the world in which they lived. For all that, their Christianity was not a failure. Nor does the relentlessness which they shared with their age condemn them; it was a phase which they had not outgrown. It was natural enough for them to take it as an obligation upon Christians that they should hate their adversaries as the Psalmist hated his, and any qualms of pity were rejected as unworthy of men who were called to follow the example of the man after God's own heart. Here, and in many other respects, the absolute acceptance of the whole Scripture as equally inspired and equally binding on Christians worked sad results. There is a striking passage in a homily of St. Hilary of Poitiers, a younger contemporary of Athanasius

* "Cambridge Medieval History," vol. i., p. 571.

and the chief exponent in the Latin tongue of Nicene orthodoxy, in which he enforces our Lord's command not to return evil for evil by the consideration that the Christian who does so will spoil the completeness of God's vengeance. When we think of the bitterness with which doctrinal conflicts were waged, we must bear in mind that Christian hearts had been hardened by almost three centuries of persecution, and had learned to regard any adversary as also the adversary of God. We see controversy at its worst when calumny is used as a weapon. It was used on the orthodox side as well as on the heretical. But here, again, we find that the customs of the old world were too deeply rooted to be purged out by the new spirit of Christianity. The least attractive aspect of the great classical orators is their invective; we see it at its worst in the insults of Demosthenes towards the mother of his rival. Now all ancient education was rhetorical, and the art of insolence was regularly taught and practised in the schools. Every educated Christian author was a rhetorician, and used the weapons of his craft. When we find him bespattering an opponent, we need not suppose that he meant more than that he heartily disapproved his doctrine; nor need we suppose that the readers, who knew the rules of the rhetorical game and

expected to see them dexterously employed, would take these assaults as meant for literal truth. Our modern Church historians have often been too credulous of charges against the character of erroneous teachers; not that, like some of their predecessors, they have taken pleasure in tracing a connection between falsehood of doctrine and depravity of life.

In these and in other ways we see that the old civilization retained its grip on the adherents of the new faith. They adapted it to their creed; they also adapted their creed to it. They had to work with the same set of general ideas as their pagan compeers. And in some respects it was an age of decadence. If it was one of progress in ethics and in the science of law, departments of thought in which, as Dean Inge has told us, the Christians were disciples in the school of their time, and learned lessons which they have handed on to us, it was an age of decline in the physical sciences. The great compilation of Pliny, which garnered the knowledge and the ignorance and superstition of the period, offers a sad contrast to the intelligence of Aristotle The Christians had to bear the load of the credulity which was common to themselves and their contemporaries, and some of its effects upon religious thought have been permanent. But it was their environment, not their

Christianity, that was at fault. The faith, then as little as now, was working *in vacuo;* it was conditioned by circumstances. It is vain, therefore, to look to the early Christians without reserve as patterns to be followed. To do so would be to accept one of the strangest of fallacies which they shared with their time. It was that of a golden age in the past. It was not merely a poetical imagination, it was a reasoned philosophy of nature, that mankind, like the whole universe, is deteriorating and near its end. All evolution (for they had the idea) was by way of degeneration. The notion found its classical expression in Horace:

> "Ætas parentum peior avis tulit
> Nos nequiores, mox daturos
> Progeniem vitiosiorem."

The Christians, too, held that the remoter the past, the healthier, the more virtuous, the wiser, were those who lived in it. St. Cyprian pointed to children born with the white hair of age as evidence of the decrepitude of the race, and this doctrine of degeneracy fitted well with the Christian and Jewish expectation of an approaching end of the world. Wisdom, then, was not garnered by experience, but was a primal gift, and Moses, the original recipient of the true revelation, must therefore be the

earliest of sages. "What," said a critic quoted by Clement of Alexandria, "is Plato but Moses talking Attic?" Whatever truth he possessed must have been borrowed, and distorted in transmission, from the virgin source. Reasoning so grotesque worked sad havoc in Christian minds. We are not concerned here with its effects, but with its cause. It was not specifically Christian; it was part of the common heritage of the time, and is part of the evidence for the fact that the Christian faith was but one element, though the strongest, in the furniture of their mind.

It was a more serious matter that in two most important regions of thought, those of philosophy and of law, the Christians moulded their mind after the current pattern. The educated among them could not escape the influence of the higher thought of their age. Christian speculation on the supreme topics of theology was guided by the philosophy of the time, as is most strikingly shown in St. Augustine's use of the very language of Plotinus, the neo-Platonist, to express his own most intimate convictions after his conversion. And so it was with legal thought. Christian order followed the majestic system of Rome. To take only its discipline, omitting the administration which was borrowed from the imperial system,

canon law is the twin of civil law. Both are descended from the old Roman jurisprudence, and show it in their assumption of the guilt of a person criminally charged and in their demand that he should answer questions of the court that might inculpate him—a method that excited deep repugnance in English minds, whether it were practised in ecclesiastical courts in accordance with the canon law or in the Star Chamber in accordance with the civil. We have anticipated the course of history, but the case shows how religious discipline has been affected by secular; and the converse is equally true. For instance, our English law of trusts, as interpreted in Chancery, was worked out on ecclesiastical principles by a Bishop of Salisbury, who was also Master of the Rolls under Richard II.

To return to the consecutive proof of our thesis that Christianity never has been, nor can be, a force working in isolation, let us consider its state when it began to dominate the world. The age was one of intellectual decline, in which men lost all sense of probability. The early monks of Egypt, where the institution began, lived in a world of unrealities, which obfuscated minds that yet were profoundly Christian. When we read the very entertaining record of the miracles which befell them, we are not for a

moment tempted to ignore their deep faith and keen spiritual insight, but we are inevitably reminded of the equally improbable stories with which religionists of an older creed regaled Herodotus by the banks of the same river. Pagans and Christians had been victims of an equal credulity, or perhaps both had found an equal and an equally innocent pleasure in mystifying the credulous admirer. In any case, from the expansion of monasticism, or at any rate from the time of that expansion, there dates an increasing feebleness of human intelligence. Strong and shrewd though he was, the writings of Gregory the Great are an unrivalled treasury of superstition and folklore, though it must be added that St. Augustine himself had not been immune from the infection. From this time onward the Christian faith was to labour under a burden which it had not imposed upon itself, and it cannot be blamed for errors which its adherents were unable to reject. They were men of their time. And not only was their mental, and to some extent moral, state inevitable. It was a phase through which Christianity was designed to pass, and reaction from it was the necessary method of progress. But within this range of ideas—cramping, as it seems to us—the faith did, in fact, work some of its most striking victories, and types of Christian character

were developed which could not have developed in other surroundings. St. Louis and St. Francis were what they were in great measure because of their environment; it suited them, just as the quaint French of Joinville and the picturesque compromise between Latin and Italian of the "Canticle of Brother Sun" suited the thoughts and adventures they were used to describe.

So we might continue through successive centuries, always finding that Christianity is conditioned by circumstances, and that even when earnest people have striven to cultivate it in isolation their environment has broken in and spoiled the experiment. This has equally been the case when, as in the monasteries, worldly cares and temptations have distracted the mind from the purpose for which they were founded, and when, without the searching test of endowment, select companies have failed to maintain their strictness of life and doctrine. Their Christianity has not been at fault, even though we might find some inadequacy in it; the cause lies in the inseparable combination of Christianity with other forces, each acting upon the rest. Sometimes it is a Mezentian union; sometimes, on the other hand, if only for a while, there have been most inspiring illustrations of what Christianity at its best can achieve. But always in the providential order, whether for help or for

hindrance, the surrounding world has worked in and on Christian souls and the Christian society.

Has this operation been progressive? The comfortable doctrine of continuous progress has received of late shrewd blows, philosophical and practical. As Christians, we are not pledged to assume that, within our narrow horizon, progress can be clearly observed; for us the world is in the hands of one for whom a thousand years are but a day, and the cumulative evidence of the power of the Christian faith on personal character and on the conduct of masses of men is among the proofs of our faith. The effects repeat themselves in successive generations and among all races, and are strikingly uniform. It does not matter that interspersed among these phenomena are facts of a contrary kind—individual souls over which their faith exercises no control, or a control that is intermittent. This does not prove that Christianity is a failure, but that it has not had a fair trial. And in the wider sphere of religious and national life it is not that Christianity has too often broken down, but rather that it has not been fully or genuinely applied. In fact, the course of Christianity may be likened to a procession of waves in which the crest is followed by the trough; or rather, as in a troubled sea, there is a simultaneous action of

waves in every stage of rise and fall. National apostasy may be accomplished amid the silent protest of a wide and deep personal religion, and an effective maintenance of Christian causes may coincide with a low standard of Christian life in the nation which is their champion.

But there is not a simple succession of phases. There is a continuous change by way of reaction. It is one of Cardinal Newman's charges against the Church of England that this has been its history. It is perfectly true, and quite creditable. The somewhat violent spirit of our early reformers was a healthy revulsion from decadent medievalism, and each change of religious temper that has followed has had the same origin, nor need we think that the process has reached its end. We shall, indeed, be very unwise if we pin our trust to the permanence of our present modes of religious thought and religious expression. There is the same inevitable change in the wider sphere of national tendencies. Some generations have greater powers of religious apprehension than others, and it seems a safe generalization to say that days of great action have not been days of deep religious feeling. In few periods has religion in England been less conspicuously effective than in those of the Black Prince, the elder Pitt, and the Duke of Wellington, nor need we be

unduly depressed that our own should resemble theirs in both respects.

But we have not to consider only objective facts. In all impressions concerning the state of religion and character there is a strong subjective element. With perfect sincerity people exaggerate, and the picture is too bright or too dark to be true. There never was a more admirable woman than Hannah More, but what are we to think of her assertion that when she settled at Cheddar there was but one Bible to be found in a cottage, and it served to prop a geranium-pot? The Methodist movement had been in full blast for two generations, and nowhere with more energy than in Somersetshire. Can we believe Miss More's account of its failure? It is conceivable, though most unlikely, that the movement had spent itself and provoked a reaction to indifference. It is more probable that the lady's sense of disappointment at some failure of her own efforts had persuaded her that things were worse than they really were. But such despondency is a frequent phenomenon. Bishop Butler's grave preface to the "Analogy," written in 1736, is well known: "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of enquiry; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly

they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world." Of Scotland in the next generation, that of David Hume, Professor Hume Brown has bluntly told us that religion was dead there. These were subjective impressions, destined to be quickly falsified. There was neither more nor less truth in them than in the exaggerated cheerfulness of other generations. We are now labouring under the reaction from an unbalanced optimism. Matthew Arnold exclaimed, in scorn of mid-Victorian sentiment:

> "As if the world had ever had
> A faith, or sciolists been sad."

Our sciolists are never cheerful. But it must be admitted that serious people, too, have miscalculated in their hopes, and suffered the penalty in depression. In regard to the Church of England, this was the case about 1885, when the establishment in Wales was first attacked. There arose a chorus of self-gratulation, in which, it must be said, Archbishop Benson was a leader. We were accused of inefficiency, of failure to attract and influence the multitude.

In reply, we praised ourselves lustily; never was a Church so beneficently active, so spiritual, in the best sense so successful. We forgot that we had some dull preachers, some empty churches. We are suffering still from the reaction against this exaggeration; we are perhaps too conscious of failures, and pay undue attention to the fact that some methods of appeal are outworn, while failing to notice that others are taking their place. It is, for instance, psychologically intelligible that mission preaching, which produced wonderful results in the heroic days of Aitken and Twigg, is now much less effectual, in spite of (perhaps in part because of) great improvements in technique.

Some of the illustrations that have been used may perhaps seem narrowly ecclesiastical, but they will serve to point the moral as well as if they had been chosen from a wider range. The problem before us is an apparent failure of Christianity. We have tried first to satisfy ourselves that Christianity neither fails nor succeeds in a broad sense apart from the world which it is set to influence. To use a further illustration, as planets control each other's course, so it is with Church and world. But the influence exerted is not uniform; there are recurrent periods of advance and retreat. This is the case when the facts are objectively con-

sidered; it is still more obvious when mental states are taken into account. The contemplation of the whole world order is an exercise for our faith, and, indeed, a trial. But we may see in it a proof of Divine patience and wisdom, and if we try to conform our will to the Will that is supreme, we may hope not only to strengthen our assurance, but to bring nearer the fulfilment of God's purpose for His creation.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF BELIEF

BELIEF IN GOD

By CHARLES GORE, D.D.

Formerly Bishop of Oxford

This Volume—which is to be followed by two others entitled **"Belief in Christ"** and **"The Holy Spirit and the Church,"** each volume, however, being independent of the others—is an attempt to construct a rational fabric of belief from the foundation, as far as may be, without assumptions. Accordingly, after an introductory chapter in which the breakdown of traditional belief is noted and its causes analysed, the author proceeds to enquire afresh what are the grounds, first, for any sort of belief in God and, secondly, for belief in a specific revelation such as Christianity postulates. The idea of God resulting from this enquiry is thus analysed and tested, the question of the credibility of the miraculous being considered at length. The book, which represents a lifetime of study and thought, necessarily traverses the area of all the most fundamental modern controversies, but the desire is to make it intelligible to men and women of ordinary education who are not specialists.

CONTENTS.—The Breakdown of Tradition—The Conditions of Hopeful Reconstruction—Grounds of Belief in God—The Question of Revelation—The Contents of the Prophetic Faith—Revelation and Reason—The Historical Religion—Historical Worth of the New Testament—The Prejudice of Criticism—The Prejudice Examined—The Historical Evidence—Conclusion, etc.

"It is not too much to say, after reading this volume, that the Church will be materially and permanently indebted to him, if he is able to complete the programme he sets down with so much courage."—*Church Times.*

"With his habitual honesty he faces the facts of the present situation. . . . He is critical, to a degree that will startle some people even to-day, but he establishes the fact that in the Hebrew prophets, especially those of the great canonical sequence, there is, on the whole, a firm declaration at once of the righteousness and of the love of God, which could not be based on the superficial experiences of the time, and yet bears the impress of an 'experience of reality.'"—*Guardian.*

"But the first thing that strikes one about the book is its complete sincerity and naturalness. It is written with a fine reticence and restraint, partly temperamental, partly due to a high sense of responsibility."—*Christian World.*

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY

THE STORY OF THE PASSION

ITS OWN MESSAGE CONSIDERED IN SIMPLE ADDRESSES. By the Very Rev. Henry Wace, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. The author's purpose in this book is to elucidate the history of our Lord's Passion from the words of the Evangelists alone, to bring out into clear light the words that were uttered and the deeds that were done during that solemn day, and to leave them to make their own revelation. Those words and deeds bring us into the heights and depths of Divine and Human Life, and they afford the best evidence of our Christian Faith.

FAITH, BELIEF, AND PROOF

AN INQUIRY INTO THE SCIENCE OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. By the Rev. J. H. Beibitz, M.A., Vicar of All Saints, Warwick; Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Coventry; sometime Vice-Principal of Litchfield Theological College. With an Introduction by the Right Rev. Bishop Gore, D.D. This book is occupied with a criticism of the old so-called "proofs of the existence of God" in the light of recent scientific and philosophical thought. In the introductory chapter the writer seeks to distinguish between "belief" and "faith" as two different mental attitudes. The main thought running through the essay is the possibility of applying a tested scientific method to the subject matter of theology.

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY

BY THE REV. HENRY WACE

THE FOUNDATIONS OF FAITH.
Being the Bampton Lectures for 1879. 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

PROPHECY: JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN.
Considered in a Series of Warburton Lectures at Lincoln's Inn. 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST: ITS VITAL REALITY AND EFFICACY.
Reissued with New Introduction. 1*s.* net.

THE APOCRYPHA.
By Various Writers. Edited by the Very Rev. HENRY WACE, D.D. 2 vols. 50*s.* net.

MURRAY'S DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN BIOGRAPHY AND LITERATURE.
To the end of the Sixth Century A.D., with an account of the Principal Sects and Heresies. In 1 vol. 25*s.* net.

BY CHARLES GORE, D.D.,
Formerly Bishop of Oxford.

BELIEF IN GOD.
The Reconstruction of Belief. *7th Impression.* 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT.
A Practical Exposition. 5*s.* net.
Cheap Edition in paper covers, 1*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. 2 vols. 5*s.* net.

THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS. 5*s.* net.

THE EPISTLES OF ST. JOHN. 6*s.* net.

THE INCARNATION OF THE SON OF GOD.
Bampton Lectures, 1891. 5*s.* net.

DISSERTATIONS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE INCARNATION. 5*s.* net.

THE BODY OF CHRIST. 6*s.* net.

LUX MUNDI.
Edited by CHARLES GORE, D.D. A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation. By Various Writers. 6*s.* net.

By DEAN STANLEY.

SINAI AND PALESTINE
IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR HISTORY. With Maps, and Plans.

THE BIBLE IN THE HOLY LAND,
Being Extracts from the above Work for Young Persons. With Illustrations.

THOMAS ARNOLD:
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF. In Two Volumes, with Portrait. Also in one Volume, with Portrait and 16 half-tone Illustrations.

HISTORICAL MEMORIALS OF CANTERBURY.
With 24 Full-page Illustrations and 2 Plans, Large Crown 8vo. Also with Illustrations, Crown 8vo.

THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH CHURCH,
LECTURES ON. From Abraham to the Christian Era. With Portrait, Maps and Plans. In Three Volumes.

THE HISTORY OF THE EASTERN CHURCH,
LECTURES ON. With an Introduction on the Study of Ecclesiastical History, and a Map.

THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.
Lectures delivered in Edinburgh in 1872.

WESTMINSTER ABBEY:
HISTORICAL MEMORIALS OF. From its Foundation to the Year 1876. With Illustrations.

CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS.
Essays on Ecclesiastical Subjects.

ESSAYS CHIEFLY ON QUESTIONS OF CHURCH AND STATE FROM 1850 TO 1870.

ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY,
LETTERS AND VERSES OF. Edited by ROWLAND E. PROTHERO (Lord Ernle). A Companion Volume to the above.

ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY,
RECOLLECTIONS OF. Three Lectures delivered in Edinburgh, in November, 1882. By the Very Rev. DEAN BRADLEY. Second Edition.

JOHN MURRAY, Albemarle Street, LONDON, W.1.

THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

ALLEN, the Venble. Willoughby C., M.A.,
Archdeacon of Blackburn.

THE CHRISTIAN HOPE. Addresses, Sermons, and Popular Lectures. Crown 8vo, 5*s.* net.

ARNOLD, Matthew.

LITERATURE AND DOGMA. An Essay towards a better apprehension of the Bible. Crown 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

GOD AND THE BIBLE. A sequel to "Literature and Dogma." Crown 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

ST. PAUL AND PROTESTANTISM. With Other Essays. Crown 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

LAST ESSAYS ON CHURCH AND RELIGION. Crown 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

BEECHING, the Very Rev. H. C., M.A., D.Litt.,
Late Dean of Norwich.

THE BIBLE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS. Six Lectures given in Westminster Abbey. Crown 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE APOSTLES' CREED. Six Lectures delivered in Westminster Abbey. Large Crown 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

BENSON, the late Rev. Robert Hugh.

HUGH: MEMOIRS OF A BROTHER. By A. C. Benson. With Illustrations. Large Crown 8vo, 9*s.* net.

BIBLE COMMENTARY.

A COMMENTARY ON THE HOLY BIBLE, Explanatory and Critical, with a Revision of the Translation. By Bishops and Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M.A., late Canon of Exeter.

THE OLD TESTAMENT. 6 vols. Medium 8vo. Vol. I, 30*s.* net. Vol. II, 20*s.* net. Vol. III, 16*s.* net. Vol. IV, 24*s.* net. Vol. V, 20*s.* net. Vol. VI, 25*s.* net.

THE NEW TESTAMENT. 4 vols. Medium 8vo. Vol. I, 18*s.* net. Vol. II, 20*s.* net. Vol. III, 28*s.* net. Vol. IV, 28*s.* net.

THE APOCRYPHA. By various writers. Edited by the Rev. H Wace, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. 2 vols. Medium 8vo, 50*s.* net.

STUDENT'S COMMENTARY ON THE HOLY BIBLE. Abridged from the above Work. Edited by JOHN M. FULLER, M.A., Vicar of Bexley, and Professor of Ecclesiastical History, King's College, London. 6 vols. Crown 8vo, 7*s.* 6*d.* net each.

*** *Arrangements have been made with the booksellers enabling them to offer special terms for the above two works complete.*

BICKERSTETH, the Right Rev. Edward, D.D.,

Late Bishop of South Tokyo, Japan.

OUR HERITAGE IN THE CHURCH. Papers Written for Divinity Students in Japan. With a Preface by the late Right Rev. B. F. WESTCOTT, D.D. Large Crown 8vo, 5*s.* net.

LIFE AND LETTERS OF EDWARD BICKERSTETH, late Bishop of South Tokyo. With Map and Illustrations. Cheap Edition. Cr. 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net. Also an Ed., Demy 8vo, 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

BOYD-CARPENTER, the Right Rev. William, D.D.,

Late Bishop of Ripon.

A POPULAR HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. With Illustrations. Cheap Edition. Large Crown 8vo, 6*s.* net.

BROOKE, Rev. Stopford A.

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF THE REV. STOPFORD A. BROOKE. By LAWRENCE PEARSALL JACKS, M.A., Hon. LL.D., D.D., Principal of Manchester College, Oxford. With Portraits. 2 vols. Large Post 8vo, 15*s.* net.

BURKITT, F. Crawford,

Lecturer in Palæography in the University of Cambridge.

EARLY EASTERN CHRISTIANITY. St. Margaret's Lectures, 1904, on the Syriac-speaking Church. With Illustrations. Large Crown 8vo, 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

CAILLARD, Miss E. M.

A LIVING CHRISTIANITY. Crown 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

CARNEGIE, the Rev. W. H.,

Canon of Westminster.

CHURCHMANSHIP AND CHARACTER. Three Years' Teaching in Birmingham Cathedral. Crown 8vo, 5*s.* net.

PERSONAL RELIGION AND POLITICS. Crown 8vo, 6*s.* net.

CLARKE, Sir Edward, the Right Hon., P.C.

THE NEW TESTAMENT. The Authorised Version Corrected. The Text prepared by Sir Edward Clarke. Demy 8vo, 5*s.* net.

THE EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL. The Authorised Version Amended. The Text prepared by Sir Edward Clarke. Demy 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE BOOK OF PSALMS. The Prayer Book Version Corrected. The Text prepared by Sir Edward Clarke. F'cap 8vo, 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

CLARKE, the Rev. J. Langton, D.D.

THE ETERNAL SAVIOUR-JUDGE. Fresh Light and Comfort from the Holy Scriptures. With an Introduction by the Rev. J. R. ILLINGWORTH, D.D. Demy 8vo, 4*s.* net. Simplified Edition, Crown 8vo, 2*s.* net.

COHU, the Rev. J. R., M.A.

Rector of Aston Clinton, Bucks.

THE BIBLE AND MODERN THOUGHT. Demy 8vo, 16*s.* net.

COLLINS, the Right Rev. William Edward, D.D.,

Late Bishop of Gibraltar

HOURS OF INSIGHT and other Sermons. Crown 8vo, 5*s.* net.

CONTENTIO VERITATIS.

CONTENTIO VERITATIS. Essays in Constructive Theology. By SIX OXFORD TUTORS: the Rev. H. Rashdall, D.Litt., the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, the Rev. H. L. Wild, the Rev. C. F. Burney, the Rev. W. C. Allen, the Rev. A. J. Carlyle. A Revised Edition. Demy 8vo, 6*s.* net.

CUNNINGHAM, the Venble. W., D.D., F.B.A.,

Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Archdeacon of Ely.

CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICS. The Substance of the Lowell Lectures delivered at Boston, Mass., 1914. Demy 8vo, 6*s.* net.

EFFICIENCY IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. Some Remarks Occasioned by the Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church Finance. Crown 8vo, 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

DANNATT, William,

Of Great Waltham.

THE FAITH OF A FARMER. Extracts from his Diary, edited, with an Introduction, by J. G. MONTMORENCY, M.A., LL.B. Crown 8vo, 5*s.* net.

DEARMER, the Rev. Percy, D.D.

PATRIOTISM AND FELLOWSHIP. Crown 8vo, 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

DIFFICULTIES IN CHRISTIANITY.

A Letter to a Layman. In Paper Covers. Demy 8vo, 1*s.* net.

DIGBY, Mother Mabel.

MOTHER MABEL DIGBY, 1835—1911, Superior General of the Society of the Sacred Heart. By ANNE POLLEN. With a Preface by Cardinal BOURNE. Fourth Impression. With Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 16*s.* net.

DUCHESNE, Monsignor L.,

De l'Académie Française; Hon. D.Litt. Oxford, and Litt.D. Cambridge.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE CHURCH. From its Foundation to the End of the Fifth Century. Rendered into English from the Fourth Edition.

VOL. I. To End of Third Century. Demy 8vo, 12*s.* net.
VOL. II. Demy 8vo, 12*s.* net.

ERNLE, Lord.

THE PSALMS IN HUMAN LIFE. Enlarged Edition. Large Crown 8vo, 6*s.* net. New Pocket Edition. 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

EYRE, Douglas—Edited by,

Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law

REFORM IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. A Revised Edition of "Essays in Aid of the Reform of the Church." Crown 8vo, 5*s.* net.

FAWKES, Rev. Alfred, M.A.,

Vicar of Ashby St. Ledgers.

STUDIES IN MODERNISM. Demy 8vo, 10*s.* 6*d.* net.
THE THINGS THAT ARE CÆSAR'S. Thoughts on Church Reform. In Paper Covers. Demy 8vo, 1*s.* net.
CHURCH AND STATE IN ENGLAND. With a Preface by the BISHOP OF HEREFORD. In Paper Covers. Demy 8vo, 1*s.* net.

FLYNN, the Rev. John Stephen, M.A.,

Hon. Canon of Truro

THE INFLUENCE OF PURITANISM ON THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF THE ENGLISH. Demy 8vo, 5*s.* net.

The Life and Works of CHARLOTTE BRONTË

and her Sisters

EMILY AND ANNE BRONTË

HAWORTH EDITION

In seven volumes, with Introductions by Mrs. Humphry Ward, and Illustrated with Portraits and Views of places described in the books. A facsimile of the title page of the first edition is included in each volume. Large Crown 8vo.

1. **JANE EYRE.** By CHARLOTTE BRONTË.
2. **SHIRLEY.** By CHARLOTTE BRONTË.
3. **VILLETTE.** By CHARLOTTE BRONTË.
4. **THE PROFESSOR.** By CHARLOTTE BRONTË, and **POEMS,** by CHARLOTTE, EMILY, and ANNE BRONTË, and the REV. PATRICK BRONTË.
5. **WUTHERING HEIGHTS.** By EMILY BRONTË. **AGNES GREY.** By ANNE BRONTË.
6. **THE TENANT OF WILDFELL HALL.** By ANNE BRONTË.
7. **THE LIFE OF CHARLOTTE BRONTË.** By MRS. GASKELL. With an Introduction and Notes by CLEMENT K. SHORTER. With Photogravure Portraits and other Illustrations.

POPULAR EDITION.

7 volumes (as above). Small Post 8vo.

POEMS: Selections from the Poetry of Charlotte, Emily, Anne, and Branwell Brontë. Including some Poems hitherto unprinted. Edited by A. C. BENSON, with Portraits and two Facsimile MSS.

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY

THE CORNHILL MAGAZINE

1/6 net

MONTHLY

Edited by LEONARD HUXLEY, LL.D.

"Can a magazine have a soul? In turning over the pages of the hundred volumes of the 'Cornhill,' I have been on the search, and I believe I have found it. . . . The range of subjects is very wide, the methods of treatment are infinitely various. Politics and public affairs have for the most part been avoided, though the fringe of them is often touched. . . . The 'note' of the 'Cornhill' is the literary note, in the widest sense of the term; its soul is the spirit of that human culture, as Matthew Arnold describes it in the pages, reprinted from the 'Cornhill,' of 'Culture and Anarchy.'"—SIR E. T. COOK.

OPINIONS OF LIBRARIANS.

"I find upon inquiry at our five Libraries that the 'Cornhill' is well read, and certainly it appeals to a section of readers who can appreciate better literary fare than is offered in most of the modern monthlies. May I take this opportunity of expressing my own admiration for the high literary tone which you preserve in the 'Cornhill.'"

"My Committee are of opinion that there is room for one of its kind. (Personally, I think there is only one of the 'Cornhill' kind, and that is the 'Cornhill' itself.) I may say at once that the 'Cornhill' exactly meets the wants of a select body of readers."

"It is one of the few magazines of which a complete set is kept in stock for the benefit of borrowers."

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

"Cornhill is in a class by itself and is full of the most entertaining reading with real literary flavour."—*Liverpool Courier.*

"The counsel of perfection is to purchase the 'Cornhill,' that you may not only enjoy its contents but keep them to show a friend."—*Guardian.*

"Those of us who are not in the habit of reading the magazine will be well advised to repair the omission."—*Oxford Magazine.*

THE "CORNHILL" *can be obtained of all Booksellers and Newsagents, price* 1*s.* 6*d. net monthly. The Subscription for a year, including postage, is* 20*s.* 6*d.* (*Canada* 20*s.*)

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library
1 1012 01016 1141